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This dissertation examines the acquisition of a phenomenon that lies at the interface of logic and
grammar. Polarity-sensitive items (PSIs), including negative polarity items (NPIs) such as English any,
are often characterized by their restricted distribution, and analyzed in terms of their licensing condition
(compare John doesn’t have any books, where any is licensed by negation, with the unlicensed *John has
any books). Any moreover oscillates between NPI uses and so-called ‘free choice’ uses (John may choose
any book). While a small handful of previous acquisition studies on English any have targeted children’s
knowledge of the licensing condition, no previous study has systematically investigated children’s
knowledge of the complex underlying semantics of PSIs like any, let alone the question of how children
are to reconcile the dual nature of any. The series of studies in this dissertation presents novel evidence
from experiments and corpora demonstrating that children have incredibly sophisticated semantic
knowledge of any, which includes the ability to generate subdomain alternatives, to (pre-)exhaustify these
alternatives, to perform domain widening, and to compute so-called free choice inferences. Yet samples of
parental spontaneous production reveal very little evidence that could inform the learner as to how to
carry out the semantic operations required for adult-like interpretation of any. I propose that the solution
to this learning problem lies in innately constraining the hypothesis space of PSI types. Such a restricted
hypothesis space is available to us in the form of a generative typology put forth in Chierchia (2013), an
analysis that derives the possible classes of PSIs on the basis of free variation along two dimensions: the
kind of alternatives that the target PSI activates, and the mode of exhaustification that factors the
alternatives into meaning. On the assumption that these two dimensions are innately specified, only a
finite set of PSI types can be generated; I discuss how the learner might use any’s unique distributional
properties in the input to map the string any to the target PSI within the typology of restricted options.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

1.

Background

One of the central undertakings of cognitive science is to understand how we acquire knowledge. Language
acquisition in particular has been the focus of heated debate, generating a massive amount of research and
theorization over the past half century. For all of the productive research that has been carried out, and all the
progress that we have made in characterizing the child language development process, we are still struggling
with the so-called logical problem of language acquisition (cf. Chomsky, 1965, 1975). How do children, in
response to a finite set of input data from the environment, generalize to a complete set of grammatical
representations that for all intents and purposes mirrors that of their caregivers?
For all of the progress that researchers have made toward answering the learnability questions for
specific pockets of linguistic phenomena (e.g., constraints on pronominal interpretation, quantifier scope
relations, argument structure, question formation, etc.), there remains contentious back-and-forth between
the so-called nativist generative approach, which explains a great deal of children’s success by appealing to
innate acquisition mechanisms and linguistic knowledge, and domain-general approaches to language
learning that posit acquisition on the basis of sensitivity to statistical regularities in the input. Of course these
labels are overly general, and there are indeed pockets of research that attempt to bridge the gap by more
rigorously investigating the interaction of the input data with the hypotheses that children purportedly must
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entertain (cf. for example Yang, 2004 and Pinker, 1979); such attempts also more recently include targeted
investigations of how a learner uses the linguistic input to arrive at the correct generalizations (cf. Lidz and
Gagliardi, to appear; Gagliardi, 2012; Viau & Lidz, 2011; Omaki, 2010; Pearl & Lidz, 2009). Wherever this
recent trend will take us, it is clear that for the moment the ‘nature vs. nurture’ debate is far from settled. In
fact, in recent years, the debate has intensified, partly due to discoveries that children can in fact learn certain
linguistic properties from statistical regularities in the input (cf. Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996).
Against this background, I want to tackle two general issues in this dissertation. First, many of the
developments in the field, including a recent shift to consider more and more seriously the possibility of
language acquisition without innate abstract principles, have generally played out in the domain of syntax; I
believe we are missing an important part of the picture by (relatively) neglecting the semantic component of
the grammar.1 Second, I will use the acquisition of a semantic phenomenon to address the so-called Poverty
of the Stimulus (Chomsky, 1965, 1975). I will attempt to show that when we examine the semantic
component of the grammar the way that we have the syntactic component, we find compelling evidence for
a poverty of the stimulus argument. Yet there is a subtle tension here: whatever degree of impoverishment
we want to ascribe to the input, the plain fact of the matter is that the input cannot be insufficiently rich, for
the normally developing child inevitably acquires the target grammar. This tension between an input that at
first glance may appear insufficiently rich, and the ultimate success that the child learner achieves, is in very
broad terms what I will address in this dissertation.
Going beyond the word level, i.e. lexical development, semantics/pragmatics is generally understudied
within generative acquisition work. Notable exceptions include in-depth examinations of: quantifier scope
interactions (cf. Gualmini, 2004; Lidz & Musolino, 2002; Miller & Schmitt, 2004; Musolino 1998;
Musolino & Lidz, 2002, 2003, 2006), logical operators (disjunction, negation, conjunction, conditionals)
(cf. Crain & Thornton, 2006 for a nice overview), scalar implicatures (cf. among many others, Chierchia et
al., 2001; Gualmini et al., 2001; Guasti et al., 2005; Pouscoulous et al., 2007; Papafragou & Musolino,
2003), presupposition (Legendre, 2011; Yatsushiro, 2008a,b), and children’s development of Theory of
Mind (cf. Tager-Flusberg et al., 1997; Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Perner, 1988; Fodor, 1992; de Villiers,
2007). While these few topics have been the subject of intense study, it is generally the case that what
researchers have relied on to argue for or against innate language-specific knowledge is evidence from
syntax and syntactic development. While there are studies that target semantic phenomena, these have
generally focused more on whether children are adult-like, than on how children can acquire the relevant
phenomena. Perhaps it is because meaning is generally conceived of as much more transparent than
underlying syntactic structure, and so one tends to take it for granted that children can and will learn ‘all
the right meanings’ on the basis of evidence in the input.
1
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2.

Outline of the Study

The semantic phenomenon I will investigate is the semantics of so-called negative polarity items (NPIs).
What most of the literature on negative polarity has focused on is the observation that NPIs like English any
need to be “licensed” (compare (1) and (2)). One prominent account of NPI licensing is the Fauconnier/
Ladusaw hypothesis, according to which NPIs are licensed when they appear in the scope of a downwardentailing operator, i.e. an operator that licenses subset inferences.

(1) Alexandre did not attend any lectures.
(2) *Alexandre attended any lectures.

But adult-like knowledge of any entails knowing much more than its restricted distribution; in particular it
entails a fair amount of sophisticated semantic knowledge (i.e. the key semantic mechanisms that underlie
any’s restricted distribution). This dissertation will present a series of experimental and corpus studies meant
to probe for this semantic knowledge; moreover these studies will all constitute steps towards a discussion of
the learning problem that polarity sensitive items (PSIs) like any pose to the child learner.
Chapter 2 will start the ball rolling by presenting the object of study, namely the PSI any, and how this
item is represented in the adult grammar. I’ll present some prominent accounts of the NPI any from the
theoretical literature, as well as the ingredients we’ll need to investigate children’s knowledge of NPI any.
The key is to clearly define the adult grammar, as we take it to be the target of acquisition for the child
learner. With this goal in mind, Chapter 2 will also present an experiment designed to tap into adults’
intuitions concerning a particular property of any, namely that of domain widening. This experiment will
investigate adults’ sensitivity to the nature of any’s semantic alternatives, how these alternatives are factored
into meaning, i.e. exhaustified, and how any’s domain of quantification contrasts with more restricted ones
of plain indefinites like a and bare plurals.
Once we have a proper characterization of the adult grammar with respect to any, we’ll move on to a
discussion of the child data. Chapter 3 will begin by reviewing previous acquisition studies of 3-, 4-, and 5year-olds’ knowledge of any. In particular, I will argue that these studies overlooked the semantics of any,
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and thus their claims of target performance cannot be equated with a claim that 4-year-olds have (complete)
target knowledge of any. To rectify this, I will present an experiment that demonstrates that most (though not
all) 4-year-olds have very sophisticated semantic knowledge that allows them to interpret any in an adultlike manner: they are able to identify the nature of any’s alternatives, generating them from the context; they
are able to perform an exhaustification operation over these alternatives; moreover, they are sensitive to
contrastive focus and can contrast any’s domain of quantification with more restricted domains available in
the context.
In Chapter 4, I continue in the same vein by presenting novel experimental evidence that 4-year-olds are
also adult-like in their comprehension of any on its so-called “free choice” instantiation (3); children can
compute “free choice inferences” like that in (3), interpreting any in modal contexts in an adult-like way:

(3) You may write your paper on any topic.
You may write your paper on topic A, and you may write your paper on topic B, and you may
write your paper on topic C, ...

In Chapter 5, I present the learning problem that the child learner faces: on the one hand, we will by that
point have accumulated a great deal of evidence that children are target-like both in their production and
comprehension of any. On the other hand, I will present an analysis of parental speech samples that reveal
very little to no direct evidence for the semantic mechanisms and operations that would be required for
children to display such target-like performance on our experiments. To solve this learning problem, I look
to Chierchia’s (2013) theory-driven typology of the kinds of PSIs that we can expect to find within and
across languages. According to Chierchia, PSIs can differ along two dimensions: the kinds of alternatives
that they activate, and the modes of exhaustification that use up those alternatives (and factor them into the
meaning of the sentence). I argue that these two dimensions must be innately specified, such that the child
only has to consider a restricted space of possible PSI categories; more specifically, these two dimensions
and their respective range of parametric variation will only generate a restricted set of possible categories.
The child’s task is to use the unique distribution of any in the input (for which there is indeed observable
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evidence) to map any to the target PSI within the typology of restricted options. The dissertation will close
with discussion of some open questions, as well as some predictions of the proposed account.
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Chapter 2
NPI any in the Adult Grammar

1.

Introduction

In this chapter, we will begin our study in earnest by establishing the target grammar to be acquired by the
child; after all, only once we have established an adequate characterization of the target structures can we
begin to fully investigate the learning task that faces the child learner.
A great deal of literature has focused on the restricted distribution of the negative polarity item (NPI)
any, attempting to derive appropriate licensing conditions that can capture its restricted distribution. Section
2 of this chapter will review some previous approaches to any, including a recent compositional
implementation of any’s semantics. Section 3 will present an experiment designed to resolve some
controversy surrounding any’s semantic contribution.

2.

Theories of Negative Polarity Item any

Much of the literature on NPIs has focused on the fact that NPIs like any have a restricted distribution: they
must be ‘licensed’ where they appear. While I will briefly describe that restricted distribution in this section,
highlighting one prominent line of proposals concerning any’s licensing condition, the focus of this
dissertation is on any’s semantics. The key semantic property of any that I will focus on, i.e. domain
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widening, can, at least descriptively, be discussed independently of the particular view of licensing that one
chooses to adopt; this is because any account of licensing must contend with the domain widening facts. In
this chapter, I will present one particular approach to licensing that successfully ties licensing to the domain
widening semantics of any. But the child data that we will subsequently discuss will not hinge on a
particular account of NPI licensing, and any learnability story will ultimately have to contend with how
children acquire the semantics of any, regardless of the particular account of NPI licensing adopted.

2.1

NPI Licensing

Any is licensed in the scope of negation in (1), but is ill-formed in the affirmative declarative sentence in (2).

(1) Alexandre did not attend any lectures.
(2) *Alexandre attended any lectures.

Given this pattern of behaviour, any is a so-called NPI; its distribution appears restricted to “negative”
environments, and it is almost always acceptable under negation. The set of licensing environments for any
extends well beyond negation however, as seen in (3)-(8).

(3) Nobody has any idea where Mathieu and Sophie have gone.
(4) Every Bluth Company investor who has any sense will sell their stock.
(5) If anybody wants office space, there is a free room down the hall.
(6) I regret giving Sasha any of my money.
(7) Did anybody survive the zombie apocalypse?
(8) I wonder whether Ron has any eggs.

A great deal of the extensive literature on NPI licensing has therefore been devoted to characterizing those
environments which do appear to license NPIs like any (see among others, Fauconnier, 1975, 1979;
Ladusaw, 1979; Linebarger, 1987; Heim, 1984; Horn, 1989; Kadmon & Landman, 1993; Krifka, 1995;
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Giannakidou, 1998). One very productive line of research is built upon the Fauconnier-Ladusaw hypothesis,
according to which NPIs are licensed by downward-entailing (DE) operators such as negation (Ladusaw,
1979, a.o.). A DE operator is one which has the logical property of validating set-to-subset inferences (9).
According to the Fauconnier-Ladusaw proposal (10), NPIs are licensed in the scope of such DE expressions.

(9) A function of type <σ,τ> is downward entailing iff for all x,y of type σ such that x⇒y:
f(y)⇒f(x).
(10)An NPI is only grammatical if it is in the scope of an α such that [[α]] is downward-entailing.
(von Fintel, 1999:100)

While the affirmative (11a) entails (11b), the addition of negation, a DE operator, reverses the direction of
entailment such that truth is preserved when moving from the superset (12a) to the subset (12b).

(11)a. Alexandre is a father
b. ⇒ Alexandre is a man
(12)a. Alexandre is not a man
b. ⇒ Alexandre is not a father

The negative quantifier no NP is DE (13) and licenses any (14), while the existential quantifier some NP is
not DE (15) and fails to license any (16).

(13)

No students read novels ⇒ No students read fantasy novels

(14)

No students saw any movies over the weekend

(15)

Some students read novels

(16)

*Some students saw any movies over the weekend

Some students read fantasy novels
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Other examples of licensing environments include the restrictor of universal quantifiers, antecedents of
conditionals, the scope of adversative predicates such as regret and sorry, the scope of only, superlatives,
and matrix and embedded polar questions.
A number of any’s licensing environments have been shown not to be strictly DE, and thus have been
cited as counterevidence to the DE hypothesis (cf. Linebarger, 1987 for extensive discussion of noted
counterexamples). (17) for example shows that only is not strictly DE, despite licensing any (18).

(17)a. Only Ethan read a book
b.
(18)

Only Ethan read a linguistics book
Only Ethan has any linguistics training

von Fintel (1999) argues that the presuppositional content of the expressions involved interferes with the
evaluation of the relevant DE inferences. (17b) for example, presupposes that Ethan read a linguistics book,
and failure to satisfy this presupposition interferes with our evaluation of the entailment relation in (17). von
Fintel proposes the modified notion of downward entailment in (19), according to which DEness is
evaluated on the assumption that all the conventional implicatures and presuppositions of the premises and
conclusion are satisfied:

(19)

Strawson downward entailment
A function of type <σ,τ> is Strawson-DE iff for all x,y of type σ such that x⇒y and f(x) is
defined: f(y)⇒f(x).
(von Fintel, 1999:104)

By adding the definedness condition in (19), von Fintel eliminates the problem of having to judge truth
values in contexts containing unsatisfied presuppositions. Indeed we see that once we add the premise that
the conclusion’s presupposition in (17) is satisfied, i.e. that it is true that Ethan read a linguistics book (in
addition to the presupposition that a linguistics book is a book), the entailment goes through without issue:
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(20)

A linguistics book is a book
Ethan read a linguistics book
Only Ethan read a book
∴ Only Ethan read a linguistics book

While debates over adequate licensing conditions are far from definitively settled, von Fintel’s
(Strawson-)DE account appears to be sufficient for the purposes of capturing the restricted distribution of
the English NPI any, and thus we will adopt it here in our discussion of children’s acquisition of negative
polarity. 1 Any differences among alternative accounts of licensing will not play a substantive role in the
discussion (nor will I aim to use the child data to tease apart alternative accounts of licensing). In the coming
chapters, I will separate children’s acquisition of the licensing condition, i.e. of any’s restricted distribution,
from their acquisition of any’s semantic contribution, i.e. its meaning. Insofar as these are discussed
separately, any adequate account of NPI licensing in the adult grammar will suffice for the discussion.

1

Rather than modify the relevant notion of DEness, alternative licensing accounts instead attribute
licensing to properties other than DEness. Giannakidou (1998, 2011) for example, attributes licensing to
the property of non-veridicality, defined for propositional operators as follows:
(i) A propositional operator F is veridical iff Fp entails or presupposes that p is true in some
individual’s model M(x); p is true in M(x), if M(x)⊂p.
(ii) If (i) is not the case, F is nonveridical.
(Giannakidou, 2011:1676)
As we obtain more diverse data sets from cross-linguistic investigations of NPIs, it may become apparent
that different approaches fare better with different languages. In Mandarin Chinese for example, noninterrogative uses of the wh-indefinite shenme ‘what’ are claimed to be subject to a ‘weaker’ licensing
condition than any, namely non-veridicality (Lin, Weerman, & Zeijlstra, 2013; cf. also Liao, 2011). I leave
the issue of cross-linguistic variation aside until Chapter 5, where we discuss how the cross-linguistic
picture bears on the learnability of polarity sensitivity. There however, focusing on the semantics of
negative polarity, I will adopt an exhuastification-based framework posited to capture cross-linguistic
variation in the polarity sensitivity system; thus I will not go any further into non-veridicality here.
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2.2 The Semantics of any
2.2.1 Domain Widening
Kadmon and Landman’s (1993) paper was a hallmark attempt to explain why NPIs ought to be sensitive to a
logical notion such as downward entailment. According to Kadmon and Landman’s influential thesis, we
can derive the restricted distribution of any by looking at a quirk of its quantificational properties: any
widens previously restricted domains of quantification along contextually given dimensions, giving rise to
an apparently reduced tolerance of exceptions. Consider the following example:

(21)

[Conversation in a department store]
A: Do you have a camera? / Do you have cameras?
B: No.
A: Nothing too fancy, even a disposable camera will do.
B: I don’t have ANY cameras.

Imagine that the initial domain of quantification starting with A’s query is set to cameras of a decent grade
that one might look to purchase in a department store, e.g., one that by contextually determined
technological standards, includes only digital cameras of a decent grade, and excludes one-time-use
disposable cameras. The observation is that B’s final assertion (containing any) quantifies over a wider
domain that has in fact been expanded to include even basic disposable cameras, which were initially treated
as exceptions to the domain. That is, B’s final assertion “widens” the domain of quantification such that
disposable cameras no longer count as exceptions to the claim that B does not have cameras.2 This latter

2

Notice that B could also reply with: In that case, yes, I have some. This suggests that the initially
restricted domain did not include disposable cameras (hence B’s initial negative response), but was
subsequently expanded to include disposable cameras (hence B’s changing his response to yes).
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point exemplifies Kadmon and Landman’s observation that any is somehow less tolerant of exceptions to
the domain.3
The typical cases of “widening” provided in the literature involve this kind of contrast between the
wider domain of any and a more restricted initial domain of quantification. Any, however, can be uttered out
of the blue, and in such contexts, the domain of quantification can be set any which way (Chierchia, 2013).
In (22) for example, the customer can issue his initial query using any rather than the plain indefinite a; in
such a case, the initial domain could still exclude disposable cameras (i.e. it might still be restricted to digital
cameras of a decent grade that one might expect to buy in a department store); the dialogue could continue
as it did in (21), with the final use of any still quantifying over a wider domain.

(22)

[Conversation in a department store]
A: Do you have any cameras?
B: No.
A: Nothing too fancy, even a disposable camera will do.
B: I don’t have ANY cameras.
B’: Oh, in that case, yes, I have some.

According to Kadmon and Landman’s analysis, the key to licensing any is the following: widening must
yield a stronger assertion. That is, the statement on the “widened” interpretation (i.e. after domain widening)
must entail the statement on the narrower interpretation. Any is licensed under negation because negatively
quantifying over a larger domain yields a stronger assertion than the same assertion quantifying over a

3

Of course it is A’s preceding utterance that first introduces disposable cameras to the domain of discourse;
the point however is that while any can quantify over the wider domain (which now includes disposable
cameras), a regular plain indefinite like a cannot (Chierchia, 2013):
(i) A:
B:
A:
B:

Do you have a camera?
No.
Nothing too fancy, even a disposable camera will do.
#I don’t have A camera!
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narrower domain. Notice the contrast between the direction of entailment in the affirmative, upwardentailing (UE) (23) and that in the negative, DE (24):

(23)a. I saw a student [D: in the UConn linguistics lounge]
b. I saw a student [D’: in the UConn linguistics building]
c. I saw a student [D’’: on the UConn campus]
(24)a. I didn’t see a student [D’’: on the UConn campus]
b. I didn’t see a student [D’: in the UConn linguistics building]
c. I didn’t see a student [D: in the UConn linguistics lounge]

(where D⊂D’⊂D’’)

The direction of entailment in (23) goes from (23a) through to (23c); the strongest assertion one can make,
given these three alternatives, is the one quantifying over the narrowest domain. If I saw a student where the
set of contextually relevant students are those in the linguistics lounge, then it is also true that I saw a
student in the linguistics building, and likewise it is true that I saw a student where the set of students I have
in mind are those on campus. But negation reverses the direction of entailment in (24) such that the
strongest assertion of the three alternatives is the one that quantifies over the largest domain, i.e. it entails the
other two alternatives. If I did not see any students on campus, then it follows that I did not see any students
in the linguistics building or in the linguistics lounge.
Thus under Kadmon and Landman’s story, any widens the domain of quantification, and is licensed
under negation (and other DE operators) because it is precisely in these environments that widening results
in a stronger assertion. Kadmon and Landman rooted these properties in the lexical semantics of any and did
not develop a compositional analysis of its behaviour. 4

4

Lee and Horn (1994) also converge on this characterization of ‘widening’, but induce the widening effect
through the use of an underlying even. It is this silent even that is responsible for triggering expansion of
the set to include unlikely and atypical exemplars. Under this account, NPI any denotes a low endpoint on
a scale of quantities, and under negation triggers a meaning akin to ‘not even a single X’ or ‘not even the
least bit of X’.
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Krifka (1995), building on similar intuitions regarding the strengthening effect of any, links domain
widening to quantity implicatures. He assumes that NPIs introduce alternatives, and moreover that these
alternatives induce an ordering relation of semantic specificity, with the NPI denoting the most specific
element of these alternatives. Anything yields the assertive content of thing, but because of its alternatives,
further triggers an implicature that the assertion containing any is the strongest of the alternatives. 5 In
positive environments, negating semantically stronger alternatives yields a contradiction, while in scalereversing/DE environments, the assertion and the implicature are consistent. In more recent work building
on the earlier insights behind Kadmon and Landman’s and Krifka’s proposals, Chierchia (2006, 2013)
provides a compositional implementation of any’s semantics.6 Under this analysis, any is truth-conditionally
equivalent to plain indefinites (like some or a) (25), but activates a set of alternatives corresponding to the
indefinite associated with more restricted domains of quantification available in the context, i.e. its
subdomain alternatives (26):

(25)

||any|| = ||some|| = λPλQ∃x∈D[Pw(x)&Qw(x)]

(26)

||any||D-ALT = ||some||D-ALT = {someD’: D’⊆D}
(Chierchia, 2006; 2013)

Crucially, active alternatives must be factored into meaning. This is carried out through the use of
exhaustification operators. In the case of NPIs like any, subdomain alternatives are exhaustified via a covert
only-like operator (27).7 Exhaustification via O eliminates any alternatives that are not entailed by the
assertion, yielding the consequence that the assertion is stronger than all of the activated alternatives.

5

In a similar vein, Lahiri (1998) proposes that the lexical meaning of any includes a component similar to
the focus particle even.
6

Chierchia’s account of any is part of a larger proposal that attempts to reconcile different polaritysensitive elements (NPIs, free choice items, negative concord items, etc.) within a recursive compositional
system of scalar implicatures. We will focus here on his implementation of any as an NPI, and turn to free
choice any in Chapter 4.
7

Covert O and only differ in that O asserts rather than presupposes the truth of its prejacent. This
difference will not bear on the present discussion.
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(27)

Oc(p) = p & ∀q∈C [q → p⊆Cq], where C=ALT
(Chierchia, 2006; 2013)

In Chierchia’s analysis, any bears a [+D(omain)] feature which must be checked by an exhaustifying
operator that bears the same feature (i.e. ODA, which operates over domain alternatives). Obligatory
exhaustification is thusly encoded in the syntax. Semantically, any can only occur in DE environments
because these are the environments that satisfy the requirements of the exhaustification operator; in a nonDE environment, exhaustification will yield a logical contradiction. Take the sentence in (28a), which
corresponds to the literal meaning in (28b). The alternatives that any activates correspond to all the possible
ways of dividing up the domain D into smaller subdomains (e.g., smaller subdomains of novels in D, let’s
say fantasy novels, sci-fi novels, and romance novels), represented schematically in (28c). (28a) essentially
amounts to saying that John has one or more novels in D (i.e. one or more fantasy, sci-fi, or romance novels)
(28d). The problem arises when we attempt to exhaustify the alternatives (28e). Negating the stronger
alternatives amounts to saying that John doesn’t have any of the specific kinds of novels, which is in
contradiction to the assertion that he does have one or more of these novels (28f). 8

(28)a. *John has any novels
b. ∃x∈D[novelw(x)∧havew(j,x)]
c.

{f,s,r}
{f,s}

{s,r}

{f,r}

{f}

{s}

{r}

d. [novelw(f)∧hasw(j,f)] ˅ [novelw(s)∧hasw(j,s)] ˅ [novelw(r)∧hasw(j,r)]
e. ODA([∃x∈D[novelw(x)∧havew(j,x)])

8

Generalizing, in any UE environment, none of the alternatives will be entailed by the assertion and will
have to be eliminated, yielding a logical contradiction. While the [+D] feature on any can still be checked
by the O operator, i.e. satisfying the syntactic requirement, exhaustification will fail to yield a consistent
semantics, i.e. failing to satisfy the semantic requirement of NPI licensing. It is the latter that makes any
ungrammatical in UE environments.
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f.

[novelw(f)∧hasw(j,f)] ˅ [novelw(s)∧hasw(j,s)] ˅ [novelw(r)∧hasw(j,r)]
∧ ¬([novelw(f)∧hasw(j,f)]) ∧ ¬([novelw(s)∧hasw(j,s)]) ∧ ¬([novelw(r)∧hasw(j,r)])
(adapted from Chierchia, 2013:166, Ex. 45)

Exhaustification is consistent however, in a DE environment (29a,b). Again, the set of subdomain
alternatives correspond to the more restricted domains of quantification in the context, yielding the assertion
in (29c). In this case, as in any DE environment, the relevant alternatives are all entailed, so exhaustification
does not yield a logical contradiction (29d). If John doesn’t have any novels, it follows that he doesn’t have
any specific kinds of novels. In other words, (29a) has the effect of a plain negative existential statement.

(29)a. John doesn’t have any novels
b. ¬∃x∈D[novelw(x)∧havew(j,x)]
c. ¬([novelw(a)∧havew(j,a)] ˅ [novelw(b)∧havew(j,b)] ˅ [novelw(c)∧havew(j,c)])
d. ODA(¬∃x∈D[novelw(x)∧havew(j,x)])
= ¬∃x∈D[novelw(x)∧havew(j,x)]
(adapted from Chierchia, 2013:166, Ex. 47)

To summarize then, any is lexically specified to trigger obligatory exhaustification of its subdomain
alternatives. This exhaustification succeeds in DE environments but fails in non-DE environments.

2.2.2 Problems
Despite the fairly strong intuitions behind the domain widening thesis, some have objected that domain
widening can’t be central to any, because it does not arise as systematically as claimed. The objection is that
when we go beyond the clean minimal pair examples in the literature (e.g., I don’t have a potato vs. I don’t
have ANY potatoes), judgments are not as clearcut as expected. As Arregui (2008) points out, plain
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indefinites may not always restrict even when there is a salient restriction in the context (30), and any may
not always widen as expected (31).

(30)

A friend approaches you at a barbecue with a plate of veggie burgers he has recently finished
cooking. They are burnt.
Your friend: Do you want veggie burgers?
You: No thanks, I don’t want veggie burgers.
(Arregui, 2008:48, Ex. 9)

(31)

You: Do you know French writers or singers?
Me: I don’t know any writers, but I know singers. (=I don’t know any French writers)
(Arregui, 2008:51, Ex. 17)

In (30), the bare plural veggie burgers in the second utterance seems not to be restricted to the salient set of
burnt veggie burgers; in (31), uttering any does not seem to expand the domain of writers beyond French
ones. 9
In her objections, Arregui rightly argues that her data reveal a disconcerting lack of categorical
difference between regular indefinites and any indefinites. She suggests that we need more systematically
collected data that speak to the predicted differences between plain indefinites and any. Under the Kadmon
and Landman-/Krifka-/Chierchia branch of accounts, and given the objections raised by Arregui, what we
can safely say is that any has the potential to quantify over “larger” domains than plain indefinites; that is,
any can but need not always quantify over wider domains. So when we refer to the ‘domain widening’
property of any, what we really mean to refer to is a potential for domain widening. Moreover, the problem
seems to be that a satisfying explanation of why any is licensed in DE environments, even one that links its

9

In a somewhat similar vein of objections, see also Duffley and Larrivée (2010) for an argument that the
scalar endpoint meaning of any, i.e. the even the least/even a single meaning apparent in the typical
examples of domain widening, is not a part of any’s core meaning. Rather, these authors argue that the
scalar meaning arises as a product of the interaction of the NPI with contextual factors.
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restricted distribution to its semantics, does not on its own appear to be sufficient to systematically capture
when domain widening does and does not occur.
It is difficult to systematically compare “potential” domain sizes without controlling for what sets of
individuals count as relevant in a particular context. This is where careful semantic/pragmatic
experimentation that can systematically control for relevant subdomain alternatives can fill a critical gap.
What is required is a way to systematically evoke categorically different responses to any compared to plain
indefinites. Yet there has been relatively little psycholinguistic study investigating domain widening with
any. One problem is that it is not a trivial task to get exactly at domain widening and not some possibly
confounding phenomenon (such as the scope of any relative to licensers within the relevant sentences).
In the next section, I describe a study that was designed to meet the need for systematically elicited
judgments about domain widening. The experiment was devised to measure the relative degree to which
participants could restrict the domain of quantification for different indefinites, namely any, a, and bare
plurals. What we wanted to know was whether, when provided with clearly defined subdomain alternatives
in the context, adults would interpret any as quantifying over larger domains than plain indefinites.

3.

Experiment 1: Evidence for Domain Widening

3.1

Method

3.1.1 Subjects
We tested 145 adult native speakers of English (99 females, 46 males). All participants were undergraduate
linguistics/psychology students at the University of Connecticut or the University of Maryland. Participants
were paid $10 or received course credit for participating. All were native English speakers according to the
information filled out on the consent forms.
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3.1.2 Procedure
We tested adults’ interpretations of negatively quantified sentences containing different indefinites using the
Truth Value Judgment Task (TVJT) methodology (Crain & Thornton, 1998, 2000). The task was carried out
by a single experimenter using a laptop computer. Stories were told (by the experimenter) using cartoon
pictures and animations created and displayed in PowerPoint. Pre-recorded video clips of a puppet created
the pretense that the puppet was participating in the task live via webcam. Participants were told that the
puppet was not very good at paying attention to stories, and were given a scorecard to fill out, with the goal
of helping the puppet to learn how to pay better attention. At the end of each story, the puppet was asked a
question about the story. The participant’s task was to determine whether the puppet’s statement was ‘right’,
in which case s/he was instructed to put a stamp under the ‘smiley face’ column of the scorecard. If the
puppet was ‘wrong’, the participant was instructed to put a stamp under the ‘sad face’ column of the report
card. We also elicited follow-up justifications from subjects to ascertain their reasons for providing yes or no
responses. All subjects were tested individually. Sessions were videorecorded for subsequent coding and
analysis.
One of the reasons for using this child-friendly (TVJT) method was that we wanted to be able to
eventually replicate the experiment with young children. Subjects were told of this in advance of starting the
experiment so that they were not thrown off by the puppet ruse or use of the scorecard.

3.1.3 Materials
We designed experimental situations that made negatively quantified statements felicitous. The context
clearly provided different possible (sub)domains of quantification. On the critical test trials, the context
would also make one of these possible subdomains highly salient; importantly, the relevant subdomain was
not the largest of the possible domain alternatives but rather a restricted subdomain. Depending on whether
subjects accepted the negatively quantified test sentence, we could infer whether they were associating the
relevant indefinite with the more restricted subdomain, or whether it had to quantify over a larger domain
alternative. Acceptances or rejections of the puppet’s statements, along with appropriate follow-up
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justifications, were taken as a measure of subjects’ ability to restrict the domain of quantification to just the
salient subdomain.
Each subject received two training items, followed by four test and four control items, which were
randomized and counterbalanced. The four test trials varied in the dimension along which widening could
be expected (colour, pattern, size, and texture). An example test story is provided in Fig. 1.

Fig. 1. Experiment 1: Example test story
(Slide 1/8)
”This story is about Donald and Daisy. They’re doing
some puzzles. See, they have to put a wooden star here, a
metal star here, and a fuzzy star here.
Oh no! The puzzle box is empty! Where all the pieces?”

(Slide 2/8)
“Silly Goofy! He’s taken all the puzzle pieces and hidden
them all over the attic! If Donald and Daisy want to finish
their puzzles, they’re going to have to find some stars!”
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(Slide 3/8)
“Can you find all the wooden stars? Can you find all the
metal stars? What about the fuzzy stars? They’re all the
way up on the clock! Good job. Let’s see if Donald and
Daisy can find them.”

(Slide 4/8)
“Donald and Daisy find all the wooden stars and all the
metal stars!”

(Slide 5/8)
“They can fit their wooden stars and their metal stars
perfectly! What they each need to finish their puzzle is a
fuzzy star.”
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(Slide 6/8)
“But Goofy did a really good job hiding the fuzzy stars up
on the clock. Donald and Daisy look and look but they
can’t find the fuzzy stars!”

Slide (7/8)
“So they can’t finish their puzzles. Let’s ask Froggy
why.”

(Slide 8/8)
“EXP: Hey Froggy, why can’t Donald and Daisy finish
their puzzles?

(i)
(ii)
(iii)

‘Hmm... Donald and Daisy both can’t find any stars!‘
‘Hmm... Donald and Daisy both can’t find a star!‘
‘Hmm... Donald and Daisy both can’t find stars!‘
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(ANY condition)
(A condition)
(BARE PLURAL condition)”

In this test story, the domain of quantification consists of a set of nine stars which vary along the
contextually determined dimension of texture, i.e. there are three wooden stars, three metal stars, and three
fuzzy stars. The largest domain of quantification in this context is the one containing all nine stars. Possible
subdomain alternatives in this context include: {wooden stars}, {wooden stars, metal stars}, {metal stars,
fuzzy stars}, {fuzzy stars}, etc. In the story, Mickey and Minnie have to find the stars in order to finish a
puzzle; at a critical juncture of the story, it is established that though they have been successful in finding the
wooden stars and the metal stars, they cannot finish their puzzles because they cannot find the fuzzy stars.
Thus what is at issue revolves around just one particular subdomain alternative (e.g., the fuzzy stars). At this
point, a puppet appears on the screen to answer a question about the story: Why can’t they finish their
puzzles? with a negatively quantified sentence containing one of the indefinites: “Mickey and Minnie both
can’t find any stars!”/“Mickey and Minnie both can’t find a star!”/“Mickey and Minnie both can’t find
stars!” The participant’s task was to decide if the puppet’s statement was correct (Did he say the right
thing?). If participants restricted the domain of the relevant indefinite to a smaller subdomain alternative
(i.e. the fuzzy stars), they were expected to accept the statement; if the indefinite had to quantify over a
larger domain, they were expected to reject the statement.
The primary comparison of interest is that between any and plain indefinites, as any is argued to
quantify more widely. Claims that any widens the domain rely on it doing so in contrast to plain indefinites
like a or some. First, we chose to compare any to a for the following reason: we chose to use negative test
sentences, as negation is the most frequent licenser of any. The test sentences were then designed to be
identical across conditions save for the indefinite: since some resists the scope of negation, and any is only
good in the scope of negation, we chose to use a, which allows a narrow scope reading. But the use of a
gives rise to a potential scope confound: a wide-scope, specific reading of a above negation yields the same
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response as a narrow scope reading of a with a restricted domain of quantification. Bare plurals on the other
hand, resist wide scope (Carlson, 1977), and thus provide a control for the scope confound.10,11
The critical test sentences from the four test trials, along with the final slides that subjects saw when
hearing the test sentence, are provided in Table 1.

10

For example, the following examples from Carlson (1977) show that the wide scope reading which is
available with a in (i) is unavailable with the bare plural in (ii).
(i) Minnie wishes to talk with a young psychiatrist
(a) (∃sg x) (young psychiatrist(x) & Minnie wishes Minnie talk with x)
(b) Minnie wishes (∃sg x) (young psychiatrist(x) & Minnie talk with x)
(ii) Minnie wishes to talk with young psychiatrists
(a) #(∃pl x) (young psychiatrist(x) & Minnie wishes Minnie talk with x)
(b) Minnie wishes (∃pl x) (young psychiatrist(x) & Minnie talk with x)
(Carlson, 1977:417)
Carlson goes on to show that the unavailability of the wide scope reading cannot lie in the plurality marker,
since other plurally quantified NPs (many/all/twelve/a few/most psychiatrists) exhibit a similar scope
ambiguity as that displayed in (i). Similar contrasts can be observed in the following examples:
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)

(a) Max believes a Commie to have robbed Macy’s.
(b) Max believes Commies to have robbed Macy’s.
(a) A drunk is likely to win the annual potato-sack race.
(b) Drunks are likely to win the annual potato-sack race.
(a) Max is seeking a unicorn.
(b) Max is seeking unicorns.
(a) Gerald must talk to a congressman before noon today.
(b) Gerald must talk to congressmen before noon today.
(Carlson, 1977:418)

11

Initial piloting involved stories that had only one character completing a single puzzle; piloting with the
addition of a bare plural condition revealed that the bare plural sentences were much more felicitous when
there was more than one character searching for (multiple) puzzle pieces. Thus for consistency, and
because it did not affect the felicity of the other two conditions, we had two characters searching for
multiple copies of the three puzzle pieces across all three conditions. The floated both was then added
based on pilot feedback suggesting that it made the use of the conjoined NP subject more natural.
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Table 1. Experiment 1: Puppet’s statements on (4) test stories for (3) test conditions
ANY condition

A condition

BARE PLURAL
condition

Test story 1

‘Mickey and
Minnie both can’t
find any
diamonds’

‘Mickey and
Minnie both can’t
find a diamond’

‘Mickey and
Minnie both can’t
find diamonds'

Test story 2

‘Mickey and
Minnie both can’t
find any
triangles’

‘Mickey and
Minnie both can’t
find a triangle’

‘Mickey and
Minnie both can’t
find triangles’

Test story 3

‘Donald and
Daisy both can’t
find any hearts’

‘Donald and
Daisy both can’t
find a heart’

‘Donald and Daisy
both can’t find
hearts’

Test story 4

‘Donald and
Daisy both can’t
find any stars’

‘Donald and
Daisy both can’t
find a star’

‘Donald and Daisy
both can’t find
stars’
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The researcher who played the role of the puppet in the pre-recorded videos was instructed to say the
sentences as naturally as possible, with neutral intonation, and in particular without stressing the indefinite.
Having the critical test sentences presented via video files ensured consistency in stimuli across subjects.
In addition to the four test stories, each participant also saw four control trials. Two of the four control
trials had test sentences containing negation without any indefinites, and the other two control trials
involved sentences containing the relevant indefinite without negation (i.e. some in the ANY condition, a in
the A condition, and the bare plural in the BARE PLURAL condition). These control items allowed us to ensure
that subjects were on task, and would later allow us to control for children’s knowledge of the relevant
indefinites and negation separately from each other. The control items were also presented dynamically: if a
subject provided a yes response to a given test story, the following control item would have as its target a no
response, and vice versa. This allowed us to balance the number of yes and no responses. Any subjects who
did not correctly answer at least 3 of the 4 control trials were excluded from data analysis. The puppet’s
statements on the negation control stories are provided in Table 2, and the indefinite controls in Table 3.

Table 2. Experiment 1: Puppet’s statements on (2) negation control stories
Control story 1

‘Mickey and Minnie both didn’t find the squares’
(target: yes)
‘Mickey and Minnie both didn’t find the moons’
(target: no)

Control story 2

‘Mickey and Minnie both didn’t find the circles’
(target: yes)
‘Mickey and Minnie both didn’t find the suns’
(target: no)
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Table 3. Experiment 1: Puppet’s statements on (2) indefinite control stories
ANY condition
Control story 1

Control story 2

A condition

BARE PLURAL
condition

‘Mickey and
Minnie both found
some suns’
(target: yes)

‘Mickey and
Minnie both
found a sun’
(target: yes)

‘Mickey and
Minnie both found
suns’
(target: yes)

‘Mickey and
Minnie both found
some circles’
(target: no)

‘Mickey and
Minnie both
found a circle’
(target: no)

‘Mickey and
Minnie both found
circles’
(target: no)

‘Mickey and
Minnie both found
some squares’
(target: yes)

‘Mickey and
Minnie both
found a square’
(target: yes)

‘Mickey and
Minnie both found
squares’
(target: yes)

‘Mickey and
Minnie both found
some clouds’
(target: no)

‘Mickey and
Minnie both
found a cloud’
(target: no)

‘Mickey and
Minnie both found
clouds’
(target: no)

72 adult participants were randomly assigned to one of the three test conditions. We treated indefinite type
as a between-subject factor to avoid contaminating effects on subsequent trials. If a participant happened to
interpret an indefinite as associated with a more restricted domain of quantification for example, we wanted
to ensure that this domain restriction would not influence how they interpreted subsequent sentences
containing other indefinites. Thus subjects only heard one kind of indefinite across the four test trials.
In addition to the three test conditions described above, we also had three control conditions. The test
stories in these control conditions were parallel to those in the test conditions except that the three puzzle
shapes in each case did not vary along the relevant dimensions (colour, pattern, size, or texture); rather they
were of three completely different shapes, thus eliminating potential widening of the domain as a factor.
This allowed us to control for subjects’ ability to simply interpret the literal, truth conditional meaning of
negatively quantified existential statements. The target truth values of these control sentences were the
opposite of the target values in the test conditions, i.e. where we expected yes-responses on the plain
indefinite test conditions, we expected no-responses on the plain indefinite control conditions, and where we
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expected no-responses on the any test condition, we expected yes-responses on the any control condition.
Examples of the test stories from the control conditions are provided in Tables 4 and 5. In these conditions
as well, subjects received two training items, followed by four test and four control items, which were
randomized and counterbalanced. The control items were the same as those in the test conditions (two
negation controls and two indefinite controls), and were also dynamically presented to balance the total
number of yes and no responses. In all, 73 adult subjects were randomly assigned to one of the three control
conditions.
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Table 4. Experiment 1: Puppet’s statements on (4) test stories for ANY control condition
Test story 1

‘Mickey and Minnie both can’t find any diamonds’
(target: yes)

Test story 2

‘Mickey and Minnie both can’t find any triangles’
(target: yes)

Test story 3

‘Donald and Daisy both can’t find any hearts’
(target: yes)

Test story 4

‘Donald and Daisy both can’t find any stars’
(target: yes)
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Table 5. Experiment 1: Puppet’s statements on (4) test stories for A and BARE PLURAL control
conditions
A condition

BARE PLURAL condition

Test story 1

‘Mickey and Minnie both
can’t find a diamond’
(target: no)

‘Mickey and Minnie both
can’t find diamonds'
(target: no)

Test story 2

‘Mickey and Minnie both
can’t find a triangle’
(target: no)

‘Mickey and Minnie both
can’t find triangles’
(target: no)

Test story 3

‘Donald and Daisy both
can’t find a heart’
(target: no)

‘Donald and Daisy both
can’t find hearts’
(target: no)

Test story 4

‘Donald and Daisy both
can’t find a star’
(target: no)

‘Donald and Daisy both
can’t find stars’
(target: no)
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3.2

Results

The dependent measure in the following analyses was the proportion of yes-responses to the puppet’s
statements, taken to indicate domain restriction to a salient subdomain.

3.2.1 Control Conditions
All subjects in the three control conditions gave correct answers to the test trials 100% of the time. There
was no effect of condition (F(2,70)=0.959, p=.388). Subjects were also at ceiling on the control items in the
three control conditions; no subjects were excluded from data analysis.

3.2.2 Test Conditions
Subjects performed at ceiling on the control items in the three test conditions; no subjects were excluded
from analysis. Subjects performed as expected on the test trials (Fig. 9). A one-way ANOVA revealed a
significant main effect of indefinite type (F(2,69)=54.8, p<.001). Adults rejected the puppet’s statement in
the any condition 100% of the time, but generally accepted the plain indefinite statements (84% yes in the A
condition; 72% yes in the BARE PLURAL condition). Adults were significantly more accepting in the A and
BARE PLURAL conditions than in the ANY condition (Tukey HSD; both p<.001), but did not differ
significantly in their acceptance of a- and bare plural statements (p=.34).
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Follow-up justifications from the participants also allowed us to ascertain their reasons for accepting or
rejecting the statements. Justifications for accepting the plain indefinite statements made reference to the
relevant restricted subdomain alternative (e.g., Yes, they can’t find the blue diamonds). In contrast,
justifications for rejecting any-statements made reference to the other two subdomain alternatives,
suggesting these could not count as exceptions to the domain of quantification (e.g., No, they found the red
and green diamonds - they just can’t find the blue diamonds).

3.3

Discussion

Our main finding from Experiment 1 was that when provided with contextually salient subdomain
alternatives, adult speakers of English systematically interpreted any as quantifying over larger domains than
the plain indefinites a and bare plurals. Follow-up justifications suggested that any-statements were rejected
for quantifying more widely than was appropriate given the context. Thus we now have systematic evidence
of categorical differences between any and plain indefinites in terms of the relevant size of domain of
quantification. Our results thus provide empirical support for the domain widening thesis, according to
which any is distinct from plain indefinites in its preference for “wider” domains. The adult findings here
will provide a baseline for our discussion in Chapter 3 of a parallel experiment conducted with 4- and 5year-old children. Before we move on to the child experiments however, our findings above raise some
questions, which I address in turn below.

3.3.1 The Role of Contrastive Focus
Given the nature of the test stories, and with 100% rejection in the any-condition, a natural conclusion seems
to be that among a set of domain alternatives, any must quantify over the largest. As soon as we’ve
introduced a possible subdomain alternative, we cannot exclude it. Importantly, the stories that led up to the
critical test sentences in the three test conditions were identical - the only thing that differed was the
indefinite used in the test sentence. Thus we see that with plain indefinites, we can harmlessly exclude
subdomain alternatives that may no longer be relevant or salient by the end of the story; but these same
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alternatives cannot be excluded when any is uttered. Thus all of the alternatives that have been introduced in
the story must be exhaustified. On Chierchia’s analysis, exhaustification of these alternatives is obligatory,
being triggered by a focal feature on any. But what forces the set of alternatives to be the largest one
available? In other words, what is the source of any’s preference for the widest domain?
Consider again the example in (32). A plain indefinite like a can be used out of the blue as in (32-A1),
and the subsequent use of any, particularly when stressed, yields the familiar “widening” effect (such that
even the most basic disposable cameras are no longer exceptions to the domain). Recall that any can also be
uttered out of the blue, in which case its domain can also be restricted to exclude disposable cameras, as in
(33-A1). As we saw however, ending the dialogue with the plain indefinite a, even with stress, fails to
induce widening (33-B2).

(32)

A1: Do you have a camera?
B1: No.
A2: Nothing too fancy, even a disposable camera will do.
B2: I don’t have ANY cameras.

(33)

A1: Do you have any cameras?
B1: No.
A2: Nothing too fancy, even a disposable camera will do.
B2: #I don’t have A camera.

Two questions immediately arise. First, what is behind the widening that succeeds in (32-B2) but fails in
(33-B2)? Second, why does any widen the domain in (32-B2) but not in (33-A1)? In other words, we have
now returned to our initial question of when precisely domain widening does and does not arise.
For Chierchia, the answer lies in the nature of contrastive focus on the relevant indefinites. The
successful widening in (32-B2) arises from contrastively focusing any; since the focal alternatives of
stressed any are its domain alternatives, the discourse in (32) satisfies conditions on contrastive focus by
providing an appropriate antecedent (Rooth, 1992); in other words, the domain of any in (32-B2) is
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contrasted with the more restricted domain of a in (32-A1). Focal stress on a fails to widen the domain in
(33-B2) because the focal alternatives of plain indefinites are not domain alternatives, but rather functions of
the same type (I don’t have two cameras, I don’t have every camera, etc.).
Thus in the absence of contrastive focus, any should behave like a plain indefinite in terms of its domain
restriction; but where conditions on contrastive focus are satisfied, we expect domain widening to succeed.
In light of this, let us reconsider our experimental findings. We saw that our adult subjects consistently
interpreted any as quantifying over the widest possible domain. Yet our test sentences were presented
without stress on any; all of the test sentences were pre-recorded with neutral intonation. Thus the finding of
domain widening in the absence of stress on any provides experimental evidence that stress is not required
to derive domain widening.12
One might question however whether the condition on contrastive focus was satisfied, even without the
stress on any. Recall that the test sentences were not explicitly contrasted with an immediately preceding
plain indefinite statement. Given the design of our stories however, there are (at least) two ways in which the
contrastive focus condition might have been satisfied. Participants could have explicitly contrasted the anystatement with the negative statement that precedes the prompt by a few lines in the story:

(34)

EXP: Mickey and Minnie look and look, but they can’t find the blue diamonds. So they can’t
finish their puzzles. Let’s ask Froggy why. Hey Froggy, why can’t Mickey and Minnie finish their
puzzles?
FROGGY: Hmm... Mickey and Minnie both can’t find any diamonds.

If subjects could recall the story and retrieve the previous negatively quantified statement, which explicitly
mentioned the salient subdomain of blue diamonds, then it would appear conditions are met for contrasting
the wider domain of the any-sentence with the more restricted domain of the previous negative statement,
thereby yielding the widening effect.

12

This is consistent with Kadmon and Landman’s and Chierchia’s claims.
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Alternatively, participants might have contrasted the any-statement with their preconceived answer to
the experimenter’s question to the puppet. Since the question was posed explicitly (Why can’t they finish
their puzzles?), subjects might have come up with what they thought to be the most appropriate (and
informative) answer, i.e. Because they can’t find the blue diamonds. In this case, again, it would appear
conditions are met for contrasting the any-statement with an alternative, thereby yielding the widening
effect. Our findings do not allow us to decide what contrasts (if any) the subjects were performing before
rejecting the any-statements. They do reveal however that domain widening can take place even in the
absence of an explicit contrast between an any-statement and an immediately preceding antecedent. It
appears that the presence of salient subdomain alternatives in the context is sufficient to yield widening, i.e.
through implicit contrast between the domain alternatives.

3.3.2 Plain Indefinites
While adults were significantly more accepting of both kinds of plain indefinite statements than of anystatements, one might question why the acceptance rates in the plain indefinites were not higher than they
were. In other words, why did the participants, who rejected any-statements 100% of the time, not accept
plain indefinite statements 100% of the time? A second question arises from comparing the A and BARE
PLURAL conditions. These did not differ significantly in acceptance rates (p=.34), but the trend was towards
greater acceptance in the A condition than in the BARE PLURAL condition. Why should this be the case? I
consider these two questions in turn below.
Although adults generally accepted the plain indefinite statements, several of them equivocated and
reasoned about the relative informativeness of the plain indefinite statements. While adults did not hesitate
to reject the any-statements, they were often slower to accept the plain indefinite statements. When asked
after the experiment whether they had had difficulty with any of the test sentences, a number of adults in the
plain indefinite conditions noted that the puppet could have been more specific by including the relevant
property of the puzzle pieces (i.e. that the diamonds were blue, or that the triangles were striped, etc.). On
the one hand, this might be a task effect. Although adults can and ultimately do accept the plain indefinite
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statements, they might initially resist a restricted interpretation because they are in an experimental situation
in which a puppet is essentially being tested for whether he can provide the “right” kind of information; in
particular, the subjects were being asked to fill out a scorecard for the puppet. It could very well be that what
is perfectly acceptable in a spontaneous dialogue is insufficient on such a metalinguistic judgment task. On
the other hand, although there is a clear preference for accepting the plain indefinite statements on the
restricted interpretation, there is nothing ungrammatical about the plain indefinite statements on the widened
interpretation. With plain indefinites, participants are free to set the domain of quantification however they
please; thus the 16% rejection rate in the A condition and the 28% rejection rate in the BARE PLURAL
condition might very well arise from licit interpretations of plain indefinites being associated with a
relatively wider domain of quantification available in the context. What is crucial for us is the absolute
rejection of any-statements in the same contexts, compared to the relatively high rates of acceptance in the
plain indefinite conditions.
Next, consider the difference between the two plain indefinite conditions. One possible reason that
adults trended towards being more accepting of a-statements might lie in the possibility of the wide scope,
specific reading of the indefinite. The reason for including the bare plural condition was to control for this
scope confound, since bare plurals resist wide scope. While we can be reassured that the two conditions did
not differ significantly, it was indeed crucial to include the BARE PLURAL condition in our experiment, as we
cannot rule out that some of the acceptance in the A condition was due not to domain restriction but to wide
scope of the indefinite above negation.
Another possible explanation for the trend towards greater acceptance in the A condition lies in the
nature of bare plurals, which are ambiguous between an existential reading (i.e. on the event reading of the
predicate) and a universal reading (i.e. on the characteristic reading of the predicate), as shown in the
following examples from Carlson (1977):

(35)

Dinosaurs ate kelp.

(36)

Maxwell ate kelp.

(37)

Lots of conductors ate kelp.
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(38)

The old fireman ate kelp.

(39)

A few scientists ate kelp.

The intended target reading of the bare plurals in our test sentences was the existential, event reading. But
one possible reason the bare plural statements were accepted 72% rather than 100% of the time might be that
some subjects were accessing a characteristic or generic interpretation of the bare plural statement. For
example, some subjects might have interpreted Mickey and Minnie both can’t find diamonds as Mickey and
Minnie are both incapable of finding diamonds, which is clearly false in the given scenario.
On this note, one might think that the use of the present tense in the test sentences could have biased
participants towards the generic interpretation. Contrast the version used (40) with a version of the prompt
and test sentences in the past tense (41):

(40)

EXP:

Why can’t Mickey and Minnie finish their puzzles?

PUPPET: Hmm... Mickey and Minnie both can’t find {any/a/∅} diamond(s).
(41)

EXP:

Why couldn’t Mickey and Minnie finish their puzzles?

PUPPET: Hmm... Mickey and Minnie both couldn’t find {any/a/∅} diamond(s).

To rule out an effect of tense, we ran the three test conditions with the prompt and test sentences in the past
tense with a new group of 45 adult subjects (15 per condition), and found virtually no change in the
responses (Table 6). T-tests revealed no significant differences between rates of acceptance on the present
tense condition and past tense condition for all three indefinite conditions.
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Table 6. Yes-responses across tense conditions
% yes-responses
Indefinite condition

Present tense
(original data set)

Past tense

any

0

0

a

84

87

bare plural

72

70

Thus if some proportion of adults were accessing a generic or characteristic interpretation of the bare plural
sentence, it cannot be due to the use of the present tense.13
Whatever the source of the non-categorical acceptance of the plain indefinite statements however, what
is crucial for us is that adults were significantly more accepting in the plain indefinite conditions than in the
ANY condition.

4. Summary
The experiment described in this chapter provides novel empirical evidence for the domain widening thesis.
We see that once we carefully control for the possible subdomain alternatives that any can trigger, adults do
indeed consistently interpret any as quantifying over wider domains than plain indefinites. In particular, our
findings suggest that any must quantify over the widest domain available in the context; once a possible

13 Although

we’ve ruled out an effect of the present tense, a separate issue worth investigating is the role of
the modal can in allowing the more restricted reading of the plain indefinites. In the same contexts as those
presented in our test conditions, switching from can to do appears to make it more difficult to accept the
plain indefinite statements (compare (i) and (ii)). This apparent contrast between (i) and (ii) does not
appear to have any clear explanation within the theories of domain widening discussed so far.
(i)

(ii)

EXP:
(a) PUPPET:
(b) PUPPET:
EXP:
(a) PUPPET:
(b) PUPPET:

Why couldn’t Mickey and Minnie finish their puzzles?
Hmm... Mickey and Minnie both couldn’t find a diamond.
Hmm... Mickey and Minnie both couldn’t find diamonds.
Why didn’t Mickey and Minnie finish their puzzles?
Hmm... Mickey and Minnie both didn’t find a diamond.
Hmm... Mickey and Minnie both didn’t find diamonds.
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subdomain alternative has been introduced, it cannot count as an exception to the domain, thus resulting in
any’s observed reduced tolerance of exceptions (Kadmon & Landman, 1993). In contrast, there is no such
restriction on the interpretation of plain indefinites, which are free to restrict to salient subdomains.
Now that we have clear baseline measures of how adults interpret any and plain indefinites (and their
associated domains of quantification), we are in a position to evaluate whether young children are sensitive
to the domain widening property of any.
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Chapter 3
Children’s Knowledge of NPI any

1.

Introduction

Chapter 2 served to establish the nature of any in the adult grammar, and in particular examined its property
of domain widening. This chapter takes up the question of whether young children acquiring English can
demonstrate adult-like knowledge of the properties of any. As such, this chapter has three main goals. We
will begin in Section 2 by providing as explicit as possible a description of the target of acquisition, that is,
the NPI any along with its relevant syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic properties. Identifying these target
properties will crucially set the stage for our subsequent discussion (in Section 3) of children’s knowledge of
these properties, and for our later discussion (in Chapter 5) of how children could acquire knowledge of
these properties.
In Section 3, we will examine various measures of children’s knowledge of any. First, I provide evidence of apparent target-like behaviour from an analysis of the spontaneous speech transcripts of 40 children
acquiring American and British English. The data demonstrate that children (as young as 2;02) who produce
any spontaneously and productively, have target-like knowledge of the licensing condition on any. I then
review previously gathered evidence from elicited production (O’Leary & Crain, 1994) and comprehension
experiments (Thornton, 1995; Xiang et al., 2006) suggesting that children as young as 3;06 (by comprehension measures) and 4;04 (by elicited production measures) exhibit target-like production and comprehension
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of any in the scope of negation. While the spontaneous and experimental data appear to converge however, I
will then argue that neither the experimental studies nor the spontaneous production data allow us to conclude that the children have target knowledge of all of any’s quantificational properties; in particular I argue
that the previous studies do not justify any conclusions about children’s knowledge of any’s potential for
domain widening.
In Section 4, I address the missing piece of evidence regarding children’s knowledge of any. I present
the results of a truth value judgment task conducted with 4- and 5-year-old English-speaking children, which
suggest that many, but not all, children in this age group interpret any as quantifying over wider domains
than plain indefinites. After some discussion of the results, we will close the chapter with a summary of what
we have learned about children’s knowledge of NPI any.

2.

The Target of Acquisition

In this section, I lay out the key properties of any that I take to form part of the target of acquisition. NPIs
like any involve an amalgamation of syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic properties, and I will, for ease of
exposition, try to be as explicit as possible in identifying these different target properties of any.
Let us begin with the syntax. First, any usually surfaces as an indefinite determiner; this entails a certain
syntactic distribution. As shown in (1) and (2), any can take a noun phrase (NP) complement, which can be
elided. As shown in (3) and (4), any can also occur within an NP as part of a complex indefinite. Finally, as
(5) and (6) show, any can also be used as a modifier of the comparative adverb more.

(1) I don’t have any milk.
(2) I don’t have any.
(3) John didn’t see anyone.
(4) Mary didn’t write anything.
(5) I don’t have any more milk.
(6) Don’t do that anymore.
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In addition to the syntactic distribution of any, the child must figure out the structural licensing condition on
any, that is, the particular structural dependency relation that holds between any and its licensing operator.
Any must be c-commanded by its licensing operator, as shown by the contrast between (7) and (8). 1 Moreover, the dependency relation between any and its licenser is not clausebounded, as shown in (9). 2

(7) The student doesn’t have any homework.
(8) *Any student doesn’t have homework.
(9) John didn’t say that Mary would write anything.

Consider now what any contributes to the truth-conditional meaning of a sentence in which it appears. Let us
assume that the child has knowledge of general rules of semantic composition which will be among those
used to compute truth conditions of sentences containing any. What the child must learn specifically about
any is its existential quantificational force, for its NPI status goes hand in hand with its interpretation as an
existential within the scope of negation. Finally, in order to properly license any, the child must have knowledge of the logical property that is shared by the set of possible licensers.
As we saw in Chapter 2, many contemporary accounts of NPI licensing are predicated on some version
of the Fauconnier/Ladusaw proposal, according to which NPIs are licensed in the scope of downwardentailing (DE) operators, i.e. operators that license subset inferences (10).

(10)

Alexandre is not a man
⇒ Alexandre is not a father

1

I assume the following definition of c-command: a node A dominates a node B if and only if the lowest
branching node that dominates A also dominates B, and A and B do not dominate each other.
2

The particularities of the structural licensing condition vary in systematic ways across languages, so the
child must learn the English-specific version for any. Korean, for example, allows subject NPIs, and does
exhibit a clausemate restriction on licensing (unless the NPI is the subject of a state predicate) (cf. Lee,
1993).
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Under the DE account of licensing, the target of acquisition thus includes knowledge of the logical property
of DEness, such that licensing can be generalized beyond any single operator. Note that unless the learner
could generalize to the set of DE operators, she would have to learn each individual licenser on a case-bycase basis. In Chapter 5, we will examine the kinds of evidence that children receive for licensing by DE
operators. For the moment, it is worth pointing out a line of research arguing that DEness is innate rather
than learned from the input. Gualmini and Crain (2002) argue that data indicating relevant entailment relations are unlikely to be available in sufficient quantity; instead, they propose, entailment relations displayed
by certain DE quantifier determiners follow from their meaning, and given a restricted hypothesis space,
children only have to entertain a small number of the logically possible hypotheses about determiner
meanings.3 Crain and Thornton (2006) provide further discussion motivating the innate specification of
downward entailment as part of Universal Grammar, discussing the universality of key properties of DE expressions as well as a substantial body of experimental evidence showing that 4-year-olds are sensitive to the

3 According

to Gualmini and Crain, children are adult-like in classifying linguistic expressions as either
being DE or not DE, but they are not necessarily fully adult-like in classifying NPIs. This is in part because
what constitutes an NPI can differ cross-linguistically, whereas natural languages do not differ in their classifications of DE vs. non-DE expressions.
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properties of DE operators. 4 While we will eventually examine the input for evidence of DE licensers, we
will largely adopt these previous claims that DEness is innate.5
Consider now the semantics of any. As we saw in Chapter 2, any triggers obligatory exhaustification of
subdomain alternatives. This means the child must come to have knowledge of the following: (i) the nature
of any’s alternatives, i.e. that they are subdomain alternatives; (ii) the fact that these alternatives must obligatorily be exhaustified; (iii) how to carry out this exhaustification operation through the use of a covert exhaustification operator. Moreover, as we saw in Experiment 1, given a set of contextually defined domain
alternatives, any generally quantifies over the widest possible domain, and is consistently interpreted as
quantifying over wider domains than plain indefinites such as a or bare plurals. Thus the child must come to
know that any is a (potential) domain widener, and in fact that it widens the domain in cases of contrastive
focus. This will also entail sensitivity to and knowledge of contrastive focus.

4

One of the properties of DE expressions is that they give rise to so-called ‘conjunctive entailments’ of
disjunction (Chierchia, 2004), as shown in (i)-(iii).
(i) The runner did not receive a medal or a cash prize
⇒ The runner did not receive a medal and the runner did not receive a cash prize
(ii) Every runner who received a medal or a cash prize did an interview
⇒ Every runner who received a medal did an interview and every runner who received a crash
prize did an interview
(iii) If the runner received a medal or a cash prize, he was obliged to give an interview
⇒ If the runner received a medal, he was obliged to give an interview and if the runner received
a cash prize, he was obliged to give an interview
A number of experimental studies have shown that 4- to 5-year-olds are sensitive to these conjunctive entailments (Chierchia et al., 2001; Gualmini et al., 2001; Gualmini & Crain, 2002; Crain et al., 2002;
Gualmini & Crain, 2004); for example, children compute the conjunctive entailment in the restrictor but
not the scope of the universal quantifier every, suggesting they know the restrictor is DE but the scope is
not. As Crain and Thornton discuss, the challenge of learning this distinction between the restrictor and the
scope on the basis of positive evidence is particularly acute, given the distinction doesn’t involve the distribution of lexical material.
5

Since the focus of our investigation will be on the semantic/quantificational properties of any, I will generally refer to the existing literature on the acquisition and learnability of DEness without taking a particular stance on how it is acquired.
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Given the target set of knowledge just enumerated, let us now turn to various measures of children’s
knowledge of NPI any, the goal of all of which is to determine whether (and when) children are target-like
with respect to any.

3.

Measures of Children’s Knowledge of NPI any

3.1

Corpus Study 1: Children’s Spontaneous Production of NPI any

Certain experimental methods such as the Truth Value Judgment Task (TVJT) (Crain & McKee, 1985; Crain
& Thornton, 1998) are notoriously difficult to conduct with children younger than 3;00 and are typically
only successful with children who are older than 3;06. But looking at how children younger than 3;06 behave with respect to NPI licensing can show us whether children’s earliest hypotheses are different from
those of older children (and of adults). To accomplish this, we can look to spontaneous speech transcripts, a
prime source of evidence regarding younger children’s knowledge of NPI licensing. I present here data from
an analysis of the spontaneous speech transcripts of 40 children acquiring American and British English as a
first language. In determining whether children are target-like in their knowledge of any from the point at
which they begin to produce it spontaneously and productively, I discuss two aspects of the children’s spontaneous production data: (i) quantitatively, I discuss their rates of licensed vs. unlicensed any, which provide
an indication of, among other things, whether the children are target-like in their knowledge of the licensing
conditions on any; (ii) qualitatively, I examine the environments in which any appears, and in particular, the
diversity of licensers, which can tell us whether children genuinely have productive knowledge of any (and
its licensing condition). The data come from 18 American children, covering the age range 0;11,04-5;02,12,
and 22 British children aged 1;08,22-4;11,20. These spontaneous corpora are available on the CHILDES
database (MacWhinney, 2000), and are listed in Tables 1 and 2.
Using the kwal and combo programs available on CLAN, the corpus analysis program associated with
the CHILDES database, we can find all child utterances containing any, and check for utterances containing
negation and other potential NPI licensers, discounting imitations, repetitions, routine utterances, unclear
utterances (symbolized in the transcripts with “xxx” or “yyy”), and single-word utterances (or utterances
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consisting solely of any+NP). Charting out the development of NPI any over the entirety of the transcripts
for each child, we can take note of the proportion of licensed and unlicensed any, as well as the operators
that license any.

Table 1. American English: Corpora under study
CORPUS

CHILD

AGE RANGE

NO. OF TRANSCRIPTS

NO. OF UTTERANCES

Peter

1;09,07 – 3;01,21

20

23,000

Adam

2;03,04 – 5;02,12

55

45,371

Sarah

2;03,05 – 5;01,06

139

31,195

Eve

1;06,00 – 2;03,00

20

10,856

Trevor

2;00,27 – 3;11,27

28

6,568

Abe

2;04,24 – 5;00,11

210

22,684

Alex

1;11,16 – 3;03,21

56

31,423

Ethan

0;11,04 – 2;11,01

50

21,898

Lily

1;01,02 – 4;00,02

80

39,852

Naima

0;11,28 – 3;10,10

83

43,542

Violet

1;02,00 – 3;11,24

54

17,274

William

1;04,10 – 3;04,15

44

21,220

Sachs

Naomi

1;02,29 – 4;09,03

93

15,542

Suppes

Nina

1;11,16 – 3;03,21

56

31,423

Weist

Emily

2;06,06 – 4;05,19

23

7,264

Emma

2;07,08 – 4;08,04

28

6,669

Mat

2;03,10 – 5;00,05

56

10,157

Roman

2;02,20 – 4;07,20

42

11,064

TOTAL

1,137

397,002

Bloom

Brown

Demetras
Kuczaj

Providence
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Table 2. British English: Corpora under study
CORPUS

CHILD

AGE RANGE

NO. OF TRANSCRIPTS

NO. OF UTTERANCES

Barbara

2;04,09 – 4;01,18

14

2503

Conor

3;08,14 – 4;06,05

14

3045

Courtney

3;04,00 – 4;00,11

7

2021

David

2;00,03 – 4;02,03

14

2472

Johnny

3;06,00 – 4;04,01

7

1678

Michelle

2;04,28 – 4;04,19

14

3075

Rachel

2;05,25 – 2;09,16

8

1184

Stuart

3;05,12 – 4;05,04

11

3369

Lara

1;09,13 – 3;03,25

120

47,876

Anne

1;10,07 – 2;09,10

68

19,866

Aran

1;11,12 – 2;10,28

66

17,111

Becky

2;00,07 – 2;11,15

68

23,300

Carl

1;08,22 – 2;08,15

65

24,857

Dominic

1;10,25 – 2;10,16

68

21,097

Gail

1;11,27 – 2;11,12

68

16,947

Joel

1;11,01 – 2;10,11

68

17,862

John

1;11,15 – 2;10,24

64

13,303

Liz

1;11,09 – 2;10,18

68

16,545

Nicole

2;00,25 – 3;00,10

68

16,937

Ruth

1;11,15 – 2;11,21

66

20,295

Warren

1;10,06 – 2;09,20

67

16,587

Thomas

2;00,12 – 4;11,20

379

198,647

TOTAL

1,392

490,577

Belfast

Lara

Manchester

Thomas

47

NPI any is not a particularly high-frequency construction. To avoid distortion due to low denominators (i.e.
low numbers of total NPI any), in analyzing the error rates, I focus here on the results for the 26 children
who produced a minimum of 15 instances of NPI any over the entirety of their transcripts.
The main finding was that both the American and British groups of children made very few NPI licensing errors; moreover, these errors were interspersed among adult-like usage of the NPI. Of the 1724 total
instances of NPI any across the 26 children, 41 were categorized as errors (to be described further below).
This represents an error rate of only 2.38%. 6,7 ,8 Thus the children appeared to be quite target-like in their
knowledge of the licensing condition on any; they were able to limit the distribution of any to appropriately
licensed environments. (11) is an example of licensed any from Abe’s speech (Kuczaj corpus).

(11)

Abe (Kuczaj corpus), Transcript 133 (age 3;09,12), Lines 461, 469
*CHI: can you find any scissors ?
*FAT: I’ll look I don’t think paper wings are a good idea (.) Abe .
*CHI: come on I can’t find anything else .

Before moving on, it’s worth considering the nature of the 2.38% error rate. Taking first the total number of
apparently unlicensed NPI any (i.e. instances of NPI any where a licenser seemed to be missing), I classified
the environments of these apparently unlicensed any into four categories: (i) plausibly negative (declarative),
(ii) plausibly positive (declarative), (iii) plausibly interrogative, and (iv) indeterminate. The plausibly negative cases were instances where the child clearly intended a negative meaning, but simply omitted sentential
negation. The plausibly positive cases involved positive environments in which the child used any but essen-

This is strikingly low, particularly if we wish to consider 5% as an arbitrary baseline error rate (to accommodate speech and transcription errors).
6

7

I have chosen to collapse the American and British data here. The American and British children did not
differ significantly from each other in their mean error rates (t(24)=-0.95, p=0.35).
8

It is worth mentioning here van der Wal’s (1996) corpus study of Dutch-speaking children’s spontaneous
production of NPIs, in which van der Wal reported error rates up to 14%. Her error rates however encompassed all non-adult-like utterances, including both commission and omission errors. As I detail below, I
further classified potential licensing errors into different categories, e.g., commission vs. omission errors.
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tially intended some (these constitute the true commission errors). The plausibly interrogative cases involved
sentences which would be classified as grammatical if they were questions; these would initially be counted
as apparent errors because of the lack of a question mark in the transcription. It was sometimes possible
however to determine the interrogative status of an utterance, using the surrounding context.9 Finally, the
fourth category was for occurrences of any that might or might not have been grammatical; the surrounding
context of these utterances was simply not sufficient to yield a confident judgment. To be conservative, the
error rate was based on the sum of the plausibly positive and the indeterminate cases. Some examples of
cases involving omission of negation and cases of true commission errors follow:

(12)

Omission of Negation
Sarah (Brown corpus), Transcript 33 (age 2;10,11), Line 410
*MOT: that’s to make orange juice (.) squeeze the oranges for orange juice for babies .
*CHI: me ?
*MOT: yeah .
*CHI: I want any .
%com: negative meaning
*MOT: you don’t want any !
%par: laughs
*CHI: no .
*CHI: xxx baby .
%alt:

I not baby .

9

CLAN allows us to specify a number of preceding and following lines that surround the utterance containing the search string. In determining how to classify the apparent errors into the four categories, I examined the transcripts and looked at as much of the preceding and following discourse context as was relevant to the utterance at hand.
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(13)a. True Commission Errors10
Ruth (Manchester corpus), Transcript 23b (age 2;07,10), Line 809
*MOT: there you go .
*CHI: want anymore, Mummy .
*MOT: I think there only is three darling .
*MOT: I don’t think there’s anymore .
b. Liz (Manchester corpus), Transcript 15b (age 2;04,03), Line 1018
*CHI: there’s giraffe .
*MOT: yes that’s the giraffe .
*CHI: and get any more .
*CHI: get any more .
*MOT: I think there’s only one giraffe love .

The numbers of apparent errors, true commission errors, and error rates for the 26 children are given in Table 3.

10

The two examples I have given of commission errors show quite clearly that any is being used in a positive environment. Note that there are dialects of English where positive anymore has a meaning similar to
nowadays or these days (see Haycock, 2000 and references therein for a characterization of the phenomenon and its geographical distribution). As far as I can tell, there is no evidence suggesting that any of the
children spoke such a dialect, although two of Ruth’s four errors did involve anymore in a positive environment. In any event, if the children who produced anymore in positive environments were actually
speakers of the positive-anymore dialect, these instances ought to count as grammatical (or rather be excluded as instances of a different lexical item), further reducing the number of commission errors. To be
conservative, I assumed that none of the children spoke such a dialect, and therefore counted all positive
instances of NPI any as ungrammatical.
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Table 3. Qualitative error analysis
(— = Plausibly negative; + = Plausibly positive; Q = Plausibly interrogative; Ind. = Indeterminate)
APPARENT ERRORS /
TRUE COMMIS- ERROR RATE
CORPUS
CHILD
— + Q IND.
SION ERRORS
TOTAL NPI ANY
(%)
Bloom (US)
Peter
4 / 75
2
1 0
1
2 / 75
2.67
Adam

4 / 53

0

2

0

2

4 / 53

7.55

Sarah

8 / 53

4

0

0

4

4 / 53

7.55

Demetras (US)

Trevor

1 / 18

1

0

0

0

0 / 18

0.00

Kuczaj (US)

Abe

6 / 288

4

0

1

1

1 / 288

0.35

Lily

2 / 32

1

0

1

0

0 / 32

0.00

Naima

0 / 59

0

0

0

0

0 / 59

0.00

Sachs (US)

Naomi

1 / 24

0

0

0

1

1 / 24

4.17

Suppes (US)

Nina

3 / 53

1

0

1

1

1 / 53

1.89

Emily

4 / 37

3

0

0

1

1 / 37

2.70

Emma

2 / 29

2

0

0

0

0 / 29

0.00

Mat

0 / 55

0

0

0

0

0 / 55

0.00

Roman

3 / 48

2

0

0

1

1 / 48

2.08

Conor

0 / 19

0

0

0

0

0 / 19

0.00

Michelle

0 / 23

0

0

0

0

0 / 23

0.00

Stuart

0 / 21

0

0

0

0

0 / 21

0.00

Lara

1 / 172

1

0

0

0

0 / 172

0.00

Anne

0 / 18

0

0

0

0

0 / 18

0.00

Aran

0 / 25

0

0

0

0

0 / 25

0.00

Carl

2 / 16

2

0

0

0

0 / 16

0.00

Dominic

6 / 20

1

5

0

0

6 / 20

30.00

Gail

1 / 23

0

0

0

1

1 / 23

4.35

Joel

1 / 18

0

1

0

0

1 / 18

5.56

Nicole

1 / 26

0

1

0

0

1 / 26

3.85

Ruth

7 / 43

1

4

0

2

6 / 43

13.95

Thomas

18 / 476

2

7

5

4

11 / 476

2.31

Brown (US)

Providence (US)

Weist (US)

Belfast (UK)

Lara (UK)

Manchester (UK)

Thomas (UK)
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Errors of commission were interspersed among adult-like usage of the NPI; no child appeared to exhibit a
developmental stage characterized by lack of the licensing condition. 11
Let us now briefly switch gears to a more qualitative examination of the data and consider the kinds of
licensers observed in the children’s spontaneous production. In attempting to determine whether children
have target-like knowledge of the DE licensing condition on any, one might wish to verify that the children
have not simply memorized any as forming a lexicalized chunk with sentential negation. One way to do this
is to consider other classes of potential licensers. In particular, two other classes of operators (distinguished
by their logical properties) have been identified as NPI licensers. According to Zwarts (1998) for example,
there are at least three classes of NPIs, licensed accordingly by three classes of licensers that differ in their
“negative strength”, i.e. by the number of De Morgan’s laws that they validate. While DE operators satisfy
the De Morgan’s laws in (14i-ii), anti-additive operators satisfy (14i-iii), and anti-morphic operators satisfy
(14i-iv):

(14)

(i) f(x) f(y) → f(x ˄ y)
(ii) f(x ˅ y) → f(x) ˄ f(y)

Downward-entailing operators (license weak NPIs)

(iii) f(x) ˄ f(y) → f(x ˅ y)

Anti-additive operators (license strong NPIs)

(iv) f(x ˄ y) → f(x) ˅ f(y)

Anti-morphic operators (license superstrong NPIs)

11

The reader may notice that Dominic’s production (Manchester corpus) exhibited a particularly high error
rate (30%). It is worth pointing out that 5 of his 6 errors appear to arise from the same discourse context,
within a single transcript. It is difficult to argue that Dominic went through a stage of unlicensed any when
the bulk of his errors are isolatable to one discourse:
(i)

Transcript 21a (age 2;05,22)
*CHI: Gordon [* 0has] got any [/] any passengers on .
*CHI: he’s got any [/] any [/] any +...
*CHI: Gordon [* 0has] got any [/] any .
*CHI: Gordon [* 0has] got any [/] any passengers .
*CHI: Toby got any [/] any passengers on .

(line 673)
(line 700)
(line 764)
(line 822)
(line 1005)

The next instance of any was produced seven days later (i.e. two transcripts later); from that instance
through to the end of the transcripts, all instances of any were appropriately licensed. Prior to the utterances
in (i), Dominic produced three instances of any, two of which were licensed.
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Some examples from each of the three classes of NPI licensers follow:

(15)a. Anti-morphic, anti-additive, and downward-entailing: sentential negation not
b. Anti-additive and downward-entailing: no, nothing, never, no one, nowhere, without,
before, nobody…
c. Downward-entailing: less than n, not every, hardly, rarely, only, at most, few, not many…

Anti-additive operators are also DE, and anti-morphic operators are also anti-additive and DE. For our purposes, we won’t need to go any further into the details of Zwarts’ account, because any is considered a weak
NPI. This means that it minimally requires a DE licenser, a condition that is satisfied by all three classes of
potential NPI licensers. I point out the classes of licensers here to demonstrate the diversity of operators that
can license any; for us, diversity in the children’s production can provide an indication of whether children
genuinely have productive knowledge of any.12 Let us consider as an example the data for Abe (Kuczaj corpus), who produced a sizeable sample of any. Abe produced a total of 228 instances of NPI any in declarative environments, 217 of which involved licensing by sentential negation. Other licensers included negative

12

Given that the licensers stand in a subset-superset relation (anti-morphic operators are also anti-additive
and DE, while anti-additive operators are also DE but not anti-morphic), one question that might arise is
whether children resort to a conservative widening strategy, according to which they would start off with
the conservative hypothesis that only anti-morphic operators (i.e. sentential negation in English) license
any; they would then widen the set of licensers to include anti-additive and DE operators on the basis of
positive evidence. One way to test whether children follow such a widening strategy is to determine
whether there is a significant chronological gap between the onset of licensing by anti-morphic operators
and the onset of licensing by non-anti-morphic operators. Only three of the 40 children examined here produced more than a couple isolates of non-anti-morphic licensers, and for these three children (Abe, Mat,
and Thomas) we did not find a significant chronological gap between the onset of anti-morphic and nonanti-morphic licensing (by Binomial Test). On the basis of such data, I argued in Tieu (2010) that Englishspeaking children appear not to resort to a conservative widening strategy in the acquisition of NPI licensing. See Lin, Weerman, and Zeijlstra (2013) however, for arguments of conservative widening in languages
such as Mandarin Chinese. Also relevant is van der Wal (1996), who postulated a hypothesis of conservative widening in Dutch children’s acquisition of NPIs. van der Wal found that children went through a progression of stages, first producing NPIs only with niet ‘not’, then producing illicit forms of licensing by
anaphoric, deictic, and contextual negation, followed by non-adult-like NPIs in affirmative constructions.
van der Ziel however ultimately tied this progression to children’s development of negative expressions,
rather than a widening of the set of possible licensers for NPIs.
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quantifiers, never (which is anti-additive in addition to being DE), without (also anti-additive and DE), ifconditionals, in case-conditionals, and comparatives. The distribution of licensers in Abe’s production of any
is shown in Table 4.

Table 4. Abe: Distribution of licensers in declaratives
LICENSERS

TOTAL NPI
ANY IN DECLARATIVES

228

CONDITIONAL

COMPARATIVE

NEG

NO-

NEVER

WITHOUT

217

2

2

2

3

1

1

(0.88%)

(1.32%)

(0.44%)

(0.44%)

(95.18%) (0.88%) (0.88%)

IF

IN CASE

-ER

In other words, 95.18% of Abe’s production of any involved licensing by sentential negation, while 4.82%
involved licensing by (six different) non-anti-morphic licensers. Note that the low proportion of licensing by
an operator other than sentential negation cannot be taken as evidence that Abe did not have productive
knowledge of licensing by various DE operators. In fact, the large proportion of licensing by sentential negation was also observed in the parental speech. Abe’s father was an active conversational partner in 209 of the
210 transcripts in the corpus, producing a total of 87 NPI any in declaratives, 81 of which involved licensing
by sentential negation. That is, 93.10% of his uses of any involved licensing by sentential negation, and
roughly 6.90% involved licensing by (three different) non-anti-morphic licensers. The precise distribution of
licensers is given below:

Table 5. Abe’s father: Distribution of licensers in declaratives
LICENSERS

TOTAL NPI ANY IN
DECLARATIVES

NEGATION

CONDITIONAL IF

DOUBT

FORGET

87

81 (93.10%)

4 (4.60%)

1 (1.15%)

1 (1.15%)

The pervasiveness of licensing by sentential negation is thus reflected in both the parent’s speech and the
child’s speech. Qualitatively, it appears that Abe was indeed adult-like in his knowledge that licit licensers of

54

any included operators other than sentential negation. In other words, he was able to generalize to the class
of DE operators as NPI licensers.
To summarize this section, the children under study demonstrated a target-like distribution of any in
their spontaneous production. That is, wherever the children produced any spontaneously, they produced it
(at least superficially) in a target-like manner. Moreover, some children were able to use any with DE operators beyond sentential negation, i.e. with operators that are not merely DE. The surface distribution of any
thus suggests productive knowledge that any must occur in the scope of a DE operator.

3.2

Elicited Production (O’Leary & Crain, 1994)

Conclusions from the single reported elicited production study of any converge with the conclusions that can
be drawn from the spontaneous production data: children know how to restrict any to the scope of licensers
in their production. The experimental evidence comes from O’Leary and Crain’s (1994) study (reported in
Gualmini, 2004), which used an elicited production paradigm to elicit DE and non-DE environments from
11 children (4;04-5;04). In the condition shown in (15), the authors found that children never produced any
outside the scope of negation, i.e. in a positive declarative, even when any appeared in the prompt. In contrast, children had no problem producing any when it could appear in the scope of negation, as in (16).

(15)a. Situation: Some dogs were hungry, and every dog eventually ate some food.
b. Test sentence:

Only one dog got any food.

c. Experimenter prompt:

What really happened?

d. Children’s responses:

No, every dog got some food! / *No, every dog got any food!

(16)a. Situation: Some dogs are hungry; only one dog decides not to eat.
b. Test sentence:

Every dog got some food.

c. Experimenter prompt:

What really happened?

d. Children’s responses:

No, this dog did not get any food! / No, this dog did not get some food!
(Gualmini, 2004:960)

55

In sum, children can restrict any to the scope of a licenser in both spontaneous and elicited production.

3.3

Comprehension in Questions (Thornton, 1995)

Other experimental evidence of children’s target-like knowledge of any comes from studies of children’s
comprehension of any, using versions of the TVJT. Thornton (1995) showed that children as young as 3;06
have knowledge of entailment relations. She tested children’s comprehension of questions containing NPI
any and negation such as the following:

(17)a. Did any of the turtles not buy an apple?
b. Didn’t any of the turtles buy an apple?

Thornton conducted the test with 10 children (3;06-4;11) and found that these children had no problem interpreting any with respect to negation, pointing to the turtle that hadn’t bought an apple 93% of the time in
response to (17a), and to the turtle(s) that had bought an apple 85% of the time in response to (17b). Such
findings suggest that by 3;06, children can correctly interpret any as an existential in questions and under
negation.

3.4

Comprehension in Declaratives (Xiang, Conroy, Lidz, & Zukowski, 2006)

Using a TVJT design, Xiang et al. (2006) provided evidence that children between the ages of 4;05-5;05
correctly interpret any as taking narrow scope with respect to negation. These authors compared children’s
comprehension of negative declaratives containing a, some, and any. While all three are interpreted as existential indefinites, the three differ in their possible scope interpretations (relative to negation). Xiang et al.
set out to test whether young children understand the scope properties of these indefinites. They designed
contexts that biased towards wide scope readings of the indefinites, and tested whether children would scope
each of the indefinites out above negation. An example item is provided in (18).
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(18)Hi, my name is Joe. I am eating dinner. My mom said I have to eat all my dinner before I can have
dessert. I really don’t like peas. But I guess they are healthy. Ok, I will try and eat them. There, I did
a pretty good job. There are only a few peas left, and those ones are mushy. I don’t think I am supposed to eat the mush peas. I will probably get my dessert!
I was listening to the story, and I know what happened!
Condition 1: Joe didn’t eat a pea.
Condition 2: Joe didn’t eat some peas.
Condition 3: Joe didn’t eat any peas.

Given that the character in the story ate all but a singleton pea (in Condition 1) or all but a few peas (in Conditions 2 and 3), participants were expected to accept the test sentences if the indefinites were allowed to
take wide scope with respect to negation (i.e. There is a pea that Joe didn’t eat / There are peas that Joe
didn’t eat), and to reject the test sentences if the indefinites took narrow scope (i.e. It is not the case that Joe
ate a pea / It is not the case that Joe ate (some) peas). Xiang et al. found that like adults, the 17 children
tested (4;05-5;05, M=4;10) consistently interpreted any narrowly.13 The authors thus concluded that children
between 4-5 years of age understand any’s status as an NPI.
To summarize, measures of elicited production and comprehension suggest that by 3 to 4 years of age,
children correctly restrict any to the scope of negation in both production and comprehension.

3.5 A Problem: Target Performance vs. Target Representation
Based on the spontaneous production and experimental data discussed so far, it would appear that 4-yearolds know the licensing condition on any. Moreover we can tell from the experimental data that children
differentiate any and some in production (O’Leary and Crain, 1994). But we cannot conclude from the data
presented thus far whether children also know that any, unlike some or a, has a particular semantics that involves obligatory exhaustification of subdomain alternatives and potential for domain widening. It is con-

13

The children were non-adult-like however in the a condition, where they interpreted a with wide scope
only some of the time.
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ceivable that young children might treat any as simply a “negative counterpart” of existential indefinites like
some. Thus the previous studies do not probe children’s sensitivity to any semantic differences that might
exist between any and non-polarity-sensitive/plain indefinites. A possible scenario that must be ruled out is
one in which the child (perhaps in an initial stage of development) hypothesizes a single categorial representation of an existential indefinite that must be realized as some in positive environments and any in negative
environments. 14 On the surface, the child would appear to have target-like knowledge of any. Such a scenario however would involve a substantive gap in the child’s knowledge of the target grammar; put differently, a child in such a scenario would have yet to acquire the target semantics of any.
In summary then, children’s target-like performance involving any might reflect target-like knowledge
of the distributional requirements of any (perhaps in relation to some), but may not necessarily reflect targetlike knowledge of the semantics of any. In the next section, we will discuss the results of an experiment designed to address this gap in empirical coverage.

4.

Experiment 2: Children’s Knowledge of any as a Domain Widener

In Section 2, we considered the target of acquisition with respect to any, and in Section 3, determined that
previous studies could not justify any conclusions about 4-year-olds’ knowledge of the semantics of any; in
fact, all of the previous studies generally neglected the semantics of any, focusing exclusively on its licensing condition (or put differently, its restricted distribution in the scope of an appropriate licenser). Given the
experimental results from Chapter 2 however, we know that the target must include the potential for domain
widening. This section presents an experiment that specifically tests children’s sensitivity to the domain
widening property of any. The research question in this study was whether children could interpret any as
quantifying over wider domains than plain indefinites like a or bare plurals. In other words, we wanted to
14

See among others Klima (1964) and Lakoff (1969) for original discussion of the idea (and subsequent
arguments against the idea) that any and some are alternative forms, the former of which surfaces in socalled ‘affective’ contexts. My point is not to endorse or argue against this kind of theoretical proposal concerning the state of the any/some dichotomy in the adult grammar; rather, I wish to point out that if a child
learner hypothesized a superficial relationship of complementary distribution between the two, without
postulating any deeper semantic differences, s/he could nevertheless perform on target in the previous experimental studies.
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determine whether children would treat any as more intolerant of exceptions than non-polarity-sensitive indefinites, as originally observed by Kadmon and Landman (1993).

4.1

Method

4.1.1 Subjects
The experiment described below was tested with 92 English-speaking children (3;05-5;08, M=4;03) recruited in Connecticut and Maryland daycares. 20 of the children were excluded from the analysis, as they
failed to correctly answer at least 3 of the 4 control trials.15 I will discuss the results from the remaining 72
children (3;06-5;08, M=4;03), 42 of whom were randomly assigned to three test conditions, and 30 of whom
were randomly assigned to three control conditions, to be described in greater detail below.

4.1.2 Procedure
This experiment was a replication of Experiment 1, with children. We used the TVJT to test children’s interpretation of negatively quantified sentences containing any, a, and bare plurals. A single experimenter told a
series of short stories using cartoon pictures and animations created and displayed in PowerPoint. Prerecorded video clips of a puppet created the pretense that the puppet was participating in the task live via
webcam. Children were told that the puppet (‘Froggy’) was still very little and not very good at paying attention to stories; they were asked to fill out a report card for him, with the goal of helping him to learn how
to pay better attention. At the end of each story, the puppet was asked a question about the story. The child’s
task was to determine whether the puppet’s statement was ‘right’, in which case s/he was instructed to put a
stamp under the ‘smiley face’ column of the scorecard. If the puppet was ‘wrong’, the child was instructed
to put a stamp under the ‘sad face’ column of the report card. We also elicited follow-up justifications from
children to ascertain their reasons for providing yes or no responses. All children were tested individually,

15

12 of the excluded children were younger than 4 years of age; some of these children were inattentive
and could not complete the task.
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usually in a quiet room away from the classroom. Sessions were videorecorded for subsequent coding and
analysis.

4.1.3 Materials
The stories used in the experiment made negatively quantified statements felicitous. Each context clearly
provided different possible (sub)domains of quantification. On the critical test trials, the context would also
make one of these possible subdomains highly salient; importantly, the relevant subdomain was not the largest of the possible domain alternatives but rather a smaller subdomain. Depending on whether children accepted the negatively quantified test sentence, we could infer whether they were associating the relevant
indefinite with the more restricted subdomain, or whether it had to quantify over a larger domain alternative.
Yes- and no-responses, along with appropriate follow-up justifications, were taken as a measure of children’s
ability to restrict the domain of quantification to one of the domain alternatives.
Each child received two training items, followed by four test and four control items, which were randomized and counterbalanced. The four test trials varied in the dimension along which widening could be
expected (colour, pattern, size, and texture). An example test story is provided in Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1. Experiment 2: Example test story
(Slide 1/8)
”This story is about Donald and Daisy. They’re doing
some puzzles. See, they have to put a wooden star here, a
metal star here, and a fuzzy star here.
Oh no! The puzzle box is empty! Where all the pieces?”

(Slide 2/8)
“Silly Goofy! He’s taken all the puzzle pieces and hidden
them all over the attic! If Donald and Daisy want to finish
their puzzles, they’re going to have to find some stars!”

(Slide 3/8)
“Can you find all the wooden stars? Can you find all the
metal stars? What about the fuzzy stars? They’re all the
way up on the clock! Good job. Let’s see if Donald and
Daisy can find them.”
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(Slide 4/8)
“Donald and Daisy find all the wooden stars and all the
metal stars!”

(Slide 5/8)
“They can fit their wooden stars and their metal stars perfectly! What they each need to finish their puzzle is a
fuzzy star.”

(Slide 6/8)
“But Goofy did a really good job hiding the fuzzy stars up
on the clock. Donald and Daisy look and look but they
can’t find the fuzzy stars!”
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Slide (7/8)
“So they can’t finish their puzzles. Let’s ask Froggy
why.”

(Slide 8/8)
“EXP: Hey Froggy, why can’t Donald and Daisy finish
their puzzles?

(i)
(ii)
(iii)

‘Hmm... Donald and Daisy both can’t find any stars!‘
‘Hmm... Donald and Daisy both can’t find a star!‘
‘Hmm... Donald and Daisy both can’t find stars!‘

(ANY condition)
(A condition)
(BARE PLURAL condition)”

In this test story, the domain of quantification consists of a set of nine stars which vary along the contextually determined dimension of texture, i.e. there are three wooden stars, three metal stars, and three fuzzy
stars. The largest domain of quantification in this context is the one containing all nine stars. Possible subdomain alternatives in this context include: {wooden stars}, {wooden stars, metal stars}, {metal stars, fuzzy
stars}, {fuzzy stars}, etc. In the story, Mickey and Minnie have to find the stars in order to finish a puzzle; at
a critical juncture of the story, it is established that though they have been successful in finding the wooden
stars and the metal stars, they cannot finish their puzzles because they cannot find the fuzzy stars. Thus what
is at issue revolves around just one particular subdomain alternative (e.g., the fuzzy stars). At this point, a
puppet appears on the screen to answer a question about the story: Why can’t they finish their puzzles? with
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a negatively quantified sentence containing one of the indefinites: “Mickey and Minnie both can’t find any
stars!”/“Mickey and Minnie both can’t find a star!”/“Mickey and Minnie both can’t find stars!” The child’s
task was to decide if the puppet’s statement was correct (Did he say the right thing?). If the child restricted
the domain of the relevant indefinite to a smaller subdomain alternative (i.e. the fuzzy stars), s/he was expected to accept the statement; if the indefinite had to quantify over a larger domain, s/he was expected to
reject the statement.
The critical test sentences from the four test trials, along with the final slides that children saw when
presented with the test sentence, are provided in Table 6.
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Table 6. Experiment 2: Puppet’s statements on (4) test stories for (3) test conditions
ANY condition

A condition

BARE PLURAL
condition

Test story 1

‘Mickey and
Minnie both can’t
find any diamonds’

‘Mickey and
Minnie both can’t
find a diamond’

‘Mickey and Minnie both can’t find
diamonds'

Test story 2

‘Mickey and
Minnie both can’t
find any triangles’

‘Mickey and
Minnie both can’t
find a triangle’

‘Mickey and Minnie both can’t find
triangles’

Test story 3

‘Donald and
Daisy both can’t
find any hearts’

‘Donald and
Daisy both can’t
find a heart’

‘Donald and Daisy
both can’t find
hearts’

Test story 4

‘Donald and
Daisy both can’t
find any stars’

‘Donald and
Daisy both can’t
find a star’

‘Donald and Daisy
both can’t find
stars’
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The test sentences were pre-recorded with neutral intonation, and in particular without stress on the indefinite. Pre-recording the critical test sentences ensured consistency in stimuli across participants.
In addition to the four test stories, each child also saw four control trials. Two of the four control trials
had test sentences containing negation without any indefinites, and the other two control trials involved sentences containing the relevant indefinite without negation (i.e. some in the ANY condition, a in the A condition, and the bare plural in the BARE PLURAL condition). These control items ensured that children had no
problems comprehending negation and the relevant indefinites separately from each other. Test sentences in
the control trials could be associated with a yes- or a no-target; depending on how the child was responding
on the test trials, the experimenter selected the appropriate control sentences that would ensure a balance of
yes- and no- responses overall. Any child who did not answer correctly on at least 3 of the 4 control trials
was excluded from data analysis. The puppet’s statements on the negation control stories are provided in
Table 7, and the indefinite controls in Table 8.

Table 7. Experiment 2: Puppet’s statements on (2) negation control stories
Control story 1

‘Mickey and Minnie both didn’t find the squares’
(target: yes)
‘Mickey and Minnie both didn’t find the moons’
(target: no)

Control story 2

‘Mickey and Minnie both didn’t find the circles’
(target: yes)
‘Mickey and Minnie both didn’t find the suns’
(target: no)
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Table 8. Experiment 2: Puppet’s statements on (2) indefinite control stories
ANY condition
Control story 1

Control story 2

A condition

BARE PLURAL
condition

‘Mickey and Minnie both found
some suns’
(target: yes)

‘Mickey and
Minnie both
found a sun’
(target: yes)

‘Mickey and Minnie both found
suns’
(target: yes)

‘Mickey and Minnie both found
some circles’
(target: no)

‘Mickey and
Minnie both
found a circle’
(target: no)

‘Mickey and Minnie both found circles’
(target: no)

‘Mickey and Minnie both found
some squares’
(target: yes)

‘Mickey and
Minnie both
found a square’
(target: yes)

‘Mickey and Minnie both found
squares’
(target: yes)

‘Mickey and Minnie both found
some clouds’
(target: no)

‘Mickey and
Minnie both
found a cloud’
(target: no)

‘Mickey and Minnie both found
clouds’
(target: no)

42 children were randomly assigned to one of the three test conditions. We treated indefinite type as a
between-subject factor to avoid contaminating effects on subsequent trials. If a child happened to associate
an indefinite with a more restricted domain of quantification for example, we wanted to ensure that this domain restriction would not influence how they interpreted subsequent sentences containing other indefinites.
Thus children only heard one kind of indefinite across the four test trials.
In addition to the three test conditions described above, we also had three control conditions. The test
stories in these control conditions were parallel to those in the test conditions except that the three puzzle
shapes in each case did not vary along the relevant dimensions (colour, pattern, size, or texture); rather they
were of three completely different shapes, thus eliminating potential widening of the domain as a factor.
This allowed us to control for children’s ability to simply interpret the literal truth conditional meaning of
negatively quantified existential statements. The target truth values of these control sentences were the opposite of the target values in the test conditions, i.e. where we expected yes-responses on the plain indefinite
test conditions, we expected no-responses on the plain indefinite control conditions, and where we expected
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no-responses on the any test condition, we expected yes-responses on the any control condition. Examples
of the test stories from the control conditions are provided in Tables 9 and 10. In these conditions as well,
children received two training items, followed by four test and four control items, which were randomized
and counterbalanced. The control items were the same as those in the test conditions (two negation controls
and two indefinite controls), and were also dynamically presented to balance the total number of yes- and
no- responses. In all, 30 children participated across the three control conditions.
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Table 9. Experiment 2: Puppet’s statements on (4) test stories for ANY control condition
Test story 1

‘Mickey and Minnie both can’t find any diamonds’
(target: yes)

Test story 2

‘Mickey and Minnie both can’t find any triangles’
(target: yes)

Test story 3

‘Donald and Daisy both can’t find any hearts’
(target: yes)

Test story 4

‘Donald and Daisy both can’t find any stars’
(target: yes)
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Table 10. Experiment 2: Puppet’s statements on (4) test stories for A and BARE PLURAL control
conditions
A condition

BARE PLURAL condition

Test story 1

‘Mickey and Minnie both
can’t find a diamond’
(target: no)

‘Mickey and Minnie both
can’t find diamonds'
(target: no)

Test story 2

‘Mickey and Minnie both
can’t find a triangle’
(target: no)

‘Mickey and Minnie both
can’t find triangles’
(target: no)

Test story 3

‘Donald and Daisy both
can’t find a heart’
(target: no)

‘Donald and Daisy both
can’t find hearts’
(target: no)

Test story 4

‘Donald and Daisy both
can’t find a star’
(target: no)

‘Donald and Daisy both
can’t find stars’
(target: no)
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4.2

Results

4.2.1 Control Conditions
The results from the three control conditions are provided in Table 11. Children performed at or near ceiling
on all three conditions. In other words, when domain widening was not at issue, children appeared targetlike in their comprehension of sentences containing any, a, and bare plurals.

Table 11. Control results from child experiment (n=30)
Target
response

N

Observations

# target
responses

% target
responses

ANY control

T

10

40

40

100

A control

F

10

40

39

98

BARE PLURAL control

F

10

40

40

100

Condition

4.2.2 Test Conditions
The results from the three test conditions are provided in Figure 2. A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant
main effect of indefinite type (F(2,39)=7.74, p<.01). Children were significantly more accepting in the Acondition than in the ANY-condition (Tukey HSD, p<.05), and likewise were significantly more accepting in
the BARE PLURAL condition than in the ANY-condition (Tukey HSD, p<.01). There were no significant differences between children’s performance on the two plain indefinite conditions.
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Let us now compare the children’s performance to that of the adults in Experiment 1. A 2x3 ANOVA revealed a main effect of indefinite (F(2,108)=51.74, p<.001), a main effect of group (F(1,108)=4.35, p<.05),
and a significant interaction (F(2,108)=3.82, p<.05) (Fig. 3). While children were adult-like in both plain
indefinite conditions, they were more accepting of any than adults (Tukey HSD, p<.05). This asymmetry
was driven primarily by four children who accepted any on at least 3 of the 4 trials, providing justifications
consistent with domain restriction to the salient subdomain.
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Figure 4 presents the distribution of children in the ANY-condition across three response-type categories:
those who rejected at least 3 out of 4 test sentences, those who provided an equal number of yes- and noresponses, and those who accepted at least 3 out of 4 test sentences.

The individual responses thus reveal that the children were generally consistent in their responses, whether
they interpreted any with a wider domain or a more restricted domain.

4.2.3 Follow-Up Justifications
We elicited follow-up justifications to ensure that children were accepting or rejecting the test sentences for
the expected reasons. For example, following a yes-response, children were asked, “How do you know
(Froggy’s right)?” Following a no-response, they might hear, “How do you know (Froggy’s wrong)?” or
“What really happened in the story?” 16

16

Justifications were elicited following both positive and negative responses, so as not to bias the child
towards one or the other. For example, we did not want the child to think that they would have to back up
their answers only if they rejected the puppet’s statement, potentially discouraging the child from providing
no-responses. Consistent elicitation of justifications thus ensured that the experimenter was not responding
differently to the children’s yes and no responses.
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Children’s follow-up justifications for their responses were generally adult-like. In accepting the plain
indefinite statements, children made reference to the salient subdomains:

(19)

(20)

[CHI-44 (age 4;04), A condition]
PUPPET:

Hmm... Donald and Daisy both can’t find a heart.

CHI:

Donald and Daisy both can’t find a heart.

EXP:

Was he right?

CHI:

Yes!

EXP:

Yes? How do you know?

CHI:

Because they can’t find these hearts. [gesturing to the small hearts]

[CHI-07 (age 4;07), BARE PLURAL condition]
a. PUPPET:

Hmm... Mickey and Minnie both can’t find diamonds.

EXP:

Was he right?

CHI:

Yes!

EXP:

Yes, good job!

CHI:

They couldn’t find the-

EXP:

The...

CHI:

The blue diamonds.

EXP:

So did he say the right thing?

CHI:

Yes.

b. PUPPET:

Hmm... Minnie and Mickey both can’t find triangles.

EXP:

Was he right?

CHI:

Yes! Striped ones.

Children who were adult-like in rejecting any statements were also adult-like in their justifications. Some
made reference to the backgrounded subdomains, suggesting these could not count as exceptions to the domain of quantification:
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(21)

(22)

[CHI-03 (age 4;05), ANY condition]
PUPPET:

Hmm... Donald and Daisy both can’t find any stars.

EXP:

Was he right?

CHI:

[shakes head]

EXP:

No? Was he paying attention or was he being silly?

CHI:

No!

EXP:

[laugh] Was he being silly?

CHI:

Yeah!

EXP:

Okay. Why- what should he have said? Did he say the wrong thing?

CHI:

Yeah!

EXP:

What should he have said? What do you think?

CHI:

They couldn’t find the fuzzy stars, but he said they couldn’t find ANY stars.

[CHI-14 (age 4;01), ANY condition]
PUPPET:

Hmm... Donald and Daisy both can’t find any stars.

EXP:

Was he right?

CHI:

[shakes head]

EXP:

No? What should he have said?

CHI:

They found two stars!

EXP:

What did they find? They found...

CHI:

Two woodens and two of the ...

EXP:

Metal?

CHI:

Yeah, the metal ones.

The children who were non-adult-like in accepting any-statements provided follow-up justifications that resembled those provided by children who accepted the plain indefinite statements. These made reference to
the salient subdomain, suggesting the domain of any could be restricted to that alternative.
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(23)

[CHI-51 (age 5;01), ANY condition]
PUPPET:

Hmm... Donald and Daisy both can’t find any stars.

EXP:

Was he right?

CHI:

Mmhmm.

EXP:

How do you know?

CHI:

‘Cause (.) they’re all the way up here. [gesturing to set of fuzzy stars]

Note also that CHI-51 was able to repeat the test sentence containing any, ruling out the possibility that he
had simply misheard or ignored the any:

(24)

[CHI-51 (age 5;01), ANY condition]
PUPPET:

Hmm... Mickey and Minnie both can’t find any diamonds.

CHI:

He was right.

EXP:

He was right? How do you know?

CHI:

Because.

EXP:

Because what. What did he say?

CHI:

He said Minnie and Minnie (.) Minnie and Mickey can’t find any diamonds.

EXP:

Is that what happened in the story?

CHI:

Mmhmm.

Finally, one child (who passed all the control trials) appeared to question the use of any (25i,iii) and had
great difficulty deciding whether the puppet’s statement was right or wrong. Her follow-up justifications
suggested she was indeed focusing on the salient subdomain (25ii), but could not decide whether any was
being used appropriately. She ultimately accepted the puppet’s any statements (25iv), perhaps behaving
charitably since the common noun phrase the puppet had used was correct.
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(25)

[CHI-55 (age 4;09), ANY condition]
PUPPET:

Minnie and Mickey both can’t find any triangles.

EXP:

Was he right?

(i) CHI:

Any triangle?

EXP:

Yeah. Is that right or is that silly?

CHI:

Hm... I don’t know.

EXP:

You don’t know. It’s kinda hard?

CHI:

Yeah.

(ii) EXP:

What happened in the story?

CHI:

The striped triangles are up the light.

EXP:

Yeah. So did he say the right thing or did he say something not so good?

CHI:

I don’t know anyway[?]

EXP:

Hm?

CHI:

I don’t know anyways...

EXP:

You don’t really know?

CHI:

Yeah...

[The experimenter asks the puppet to repeat himself.]
PUPPET:

Minnie and Mickey both can’t find any triangles.

(iii) CHI:

Any?

EXP:

Yeah.

CHI:

Hm, I don’t know...

EXP:

You don’t know?

CHI:

I think...

EXP:

What do you think?

CHI:

xxx

EXP:

This one’s kinda hard, huh? Do you think we should give him a smiley or do you
think he should say it better next time?
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(iv) CHI:

I think... the smiley.

In sum, regardless of whether the children’s responses was target-like or not, the justifications were generally consistent with a particular interpretation of the indefinite, allowing us to ascertain how widely the relevant indefinite was quantifying.

4.3

Discussion

The widening analysis of any predicts a difference between any and plain indefinites in terms of their respective tolerance for exceptions. The 4-year-olds in our study indeed appeared to interpret the plain indefinites a and bare plurals as being more tolerant of exceptions; they interpreted these as quantifying over narrower domains compared to any. Moreover, for most of the children, any appeared to quantify over the widest domain alternative available in the context. Previous studies on any did not target this particular difference between any and plain indefinites. Experiment 2 thus provides novel evidence that most 4-year-olds are
adult-like with respect to any’s domain widening property. Chapter 5 will examine the learnability of domain
widening, i.e. how children arrive at the target knowledge of any’s semantics.
While the majority of our 4-year-olds were adult-like in rejecting any (and providing appropriate justifications), four children failed to widen the domain. This is a useful finding because it reveals that testing only
for narrow scope is insufficient to fully assess knowledge of any. After all, we tested children in the same
age range as those who were shown in previous studies to have adult-like knowledge of the licensing condition on any. It would be reasonable to assume that our child participants would also know the licensing condition on any. Yet we are left with a bit of a puzzle: our children appeared to interpret any as they would any
plain indefinite (at least in terms of domain widening). What could be behind this non-adult-like behaviour?
One possible explanation is that these children were illicitly wide-scoping any above negation, assigning a specific, wide scope reading to the indefinite not available in the adult grammar. While logically possible, this scenario is unlikely, given that all other measures of children’s sensitivity to the scope properties of
any and plain indefinites suggest that they are able to restrict any to the scope of negation. Moreover, it is
generally difficult to elicit the inverse, wide scope reading of indefinites above negation. Experimenters
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have succeeded, but not without concerted effort to bias towards the wide scope reading (cf. Miller &
Schmitt, 2004). One of the studies we reviewed in Section 3 specifically created contexts that would bias
towards a wide scope reading, and found that children wide-scoped a and some significantly less often than
adults did (Xiang et al., 2006). Given that we did not set out to target the wide scope reading of indefinites,
it would be somewhat surprising if the children we tested happened to allow illicit wide scope of any.17 But
perhaps the clearest reason to reject this explanation is that the non-adult-like children were not among the
youngest of the child participants; in fact, one was among the oldest, at 5;01. If by this age, these children
have not yet acquired the licensing condition on any, let alone its semantics, it is not clear how or when they
could. Moreover, spontaneous production data suggest that any can surface as early as around 2 years of
age, and once productive enough to be observable in the transcripts, is virtually error-free.
Alternatively, the observed non-adult-like behaviour may lie in the semantics of any. On Kadmon and
Landman’s (1993) analysis, it is specified in any’s lexical semantics that it must widen the domain and consequently strengthen the assertion. Under such an analysis, our non-adult-like children would appear to lack
this requirement, and thus would not interpret any as quantifying over ‘wide’ domains. This explanation
would work a bit differently under Chierchia (2006), wherein any bears a focal feature [+F] that triggers
obligatory exhaustification of subdomain alternatives, but widens the domain only when conditions on contrastive focus are met. On this analysis of any, one potential problem could lie in the focal feature specification on any, or the exhaustification process that should follow from the focal feature. In this case, a child

17

If the domain of quantification of an indefinite were restricted to a singleton set, it would be impossible
to tease apart the narrow scope and wide scope readings of the indefinite. This is in fact at the heart of
Schwarzschild’s (2002) analysis of so-called singleton indefinites. He argues that when a quantifier’s domain restriction is reduced to a singleton set, the quantifier is effectively scopeless. On the one hand, if this
is the case, then the potential scope confound in the a- condition is less pertinent; we would assume that the
any, a, and bare plurals all took narrow scope, and any differences in interpretation arose from the respective choice of domain alternative (i.e. the size of the domain of quantification). On the other hand, if wide
scope/specific readings of indefinites are truly indistinguishable from narrow scope ‘singleton set domain’
readings, then it can be argued that Experiment 2 did indeed involve contexts that biased towards a wide
scope reading of the indefinites; each test story involved one of the subdomains being more salient than the
others at the end of the story. Nevertheless, an explanation that says that the children were wide-scoping
any is an explanation that says they did not know the licensing condition on any, which is difficult to reconcile with the findings of previous studies that very young children are adult-like with respect to NPI licensing.
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might correctly assign an existential meaning to any, but without obligatory exhaustification, or without an
adult-like ability to exhaustify, they would treat any like any other plain indefinite; that is, the non-adult-like
children would merely interpret any as a. This might mean that they are free to restrict the domain of any to
any salient domain in the context, just as they would with a plain indefinite. This story would explain why
these children’s justifications for accepting the any-statements resembled exactly those justifications from
children who accepted plain indefinite statements. This explanation nevertheless runs into the same problem
as the scope explanation: given the relatively late age of the non-adult-like children, it begs the question of
when and how such children would cue in to the right feature specification for any. There is presumably no
abrupt change in the kind of evidence for any that children receive after 5 years; what would then trigger the
child to zero in on any’s [+F] feature? Moreover, this account would predict that the non-adult-like children
would allow any to appear in non-licensing environments. If it is obligatory exhaustification that rules out
any in non-DE environments and rules it in in DE environments, a child who lacks knowledge of obligatory
exhaustification should not exhibit the target restricted distribution of any. While we did not specifically test
for knowledge of NPI licensing (nor do we have spontaneous speech samples from the children tested in
Experiment 2), the data from previous studies (particularly those from children younger than the ones we
tested) are highly suggestive that children by 3 or 4 years of age are quite adept at restricting the distribution
of any to the scope of appropriate licensers.
A final, more plausible explanation might lie in performance factors, which may underlie one of two
problems. First, part of the exhaustification process involves identifying any’s (subdomain) alternatives, retaining them in memory throughout the story (until the critical test sentence is presented), and then exhaustifying all alternatives at that point. The observed non-adult-like performance may lie in difficulty identifying
or storing relevant subdomain alternatives in memory. 18 If at the end of the story, one has only the salient
subdomain and no other alternatives to consider, exhaustification is vacuous, and the any-statement essentially amounts to a plain negative existential statement quantifying over the salient subdomain. Thus these

18

This could be because restrictions on memory prohibit storing the subdomain alternatives in memory, or
because limitations on attention span lead to the exclusion of the previously mentioned alternatives as irrelevant, i.e. the child pays attention only to a limited set of objects in the story at a time, and disregards the
previous subdomains as irrelevant to the outcome of the story.
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children may very well have knowledge that any triggers obligatory exhaustification of subdomain alternatives, but may nonetheless fail to store the relevant alternatives, and thus appear to fail to “widen”. Finally,
somewhat relatedly, the same memory/attention limitations could yield a problem with contrastive focus,
which is required to generate the “widening” effect. In order to satisfy conditions on contrastive focus, the
domain of any has to be contrasted with smaller domains in the context. If the non-adult-like child has difficulty identifying or storing domain alternatives in memory, and by the end of the story is considering only
the salient subdomain (e.g., of fuzzy stars, or blue diamonds), there is no antecedent domain with which to
contrast that subdomain; in fact, since it is one of the more narrow domains, it itself does not have subdomain alternatives (only what would be referred to as superdomain alternatives). Without satisfying the conditions on contrastive focus, there can be no widening.
Most plausibly then, the subset of children who failed to widen the domain, for reasons of limited memory or attention span, disregarded the previously mentioned domain alternatives, thus appearing, on the surface, to allow exceptions to the domain of quantification for any.19

5. Summary
In this chapter, we identified the target set of syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic knowledge that children
must acquire with respect to any. We saw that children as young as 2;06 exhibit what appears to be a targetlike distribution of any, with extremely low rates of commission errors. We saw clear evidence from both
naturalistic and experimental data that children have target-like knowledge of the syntax and structural licensing conditions on any, as well as the narrow-scope existential semantics of any. Finally, the TVJT results presented in this chapter provide novel experimental evidence that at least some 4- and 5-year-olds are
sensitive to the domain widening property of any.
This naturally leads to the question of how children get to this adult-like state. In Chapter 5, we will discuss the nature of the evidence for NPI any in the parental input, and see that the evidence appears to be

19 A follow-up

study could attempt to reduce the required memory/attention load by reducing the complexity of the domain alternatives, for example by presenting only two kinds of objects rather than three (e.g.,
red and green diamonds).
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asymmetrically more helpful for pointing the child to the more structural aspects of any (i.e. its licensing in
the scope of negation) than to its semantics (i.e. domain widening). Chapter 5 will describe the puzzling
learning problem that the semantics of any raises. Before moving to that discussion however, the next chapter will be devoted to a discussion of the other half of the any-puzzle, which I have thus far neglected,
namely any’s free choice instantiation. We will see that despite producing free choice any rather infrequently
in their spontaneous production, 4-year-olds are surprisingly adult-like in their interpretation of modalized
sentences containing free choice any. Putting children’s knowledge of NPI any and their knowledge of free
choice any together as two halves of the same learning problem, Chapter 5 will then attempt an explanation
of how children arrive at the full set of target knowledge regarding polarity-sensitive any.
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Chapter 4
Children’s Knowledge of Free Choice any

1.

Introduction to Free Choice any

We have so far in our discussion largely neglected one dimension of any, namely its so-called ‘free
choice’ (FC) instantiation. In this chapter, we turn our attention to the question of whether children are
target-like with respect to (i) the distribution of FC any, and (ii) any’s semantic contribution to modal
statements such as You may choose any card. The first we will determine by examining the same samples of
children’s spontaneous production from the CHILDES corpora that we reported on in Chapter 3. The second
we will determine by experimentally investigating 4-year-olds’ comprehension of sentences containing FC
any. Along the way, I will introduce the relevant properties of FC any.
FC any is so-called because it generally expresses freedom of choice, as in the examples in (1)-(3); these
examples give rise to so-called ‘free choice inferences’ (FCIs):

(1) You may write your paper on any topic.
You may write your paper on topic A, and you may write your paper on topic B, and you may
write your paper on topic C, ...
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(2) You can have any flower you like.
You can have flower A, and you can have flower B, and you can have flower C, ...
(3) Choose any card.
You can choose card A, and you can choose card B, and you can choose card C, ...

While NPI any is interpreted as a narrow-scope existential with respect to its licenser, FC any is usually
interpreted as a wide-scope universal in modal statements (Horn, 1972; Ladusaw, 1979; Carlson, 1981;
Dayal, 1998); it is generally compatible with a variety of modal bases, including epistemic, circumstantial,
and deontic.

(4) Alexandre will read any book you give him.
(5) Ethan would do anything to help.
(6) Mathieu might take any of the trains.
(7) Sophie could take any bus to Storrs.
(8) Nicholas is allowed to attend any party.
(9) Press any key to continue.

FC any can be acceptable in episodic statements, but only with ‘subtrigging’, a phenomenon whereby postnominal modification of an any-NP in an episodic sentence rescues it from ungrammaticality (LeGrand,
1975):1

1 According

to Dayal (1998), FC any must quantify over the widest possible domain that includes all
possible individuals. A non-subtrigged, episodic sentence containing any would thus be unacceptable
because it is impossible to quantify over the widest possible domain that includes all possible individuals,
and to predicate something that is purely episodic of those individuals. Relative clauses or modifiers can
provide a temporal or spatial bound that restricts the domain appropriately, and thus these forms of
‘subtrigging’ ameliorate the grammaticality of the sentence.
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(10)a. *During her office hours yesterday, Sophie met with any student.
b. During her office hours yesterday, Sophie met with any student who dropped by.

FC any is also acceptable in generic statements:

(11)

Any dog chases sticks.

(12)

Any chef knows how to make pasta sauce from scratch.

As observed by Dayal (1998) however, FC any is not subject to quantificational variability effects: while the
regular indefinite statement in (13a) typically acquires the quantificational force of the adverb usually,
resulting in a meaning like (13b), the any-statement in (13c) only has a frequency reading (e.g., any given
owl usually hunts mice).

(13)a. An owl usually hunts mice.
b. Most owls hunt mice.
c. Any owl usually hunts mice.
(Dayal, 2004:04)

FC any also appears in imperatives, but seems to carry existential force in such statements (Chierchia, 2013,
among others). (13) and (14) for example do not require that all buttons be pushed.

(14)

To proceed, push any button.

(15)

For assistance, press any number and an operator will assist you.

The distribution of FC any thus differs from that of NPI any, and much debate has centered on the
apparently distinct quantificational force of the two. This has led to two main camps: a uniformity camp that
treats the two as a single lexical item, and a universal approach that treats FC any as a universal quantifier. In
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many respects, FC any patterns with universals. For example, while NPI any patterns with existentials in its
incompatibility with almost-modification (16)-(17), FC any patterns with universals (18)-(19) (Carlson,
1981; Kadmon & Landman 1993):

(16)

*Almost some lawyer could answer that question.

(17)

*I don’t have almost any potatoes.

(18)

Almost every lawyer could answer that question.

(19)

Almost any lawyer could answer that question.
(Carlson, 1981; Kadmon & Landman, 1993:354,355)

According to Chierchia (2006, 2013), a uniformity approach better captures the observation that the polaritysensitive/FC ambiguity is not restricted to English; in fact, any has parallels in many other languages,
suggesting the apparent ambiguity is likely not coincidental.2 Haspelmath’s (1997) typological study of
indefinite pronouns for example yields the observation that languages split roughly equally into two groups:
those that, like English, use the same morphemes for FC and polarity-sensitive elements, and those that use
separate ones, such as Italian. Among languages that pattern like English are the typologically unrelated
Tagalog and Mandarin. The historical evolution of any also provides evidence of a strong relatedness
between polarity-sensitive and FC items. Chierchia reports that the Proto-Indo-European word oinos ‘one’
evolved into a restricted number of possible indefinite types across languages: for example, it evolved into a
2

Kadmon and Landman’s (1993) analysis of any, which we introduced in Chapter 2 in our discussion of
domain widening, is one example of a unified approach to NPI/FC any. Recall that under their analysis,
any-NPs are existential indefinites, but contribute an additional semantic component: they widen the
domain of quantification along a contextually given dimension. Regarding FC uses, Kadmon and Landman
propose that any acquires its universal flavour in combination with a generic operator, the latter being what
actually supplies the universal quantificational force. Thus the difference in quantificational force is
essentially reduced to the difference between a non-generic and a generic indefinite. In contrast to this
view, Dayal (1998) (see also Dayal, 2004 and discussion in Chierchia, 2013) treats FC any as a universal
quantifier ranging over possible individuals. The difference between any and an ordinary universal
quantifier like every lies in their respective domains of quantification: while every quantifies over a precise
extensional domain, any quantifies over the widest possible domain consistent with its property denoting
argument, making it essentially modal in nature. While some of the child data presented in this chapter will
touch on the NPI/FC debate, the primary aim of the chapter will not be to contribute to the ongoing debate.
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plain indefinite in German, NPI/FC any in English, and in Italian, a plain indefinite in the plural form but a
pure NPI in the singular form.3 Chierchia suggests that such items (e.g., plain indefinites, polarity-sensitive
indefinites, items that oscillate between NPI and FC uses) form contiguous grammatical classes that easily
transition from one to another. He provides a theoretically driven typology of possible polarity-sensitive
indefinites one might expect to find across languages. This system assumes a deep, systematic connection
between polarity sensitivity and free choice. In Chapter 5, we will turn to the question of how children
acquire such a system of polarity-sensitive items, at which point we will examine Chierchia’s typology in
further detail, in particular considering how it might restrict the hypothesis space of the language learner. For
now, our main aim is to determine whether 4- and 5-year-old English-speaking children are target-like with
respect to the distribution and semantics of FC any.

2.

Corpus Study 2: Children’s Spontaneous Production of FC any

In this section I investigate children’s knowledge of FC any by examining their spontaneous production of
any. We have already seen that children are quite target-like in their spontaneous production of NPI any,
producing it almost exclusively in well-licensed environments. Are they likewise aware of the distributional
restrictions on FC any?
In addition, we will also consider the age at which FC any emerges, relative to when NPI any emerges.
Just as there are two main camps in the theoretical debate over the lexical status of any, the child learner
might similarly entertain two hypotheses: either NPI and FC any are distinct lexical items, or they are a
single item. If children treat the two as a single lexical item, we might expect NPI and FC uses to emerge
concurrently. On the other hand, if the children treat them as distinct lexical items, all else being equal, there
is no particular expectation as to a relative order of acquisition.

3

Citing a personal communication with G. Carlson, Chierchia reports that uses of English any were
restricted to purely negative polarity uses in Old/Middle English, up until the early 16th century.
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2.1

Method

I examined the spontaneous speech transcripts from the same 40 English-speaking children whose
spontaneous speech transcripts were examined in Chapter 3. There were 18 American children, covering the
age range 0;11,04-5;02,12, and 22 British children covering the age range 1;08,22-4;11,20; these corpora are
available on the CHILDES database (MacWhinney, 2000), and are listed again in Tables 1 and 2.

Table 1. American English: Corpora under study
CORPUS

CHILD

AGE RANGE

NO. OF TRANSCRIPTS

NO. OF UTTERANCES

Peter

1;09,07 – 3;01,21

20

23,000

Adam

2;03,04 – 5;02,12

55

45,371

Sarah

2;03,05 – 5;01,06

139

31,195

Eve

1;06,00 – 2;03,00

20

10,856

Trevor

2;00,27 – 3;11,27

28

6,568

Abe

2;04,24 – 5;00,11

210

22,684

Alex

1;11,16 – 3;03,21

56

31,423

Ethan

0;11,04 – 2;11,01

50

21,898

Lily

1;01,02 – 4;00,02

80

39,852

Naima

0;11,28 – 3;10,10

83

43,542

Violet

1;02,00 – 3;11,24

54

17,274

William

1;04,10 – 3;04,15

44

21,220

Sachs

Naomi

1;02,29 – 4;09,03

93

15,542

Suppes

Nina

1;11,16 – 3;03,21

56

31,423

Weist

Emily

2;06,06 – 4;05,19

23

7,264

Emma

2;07,08 – 4;08,04

28

6,669

Mat

2;03,10 – 5;00,05

56

10,157

Roman

2;02,20 – 4;07,20

42

11,064

TOTAL

1,137

397,002

Bloom

Brown

Demetras
Kuczaj

Providence
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Table 2. British English: Corpora under study
CORPUS

Belfast

Lara

Manchester

Thomas

CHILD

AGE RANGE

NO. OF TRANSCRIPTS

NO. OF UTTERANCES

Barbara

2;04,09 – 4;01,18

14

2503

Conor

3;08,14 – 4;06,05

14

3045

Courtney

3;04,00 – 4;00,11

7

2021

David

2;00,03 – 4;02,03

14

2472

Johnny

3;06,00 – 4;04,01

7

1678

Michelle

2;04,28 – 4;04,19

14

3075

Rachel

2;05,25 – 2;09,16

8

1184

Stuart

3;05,12 – 4;05,04

11

3369

Lara

1;09,13 – 3;03,25

120

47,876

Anne

1;10,07 – 2;09,10

68

19,866

Aran

1;11,12 – 2;10,28

66

17,111

Becky

2;00,07 – 2;11,15

68

23,300

Carl

1;08,22 – 2;08,15

65

24,857

Dominic

1;10,25 – 2;10,16

68

21,097

Gail

1;11,27 – 2;11,12

68

16,947

Joel

1;11,01 – 2;10,11

68

17,862

John

1;11,15 – 2;10,24

64

13,303

Liz

1;11,09 – 2;10,18

68

16,545

Nicole

2;00,25 – 3;00,10

68

16,937

Ruth

1;11,15 – 2;11,21

66

20,295

Warren

1;10,06 – 2;09,20

67

16,587

Thomas

2;00,12 – 4;11,20

379

198,647

TOTAL

1,392

490,577
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The analysis in Chapter 3 made use of the kwal and combo programs available on CLAN to extract all child
utterances containing any. I discounted imitations, repetitions, routine utterances, single-word utterances
(including those consisting solely of any+NounPhrase), and unclear utterances where “xxx” or “yyy”
preceded any in the utterance, such that a potential licenser might be occluded. I then sorted out the FC
occurrences from the NPI occurrences,4 using as much preceding and following discourse context in the
transcripts as necessary to interpret the children’s uses. I then determined whether these were grammatical
occurrences of any.
Next, to examine the question of whether both NPI and FC uses of any emerge concurrently, I
determined whether there were statistically significant chronological gaps between the onset of each kind of
any. If there is a high enough frequency of the two kinds of any, the Binomial Test (Snyder, 2007: Ch. 5) can
be used to help judge whether the observed chronological gap between the two is simply due to a lower
frequency of use of the construction emerging later. The rationale behind the Binomial Test is that if the
grammatical knowledge for one construction is identical to the grammatical knowledge required for another
construction, the two constructions ought to emerge around the same time. We thus adopt the null hypothesis
that the polarity-sensitive and FC instantiations of any become available to the child concurrently. Of course,
it is impossible for the first single occurrence of any to be simultaneously polarity-sensitive and FC, such
that one will naturally surface ‘before’ the other; 5 the Binomial Test allows us to determine whether the gap
that we find between the two is statistically significant. Assuming that the two kinds of any maintain the
same relative frequency once they are available, non-significance of the Binomial Test based on relative
frequency indicates that the observed chronological gap is fully consistent with concurrent emergence, given
the lower probability of sampling the less frequent construction (Snyder, 2007).

4

In theory one can do this by separating those instances of any appearing in downward-entailing
environments and questions from those appearing in modal or subtrigged sentences. In practice, separating
the two kinds of uses was relatively straightforward, as most NPI uses involved sentential negation, and
most FC occurrences involved overt modals.
5 A distinct

but unlikely possibility is that the first utterance containing any would contain two any’s, one
polarity-sensitive and one FC. This was not observed in any of the corpora.
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2.2

Results

As a group, the American children only produced 38 instances of FC any, 18 of them from Adam (Brown
corpus). The British children as a group only produced 29 instances of FC any, 25 of them from Thomas
(Thomas corpus). Collapsing the two groups, we find a total of 66 instances of FC any, 64 of which look
unquestionably adult-like, occurring either in a dispositional statement or with some other overt modal. Of
the 64 grammatical occurrences of FC any, 57 involved modal statements, 10 of which also involved a
dispositional/characterizing meaning. Some examples are provided below:

(20)

Abe (Kuczaj corpus), Transcript 192 (4;08,07), Line 285
*CHI: you can bring it anywhere you want to .

(21)

Adam (Brown corpus), Transcript 52 (5;02,12), Line 3485
*CHI: you can paste it on anything .

(22)

Emma (Weist corpus), Transcript 26 (4;04,18), Line 364
*CHI: I can eat anything I want to .

(23)

Thomas (Thomas corpus), Transcript 351 (4;05,09), Line 1809
*CHI: it does anything your car does .

(24)

Thomas (Thomas corpus), Transcript 351 (4;05,09), Line 1440
*INV: and she carries everyone’s rubbish (.) out to the front .
*INV: and she collects everyone’s recycling as well .
*CHI: ahh .
*INV: what do you recycle ?
*CHI: I recycle anything .

(25)

Emily (Weist corpus), Transcript 4 (2;07,18), Line 638
*CHI: I can make him do anything .

(26)

Emily (Weist corpus), Transcript 23 (4;05,19), Line 469
*CHI: she can hold her, and I can do anything I want, like jump .
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Apart from the 64 relatively unquestionable adult-like occurrences of any, there were two instances of any
that were less adult-like; while there appeared to be a universal meaning intended, these were cases where an
adult would likely have produced every rather than any:

(27)

Emily (Weist corpus), Transcript 6 (2;08,13), Line 380
*CHI: I saw my Uncle Dave .
*CAR: what’d he talk about with you ?
*CHI: he talked anything with me .6
*CHI: he talked and talked .
*CHI: like he knowded [: knew] how to build my puzzles .

(28)

Joel (Manchester corpus), Transcript 33b (2;10,04), Line 1860
*CHI: I like pineapple .
*CHI: and this .
*CHI: and ready salted crisps .
*MOT: ready salted crisps .
*CHI: and salt .
*CHI: I [* 0have] got anything in my cupboard .7
*MOT: oh .
*CHI: got lots in my cupboard .
*CHI: in here .

6

FC any is generally not licensed in episodic sentences, unless there is post-nominal modification of any,
i.e. subtrigging. One could imagine an adult conveying (what is likely the intended meaning of) (27) with
something like, He talked about anything and everything with me. ‘Anything and everything’ seems to
introduce a modal dimension to the utterance, i.e. he talked about (or was capable of talking about) a wide
array of possible topics. It may be a fixed expression (reversing the two conjuncts seems less natural to my
ear). In any event, without the universal quantifier everything or subtrigging, (27) is ungrammatical.
7

Given the discourse context, one could imagine the child is trying to say something like, I’ve got anything
(you could imagine) in my cupboard. If there were sub-trigging, i.e. post-nominal modification of anything,
the sentence would be grammatical. ‘Covert sub-trigging’ however, is not possible in the adult grammar, so
despite the intended widened/universal meaning in (28), I’ve counted it as an error.
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It is impossible to look at individual error rates, since only two children produced more than a few isolates
of FC any. Emily produced only five instances of FC any, while Joel produced only one instance of FC any.
The overall error rate however (2/66) is quite low; thus the children who produced FC any were quite targetlike in their distribution of any.
Next, we consider the relative age of acquisition of NPI and FC any. 28 of the 40 children did not
produce any FC any at all. For those who did however, the age of onset of FC any varied from 2;07,18
(Emily) to 4;02,13 (Mat). Note that the Binomial Test is based on First of Repeated Uses, i.e. the first clear
use that is followed soon after by repeated uses (cf. Stromswold, 1996; Snyder & Stromswold, 1997); this
excludes isolated uses in early stages where a construction is likely not yet productive. 8 As such, running the
Binomial Test on a child’s data requires that the child demonstrate repeated use of the two items. In this case,
we require a sufficient frequency of NPI any and FC any. I chose 15 as an arbitrary cut-off for applying the
Binomial Test. Using this conservative measure meant that only two children could be considered: excluding
repetitions, imitations, and isolates, Adam (Brown corpus) produced 18 instances of FC any, and Thomas
(Thomas corpus) produced 25 instances of FC any. The Binomial Test results for Adam and Thomas are
given in Table 3.

Table 3. Binomial tests (NPI any vs. FC any)
# of earlier type of
# of earlier type of # of later type of
Child
any (NPI or FC)
any after gap
any after gap
during gap
Adam (AE)
32 (NPI)
14 (NPI)
15 (FC)
Thomas (UK)

229 (NPI)

227 (NPI)

24 (FC)

p-value
<.001**
<.001**

Both children’s p-values were highly significant, and remained so after a Bonferroni correction was applied.
For both children, FC any came in significantly later than NPI any. Figures 1 and 2 below show Adam’s and
Thomas’s use of NPI and FC any over time.

8

For example, the first occurrence of FC any in Adam’s transcripts appeared at 3;05,15. The next instance
did not appear until 15 transcripts later, at age 4;03,13, after which point it appears repeatedly (with no
larger than a three-transcript/three-month gap at most between consecutive uses). I therefore excluded the
first instance as an isolate, and took 4;03,13 as the onset of productive use of FC any.
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Onset of NPI any
(3;02,09)

Onset of NPI any
(2;07,22)

Onset of FC any
(3;06,00)
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Onset of FC any
(4;03,13)

Alongside these results from Adam and Thomas is the observation that 28 of the 40 children did not produce
any FC any at all, despite producing a number of NPI any. If these children treated NPI and FC any as a
single lexical item, it might be somewhat surprising that so many of them produced as many NPI any as they
did without producing a single occurrence of FC any.

2.3

Discussion

Summarizing the corpus study then, we see that the American and British English-speaking children who
demonstrated productive use of FC any were quite target-like in their spontaneous production. They rarely
produced commission errors, with FC any occurring extensively with overt modals. Although we must be
very cautious about drawing conclusions on the basis of two children’s data, we have also seen some form of
evidence that FC any emerges later than NPI any. This may suggest that (whatever the representation of any
in the adult grammar), children initially treat NPI and FC any as two different lexical items. If they are
encoded with different lexical semantics, there is no reason to expect a particular order of acquisition.
One possible objection to the idea that NPI and FC any are distinct categories for the children is the
following: two items that are really the same should surface concurrently only if all else is equal; in this
case, all else might be argued not to be equal. The FC use of any might be viewed as more complex, as it
involves either co-occurring (c)overt modals or subtrigged sentence structures. Thus even if there were only
a single any, we might see the FC use emerge later because it typically involves modals, which themselves
might emerge later. Consider Adam, for example, who produced 18 FC any, 11 of which occurred with the
overt modal can. One might object that perhaps Adam produced FC any significantly later because only later
did he develop productive use of the modal can. But if we compare Adam’s production of the modal can in
the period during which he produced NPI any but not FC any, to his production of can in the period
following the onset of FC any, i.e. when he had both uses of any available to him, we see that he in fact
produced more occurrences of can per 1000 utterances before the onset of FC any (roughly 48 occurrences
per 1000 utterances), than after (roughly 36 occurrences per 1000 utterances). Of course, we are using can as
a stand-in for modals in general; but given that more than half of his eventual FC utterances involved can, it
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seems unreasonable to hypothesize that Adam was initially prohibited from FC production due to a deficit in
his ability to produce an accompanying modal.
In sum, we do not have a clear argument for or against a unified approach to NPI/FC any in the
children’s language. What we know is that FC any either does not show up at all in the children’s
spontaneous production, or shows up virtually error-free, if productive. One drawback to trying to derive
generalizations from the spontaneous corpora is that FC any is generally not frequent in spontaneous
production; in Chapter 5 we will see that FC any corresponds to roughly 1-4% of all occurrences of any in
parental speech (according to three samples of parental spontaneous production). It is therefore difficult to
make any generalizations about children’s knowledge on the basis of spontaneous production. We will
therefore turn next to an experimental investigation of children’s knowledge of FC any.

3.

Deriving Free Choice Inferences 9

This section examines comprehension of FC any. Let’s begin by considering a particular kind of inference
that arises when FC any is used in a modal statement.
The use of a modal statement invites certain inferences, for example the “not-required-to” inference in
(29). 10 Plain disjunctions give rise to so-called exclusivity inferences, as in (30). Putting a modal and
disjunction together, as in (31), also invites an exclusivity inference. But in addition to this exclusivity
inference, the utterance typically also invites a further ‘conjunctive’ inference, namely the so-called free
choice inference (FCI) in (32). The existence of this inference is not expected under modal logic, and
moreover is absent from the plain disjunctive statement (33) (which in fact typically conveys the negation of
the conjunctive inference).

9

Much of the material presented in this and the next section draws heavily on Zhou, Romoli, and Crain (to
appear); see also Tieu, Romoli, Zhou, & Crain (2013) for further details.
10

Following terminology used in Zhou, Romoli, and Crain (2013).
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(29)

Jack may have tea
Jack does not have to have tea

(30)

not-required-to inference

Jack had tea or coffee
Jack did not have both tea and coffee

(31)

exclusivity inference

Jack may have tea or coffee
Jack may not have both tea and coffee

(32)

exclusivity inference

Jack may have tea or coffee
Jack may have tea and Jack may have coffee

(33)

free choice inference

Jack had tea or coffee
Jack had tea and Jack had coffee

Now consider a typical scalar implicature of the kind in (34), where the use of the weaker existential term
some invites the inference that the stronger statement containing the universal all is false.

(34)

Jack ate some of the fries
Jack did not eat all of the fries

Notice that the inferences in (29) through (32), like the scalar implicature in (34), are all defeasible; they can
be suspended without yielding a contradiction with the assertion:

(35)

Jack ate some of the fries
...and in fact he ate all of the fries

(36)

scalar implicature

Jack may have tea
...and in fact he might even have to have tea

(37)

not-required-to inference

Jack had tea or coffee
...and in fact he might even have had both
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exclusivity inference

(38)

Jack may have tea or coffee
...and in fact he might even be allowed to have both

(39)

exclusivity inference

Jack may have tea or coffee
...but I don‘t remember which

free choice inference

Given this similarity, a recent approach to FCIs is to derive them as a kind of recursive scalar implicature.
For the purposes of setting up the acquisition study that follows, I will briefly sketch the basic idea behind
an analysis like Fox (2007) (for specific details and alternative implementations, see Schulz, 2005;
Klinedinst, 2007; Chemla, 2010; Alonso-Ovalle, 2005; Franke, 2011).
Scalar terms typically invite so-called scalar implicatures. The basic Gricean reasoning is the following.
When we hear an utterance A, we compare it with stronger alternatives that the speaker could have uttered.
Assuming the speaker is co-operative and obeys the maxim of quantity, providing as much information as
required, we reason that if the speaker could have truthfully uttered B, s/he would have. Given that the
speaker chose not to, we make the inference that B is false in the speaker’s mind. For example, this
reasoning gives rise to the inference in (34), repeated below as (40): the speaker uttered the sentence
containing some, when the alternative containing all (which entails the some-statement) would have been
stronger. Given the speaker did not utter the all-statement, we infer that it must be false.

(40)

Jack ate some of the fries
Jack did not eat all of the fries

Consider how this reasoning applies in the case of our FC disjunction. For a sentence like (41), we have to
consider the individual disjuncts as alternatives (cf. Sauerland, 2004). That is, the disjuncts themselves are
competitors of the disjunctive assertion. A second crucial ingredient in analyses such as Fox (2007), is the
element of recursivity: we must consider not just the alternatives, but these alternatives enriched with any
inferences they might themselves give rise to (see also Kratzer & Shimoyama, 2002; Alonso-Ovalle, 2005,
among others), i.e. we must compare the assertion to its strengthened alternatives. Put differently,
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exhaustification will apply to pre-exhaustified alternatives, i.e. alternatives that are themselves exhaustified.
In a context where tea and coffee are salient alternatives, (41a) gives rise to the alternatives in (41b) and
(41c).

(41)a. Ethan may have tea or coffee
b. EXH(Ethan may have tea)
i.e. Ethan may have tea and Ethan may not have coffee (Ethan may only have tea)
c. EXH(Ethan may have coffee)
i.e. Ethan may have coffee and Ethan may not have tea (Ethan may only have coffee)

The strengthened alternatives in (b) and (c) are both stronger than the assertion in (a); exhaustification
therefore eliminates them:

(42)a. Ethan may have tea or coffee
b. NOT(EXH(Ethan may have tea))
i.e. it’s not the case that Ethan may only have tea
c. NOT(EXH(Ethan may have coffee))
i.e. it’s not the case that Ethan may only have coffee
d. Ethan may have tea and Ethan may have coffee

Given that Ethan is not restricted to one or the other, it follows that he may have either tea or coffee (he has
free choice of the two). Thus we have our FCI in (42d).
FC indefinites like any have been analyzed on a par with FC disjunction (cf. Krifka, 1994; Chierchia,
2006, 2013). The literal meaning of (43a), in a context where the relevant alternatives include tea, coffee,
and juice, corresponds to the disjunctive assertion in (43b). Recall that the alternatives of any are its
contextually defined (sub)domain alternatives, in this case: {teas}, {teas, coffees}, {teas, juices}, {juices},
{coffees, juices}, etc. Obligatory exhaustification of the strengthened domain alternatives (43c-e), as in the
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case of FC disjunction, gives rise to the FCI in (43f), which conveys that Ethan has free choice of these
various subdomain alternatives.

(43)a. Ethan may have anyD drink

[where D includes tea, coffee, juice]

b. Ethan may have tea, coffee, or juice
c. NOT(EXH(Ethan may have tea))
i.e. it’s not the case that Ethan may only have tea
d. NOT(EXH(Ethan may have coffee))
i.e. it’s not the case that Ethan may only have coffee
e. NOT(EXH(Ethan may have juice))
i.e. it’s not the case that Ethan may only have juice
f.

Ethan is allowed to have tea and Ethan is allowed to have coffee and Ethan is allowed to have juice

Returning now to the acquisition question, the next section presents an experiment designed to test
children’s ability to compute such FCIs arising from the indefinite under the deontic modal is allowed to.

4.

Experiment 3: Children’s Free Choice Inferences from any11

4.1

Method

We used a modified version of the Truth Value Judgment Task (Crain & Thornton, 1998, 2000) to
investigate children’s comprehension of FC any in deontic modal statements.

4.1.1 Subjects
16 English-speaking children from the Sydney area were tested at Macquarie University, Australia. One
child failed the control items and was excluded from the analysis. The 15 remaining English-speaking

11

This study is also reported in Tieu, Romoli, Zhou, and Crain (2013).
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children were aged 4;01-6;08 (M=5;01). All children were acquiring English as a first language, according
to the information provided on parental permission forms. Families were paid $20 for participating.

4.1.2 Procedure
The TVJT was carried out by a single experimenter using a laptop computer. Stories were told (by the
experimenter) using cartoon pictures and animations created and displayed in PowerPoint. Pre-recorded
video clips of a puppet created the pretense that the puppet was participating in the task live via webcam.
Participants were told that the puppet was not very good at paying attention to stories, and were given a
scorecard to fill out in order to help the puppet to learn how to pay better attention. At the end of each story,
the puppet was either asked to recall something from the story or to describe something that had happened
in the story. Participants were asked to determine whether the puppet’s statement was ‘right’, in which case
s/he was instructed to put a stamp under the ‘happy face’ column of the report card. If the puppet was
‘wrong’, the participant was instructed to put a stamp under the ‘sad face’ column of the report card. Followup justifications were elicited from subjects to ascertain their reasons for providing yes or no responses. All
subjects were tested individually. Sessions were videorecorded for later coding and analysis.

4.1.3 Materials
We designed stories that made free choice statements felicitous. The critical test stories revolved around a
series of (child) cartoon characters and their babysitter Mr. Cat. It was established that Mr. Cat was in charge
of setting rules for the children to follow. Each story context clearly provided different possible
(sub)domains of quantification. On the critical test trials, Mr. Cat would utter a rule that indicated the
cartoon character could interact with one of the possible subdomains in some particular way, e.g., Lucy is
allowed to hold the big rabbits. Then the puppet was asked to recall the puppet’s rule, and would utter a FC
statement, e.g., Lucy is allowed to hold any rabbit! Depending on whether subjects accepted the FC
statement, we could infer whether they were computing merely the literal meaning (the disjunctive assertion
Lucy may hold the big rabbits or the medium rabbits or the small rabbits) or the FCI (the conjunctive
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inference Lucy is allowed to hold the big rabbits and Lucy is allowed to hold the medium rabbits and Lucy
is allowed to hold the small rabbits). The literal meaning (but not the FCI) was compatible with Mr. Cat’s
story, so if the child provided a no-response, we could infer that they were calculating the FCI. Thus yesand no-responses, along with appropriate follow-up justifications, were taken as a measure of the child’s
ability to compute FCIs.
Each child received two training items, followed by four test and six control items, which were pseudorandomized and counterbalanced. The four test trials varied in the dimension of the subdomain alternatives
(size, colour, texture, and kind of animal). An example test story is provided in Fig. 3.

Fig. 3: Experiment 3: Example test story
(Slide 1/3)
“Today Lucy is visiting a rabbit farm. There are big
rabbits, medium rabbits, and little baby rabbits! Will
Lucy get to hold the rabbits? Let’s see what Mr. Cat
says. Remember, he knows all the rules!”
(Slide 2/3)
“Mr. Cat says, “Lucy, you may hold the big rabbits, but
you may not hold the medium rabbits and you may not
hold the small rabbits, because they’re still growing.”

(Slide 3/3)
EXP: Hey Baba, can you tell us something about the
story?
BABA: Hmm... Lucy was allowed to hold any rabbit!
(target: no)

In this test story, the domain of quantification consists of a set of six rabbits which vary along the contextual
dimension of size, i.e. there are two big rabbits, two medium rabbits, and two small rabbits. The largest
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domain of quantification in this context is the one containing all six rabbits (two big, two medium, and two
small). Possible subdomain alternatives in this context include: {big rabbits}, {big rabbits, medium rabbits},
{small rabbits, big rabbits}, {medium rabbits}, etc. In the story, Lucy is visiting a rabbit farm and is told by
Mr. Cat that she is only allowed to hold the big rabbits, since the medium and small ones are still growing
and rather fragile.12 Next, a puppet appears on the screen and is asked to recall something about the story:
Can you tell us something about the story? He answers with a free choice statement: “Lucy was allowed to
hold any rabbit!” Participants were asked to decide if the puppet’s statement was right or wrong. If
participants computed only the literal meaning of the puppet’s statement (44a), they were expected to accept
the statement, as it was compatible with Mr. Cat’s rule; if they computed the FCI (44b), they were expected
to reject the sentence.

(44)a. Lucy is allowed to hold the big rabbits, the medium rabbits, or the small rabbits
b.

Lucy is allowed to hold the big rabbits and Lucy is allowed to hold the medium rabbits and
Lucy is allowed to hold the small rabbits

The four test stories are provided in Table 4. All of the puppet’s lines were pre-recorded with neutral
intonation, and in particular without stressing any. Having the critical test sentences presented via video files
ensured consistency in stimuli across subjects.

12 An

anonymous abstract reviewer raised the concern that the Condition of Plausible Dissent has not been
satisfied in such a trial. The concern is that if Mr. Cat’s rule makes reference only to the objects that Lucy
is allowed to carry out the action with, the child may consider that the same rule can apply to the other
objects, but has merely been omitted by Mr. Cat (rather than holding as prohibitions against carrying out
the action with the other objects). This however, is not the case. In every test story, Mr. Cat not only
explicitly prohibits against carrying out the action with the other (subsets of) objects, he also provides an
explanation for the prohibition. In the rabbit story for example, Mr. Cat says that Lucy is not allowed to
hold the medium or small rabbits because they are too small and fragile. Every story was consistent in this
respect, satisfying the Condition of Plausible Dissent.
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Table 4. Experiment 3: (4) free choice test stories
Test story 1

1. Today Emily is visiting a farm. Emily sees some pigs,
some cows, and a sheep! Will Emily get to feed the
animals? Let’s see what Mr. Cat says. Remember, he
knows all the rules!
2. Mr. Cat says, “Emily, you may feed the pigs, but you may
not feed the cows and you may not feed the sheep,
because they’ve already eaten.”
3. Hey Baba, can you tell us something about the story?
‘Emily was allowed to feed any animal’

Test story 2

1. Today Billy’s friends are going to come over and play
with him. Billy sees some yellow trucks, some red trucks,
and some blue trucks! Will Billy get to push the trucks
around? Let’s see what Mr. Cat says. Remember, he
knows all the rules!
2. Mr. Cat says, “Billy, you may push the yellow trucks, but
you may not push the red trucks and you may not push the
blue trucks, because they belong to the other kids.”
3. Hey Baba, can you tell us something about the story?
‘Billy was allowed to push any truck’

Test story 3

1. Today Lucy is visiting a rabbit farm. There are big rabbits,
medium rabbits, and little baby rabbits! Will Lucy get to
hold the rabbits? Let’s see what Mr. Cat says. Remember,
he knows all the rules!
2. Mr. Cat says, “Lucy, you may hold the big rabbits, but you
may not hold the medium rabbits and you may not hold
the small rabbits, because they’re still growing.”
3. Hey Baba, can you tell us something about the story?
‘Lucy was allowed to hold any rabbit’

Test story 4

1. Today Mary’s daycare has some very special decorations
up. Mary sees some fuzzy stars, some wooden stars, and
some metal stars! Will Mary get to touch the stars? Let’s
see what Mr. Cat says. Remember, he knows all the rules!
2. Mr. Cat says, “Mary, you may touch the fuzzy stars, but
you may not touch the wooden stars and you may not
touch the metal stars, because they’re very fragile.”
3. Hey Baba, can you tell us something about the story?
‘Mary was allowed to touch any star’
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In addition to the four test stories, each child also saw six control stories. Control items consisted of: (i)
sentences containing only the deontic modal is allowed to to ensure full comprehension of the modal
without the FC indefinite; (ii) sentences containing the NPI any under negation;13 and (iii) sentences
containing FC any where the target response was yes, to ensure that children could plausibly give a yes
response to a FC statement where appropriate.14 While the four FC test trials and modal and NPI controls
were randomized, the two FC control trials were presented last, so as not to contaminate the children’s
interpretations of the critical test trials. 15
The control items allowed us to make sure subjects were on task, and controlled for children’s
knowledge of the relevant components of the critical test sentences. The modal and NPI control items could
be associated with a target yes or no response. If a subject provided a yes response to a given test story, the
following control item would have as its target a no response, and vice versa. This allowed us to balance the
overall number of yes and no responses. Any child who did not answer correctly on at least 3 of the 4
13

Ordinarily one would include control sentences containing just the FC indefinite without the modal, but
this was impossible, as any would be unlicensed in the resulting episodic sentence. Rather than introduce
the complication of subtrigging (e.g., Lucy held any rabbit that was close by), we chose to test children’s
comprehension of any by using its NPI instantiation, which at least allowed us to definitively isolate any
from the modal. Another reason to test any under negation was to control for the possibility that children
might interpret FC any as a universal like every or all (e.g., they would interpret the test sentence as Lucy
was allowed to hold every rabbit). Testing every-sentences in the same FC contexts would not help to tease
apart children’s comprehension of any and every, as presumably the target response in the case of every
would also be no (assuming children might interpret the sentence as, Every rabbit x is such that Lucy can
hold x). Justifications would also fail to tease apart the two interpretations, as they would be the same for
rejections of FC any and rejections of every (e.g., it is false that Lucy was allowed to hold any/every rabbit,
since Lucy was only allowed to hold the big rabbits). This is where the NPI controls came in handy; in
control story 1 in Table 6 for example, where Emily fed one giraffe, the sentence Emily didn’t feed any
giraffes should yield a no-response, unless it was interpreted as Emily didn’t feed every giraffe, in which
case the target answer would be yes. Thus a child’s response on such a trial could indicate whether that
child’s grammar distinguished any from every.
14

In other words, we wanted to rule out the possibility that a child (with a non-adult-like grammar) might
simply reject any sentence containing FC any, thereby giving the appearance of target-like performance on
the critical test trials.
15

Since the purpose of the FC control trials was to ensure that children could respond positively to a
felicitous FC statement, situating these trials after all the test trials (with a no-target) arguably stacked the
deck against us; if there were any contamination effect at all, it would go in the direction of children
rejecting the FC controls. If they successfully accepted these controls however, then we could be assured
that the children were not simply employing a reject-all strategy in their comprehension of FC statements.
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control trials were excluded from data analysis. The puppet’s statements on the modal control stories are
provided in Table 5, the NPI controls in Table 6, and the FC controls in Table 7.

Table 5. Experiment 3: Modal control items (2)
Control story 1

1. Sally is feeling rather hungry and goes to the kitchen to
find a snack. Sally sees some chocolate and an apple! Will
Sally have a snack? Let’s see what Mr. Cat says.
Remember, he knows all the rules!
2. Mr. Cat says: “Sally, an apple is much healthier than
chocolate. You may have an apple, but you may not have
chocolate.”
3. Hey Baba, can you tell us something about the story?
(i) ‘Sally was allowed to have an apple’ (target: yes)
(ii) ‘Sally was allowed to have chocolate’ (target: no)

Control story 2

1. Billy has finished his dinner and is feeling rather bored.
He could go for a swim or he could read some fun books.
Will Billy find something to do? Let’s see what Mr. Cat
says. Remember, he knows all the rules!
2. Mr. Cat says: “Billy, it’s not a good idea to swim right
after eating. You may read a book, but you may not swim
right now.”
3. Hey Baba, can you tell us something about the story?
(i) ‘Billy was allowed to read a book’ (target: yes)
(ii) ‘Billy was allowed to swim’ (target: no)
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Table 6. Experiment 3: NPI control items (2)
Control story 1

1. Emily is at the zoo and sees some little donkeys and some
big donkeys, and some little giraffes and some very tall
giraffes! The donkeys have already eaten, but the giraffes
are very hungry. Emily feeds the little giraffes but the tall
giraffes are too tall, so she doesn’t feed them.
2. Hey Baba, can you tell us something about the story?
(i) ‘Emily didn’t feed any giraffes’ (target: no)
(ii) ‘Emily didn’t feed any donkeys’ (target: yes)

Control story 2

1. Sally is playing a game where she has to find some hidden
shapes. She has to find some green and yellow triangles,
and some red and blue diamonds. Sally finds the red
diamonds but the triangles and the blue diamonds are
hidden up too high so she doesn’t find them.
2. Hey Baba, can you tell us something about the story?
(i) ‘Sally didn’t find any diamonds’ (target: no)
(ii) ‘Sally didn’t find any triangles’ (target: yes)

Table 7. Experiment 3: FC control items (2)
Control story 1

1. Today Mr. Cat brings Lucy to the pizzeria after school. Lucy
sees a pepperoni pizza, a ham pizza, and a veggie pizza. Will
Lucy get to order pizza? Let’s see what Mr. Cat says.
Remember, he knows all the rules!
2. Mr. Cat says: “Lucy, you’ve been a very good girl today.
You may order a veggie pizza, and you may order a ham
pizza, and you may order a pepperoni pizza.”
3. Hey Baba, can you tell us something about the story?
‘Lucy was allowed to order any pizza’ (target: yes)

Control story 2

1. Today Mr. Cat brings Mary to the ice cream shop after
school. Mary sees some strawberry ice cream, some vanilla
ice cream, and some chocolate ice cream! Will Mary get to
have some ice cream? Let’s see what Mr. Cat says.
Remember, he knows all the rules!
2. Mr. Cat says: “Mary, you’ve been a very good girl today.
You may have strawberry ice cream, and you may have
vanilla ice cream, and you may have chocolate ice cream.”
3. Hey Baba, can you tell us something about the story?
‘Mary was allowed to have any flavour ice cream’ (target: yes)
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4.2

Results

Children’s accuracy on the different trial types are provided in Fig. 6. Children performed at ceiling on the
FC and modal control trials. They accepted all FC control trials, and accepted and rejected the modal control
trials accordingly. They also performed well on the NPI control trials, with an accuracy rate of 87%. 16,17
Finally, children were also target-like on the FC test trials, rejecting these FC statements 95% of the time.18

16

The reader may recall that children as a group were only 66% accurate on the any test condition from
Experiment 2. The any control items here however are not directly comparable to the any test items from
Experiment 2. The test items on Experiment 2 all hinged on domain widening: if the sentences were
interpreted with a wider domain of quantification, no-responses were expected. The NPI controls here had
two possible versions/targets: the one that was used on 28/30 trials did not hinge on domain widening, and
thus are more comparable to the NPI control condition from Experiment 2 (on which children performed at
ceiling). Successfully accepting Emily didn’t feed any donkeys in Story 1 (Table 6) for example, only
required comprehension of the test sentence as a plain negative existential statement (i.e. because there was
only one ‘kind’ of donkey in the story). The control could however also be associated with a no-target, in
which case domain widening was at issue (Emily fed only a subset of the giraffes, so the child was
expected to reject Emily didn’t feed any giraffes). The purpose of this was the following: this version of the
control would only be used if the child was providing non-target responses on the test trials, i.e. accepting
the FC test trials. We wanted to know if a child who was accepting the FC test trials could nevertheless be
shown to be sensitive to the domain alternatives in the context. Testing them on NPI items where
sensitivity to the domain alternatives was required was a way to do this. (Children who were target-like on
the FC test trials would already be demonstrating sensitivity to domain alternatives, so the NPI controls
would not be required for this particular purpose.) Ultimately however, only two out of the 30 total NPI
control trials (across all 15 children) involved a no-target, and both trials were answered correctly by the
relevant children.
17

One question that might arise is why children did not perform at ceiling on the NPI controls. A one-way
ANOVA on the control conditions revealed a significant main effect of control type (F(2,42)=5.09, p<.05),
with the children being significantly less accurate on the NPI controls than either the FC or modal controls
(Tukey HSD, both p<.05). Moreover, recall that the children from Experiment 2 were at ceiling on the NPI
control condition. The reason this version of the NPI control may have been harder in comparison to the
NPI control condition in Experiment 2 is the following: these controls involved two kinds of objects, one
of which also involved subsets, e.g., donkeys vs. tall and short giraffes, while Experiment 2 NPI controls
merely involved three different shapes (and no subsets), e.g., triangles vs. hearts vs. circles. It is possible
that having to sort out the two kinds of objects and additionally two subsets of one of the kinds of objects
made the items slightly harder for the children. Nevertheless, what is important for us is that children
generally did well on all control conditions, with every child answering correctly on at least 3 out of 4
control trials.
18 Although

children’s accuracy overall was lower on the NPI condition than on the FC test condition, the
mean accuracy on the two conditions did not differ significantly (t(27)=-1.08, p=.29).
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Fig. 4: Children’s performance on FC control and test trials (n=15)
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Follow-up justifications from the the children allowed us to ascertain their reasons for accepting or rejecting
the statements. Justifications for rejecting the FC statements sometimes made explicit reference to the
subdomain alternatives that were and were not “allowed”, according to Mr. Cat’s rule. Children’s
construction of domain alternatives was also attested by their frequent use of the focus operator only, e.g.,
“Lucy was only allowed to hold the big rabbits.” Some examples of justifications are provided below.

(45)

[CHI-03 (age 4;09)]
PUP:

Hmm... Emily was allowed to feed any animal.

CHI:

Wrong.

EXP:

Wrong? How come?

CHI:

‘Cause he wasn’t paying attention.

EXP:

He wasn’t paying attention. He didn’t say the right thing. Do you remember what the
rule was? What Mr. Cat said?

CHI:

Mr. Cat said Billy, he’s only allowed to feed the pigs.
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(46)

(47)

[CHI-05 (age 5;03)]
PUP:

Hmm... Emily was allowed to feed any animal.

CHI:

No.

EXP:

No. How come?

CHI:

She was only allowed to feed the pigs.

EXP:

That’s right, and what did he say?

CHI:

He said Sal- he said Emily’s allowed to f- allowed to feed any animal.

EXP:

That’s right. And is that good or is that silly?

CHI:

That’s silly.

[CHI-06 (age 5;09)]
PUP:

Hmm... Billy was allowed to push any truck.

CHI:

He was being silly!

EXP:

He was being silly, how come?

CHI:

Billy wasn’t allowed to touch any truck.

EXP:

Yeah? What was the rule? What did Mr. Cat say?

CHI:

Um, he’s only allowed to um push the um yellow trucks.

Summarizing the data then, 4- and 5-year-old children appear quite target-like in their ability to compute
FCIs from FC any in deontic modal statements.

4.3

Discussion

4.3.1 Spontaneous vs. Experimental Data
We have thus far examined two sources of data pertaining to children’s knowledge of FC any: their
spontaneous production, and their comprehension in a carefully controlled experimental setting. There are
two observations worth considering in light of these two sets of data. The first is a commonality between the
two: both sources indicate target-like knowledge with respect to FC any. What little spontaneous production
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of FC any we could find was extremely target-like, suggesting that the children who produced it
productively were aware of the distributional constraints on any. The experimental data on the other hand,
showed us that the children we tested knew how to compute any’s semantic contribution in a FC statement.
That is, by the age of 4, children know how to compute FCIs from any.
The second observation has to do with the relative ages covered by the two data sets. We do not have
spontaneous production samples from the children who were tested on the FCI experiment, and conversely
we do not have experimental data from the children whose speech was recorded for the spontaneous
corpora. Thus we have to be somewhat cautious in generalizing across the two groups. But let us
nevertheless consider for a moment the relative age ranges. According to the spontaneous production data
from the two children who did exhibit productive use of FC any, FC any did not emerge until 3;06 (Thomas)
and 4;03 (Adam), significantly after the onset of NPI any in both cases. The children tested on the FCI
experiment on the other hand all did quite well, including the youngest at age 4;01. Thus it seems the age of
emergence of FC any corresponds roughly to the later end of our spontaneous age range, and roughly to the
lower end of our experimental age range, i.e. roughly around 4 years of age.
One could nevertheless hypothesize that children have knowledge of FC any earlier, perhaps from as
early as they have knowledge of NPI any, but that FC any statements are simply too infrequent to
adequately capture in the corpora examined (setting aside Adam’s and Thomas’ corpora). Perhaps the
circumstances that would invite modal statements containing FC any are not as numerous, and thus we see
what looks like an absence of FC any in many of the children’s earlier transcripts. The lack of longitudinal
speech samples and experimental data from the same set of children makes it difficult to draw such a
conclusion however, and we must be satisfied with a rough estimate of an upper limit; in other words, FC
any appears to be acquired by about 4 years of age, possibly earlier.
In summary, from the onset of their productive use of FC any, children appear to be target-like in their
spontaneous production, and moreover from as young as we can test them using the TVJT, also appear quite
target-like in their comprehension of FC any.
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4.3.2 On Children’s Knowledge of Alternatives
The experiment described in Section 4 builds on previous work by Zhou, Romoli, and Crain (to appear),
though this latter study had a slightly different focus and examined FCIs from disjunction rather than FC
indefinites. In this section, I’ll briefly compare the two studies, and discuss the implications of the findings
for children’s knowledge of alternatives (see Tieu, Romoli, Zhou, & Crain (2013) for details).
Zhou, Romoli, and Crain (to appear) (hereafter ZRC) examined children’s ability to compute FCIs from
disjunction in Mandarin, and found excellent performance. Their goal was to compare children’s
performance on FCIs and on scalar implicatures (SIs); if FCIs really are a kind of SI, one might expect
children to have some difficulty computing FCIs, given previous literature demonstrating children’s
persistent difficulties with SIs (see among many others, Chierchia et al., 2001; Gualmini et al., 2001; Guasti
et al., 2005). ZRC conducted a TVJT with 22 monolingual Mandarin-speaking children (3;07-4;09,
M=4;03). Children heard four free choice test trials and four scalar implicature control trials. On all trials, if
children computed the relevant inference (whether FC or typical SI), they were expected to reject the test
sentence. An example FC test story is provided below:

(48)

Typical FC test trial
[Context contains a green car, an orange car, and a purple car] Kung Fu Panda and Batman are
participating in a car-pushing competition. Before the competition, Mr. Owl (the judge)
explained the rules, telling Kung Fu Panda that he was only allowed to push the green car, and
telling Batman that he was only allowed to push the orange car. But Kung Fu Panda and
Batman were forgetful, so when the game was about to start, they asked the puppet to remind
them of the rules.
Puppet’s statement:
gongfu xiongmao keyi

tui

luse xiaoche huozhe juse xiaoche

Kungfu Panda

push

green car

may

or

‘KungFu Panda may push the green car or the orange car’
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orange car

Notice that the puppet’s statement on its literal interpretation is compatible with the context; on its FC
interpretation however, it contradicts the owl’s rule. Thus depending on whether children computed the
literal meaning or the FCI, ZRC could determine whether children had successfully computed the FCI.
Children heard two kinds of SI controls. On one kind of control, children heard disjunctive statements in
conjunctive contexts. For example, in a context where the red mermaid found both a white shell and a blue
shell, the puppet would utter the sentence:

(49)

hongse meirenyu

zhaodao-le baise

beike

huozhe lanse

beike

red

found

shell

or

shell

mermaid

white

blue

‘Red mermaid found a white shell or a blue shell’

If children computed the exclusivity inference (that the mermaid did not find both), they were expected to
reject the statement.
On the other control type, children heard an existential modal statement in a context compatible with a
universal modal statement. For example, in a context in which Mr. Owl said that Winnie the Pooh must eat a
green pepper, the puppet would utter the sentence:

(50)

weinixiong

keyi

chi qingjiao

Winnie.Bear

may

eat green.pepper

‘Winnie the Pooh may eat a green pepper’

Again, if children computed the “not-required-to” inference, they were expected to reject the statement.
ZRC found that children computed FCIs at a rate of 91%, compared to an SI rate of only 18%; their
performance on the two conditions differed significantly (Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test, z=4.52, p<.001). On
the face of it, this finding challenges the SI approach to FCIs. If FCIs are derived in the same way as SIs,
why should children succeed on one kind of inference but not the other?
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Building on recent work suggesting that children are better at computing SIs when the alternatives are
explicitly mentioned in the discourse context (among others, see Gualmini et al., 2001; Chierchia et al.,
2001; Barner et al., 2010), and more generally that children’s inability to derive SIs lies in a difficulty with
alternatives (Reinhart, 2004, 2006; Chierchia et al., 2001; Barner et al., 2011; Barner & Bachrach, 2010),
ZRC suggested that the reason their children succeeded on the FC condition was because the alternatives
required to compute the FCIs were provided explicitly as substrings of the disjunctive assertions. Thus
children performed well because the alternatives were explicitly mentioned as substrings of the test
sentences themselves, and not merely present in the discourse context. This account makes the prediction
that if the alternatives were not provided explicitly as substrings of the assertion, children might fail to
compute FCIs, as they often do with SIs. The data presented in Section 4 speak directly to this point; FC
indefinites are argued to give rise to the same kinds of FCIs as FC disjunctions, but the any-statements,
unlike the disjunction statements, do not explicitly provide the alternatives as substrings of the assertion.
Thus explicit mention as substrings cannot be the factor responsible for children’s success on FCIs. Rather,
Tieu, Romoli, Zhou, & Crain (2013) pursue a more fine-grained hypothesis based on the following
observation: children succeed on inferences involving alternatives that do not have to be: (i) learned as coscalar, or (ii) retrieved from the lexicon. Consider first the cases where children have been shown to have
difficulties: computing the not-all implicature from some, the not-and implicature from or, or the not-must
implicature from may. In these cases, there are (at least) two crucial ingredients for success. First, the child
must learn the co-scalar status of these terms, i.e. they must learn that some and all lie on the same quantifier
scale, and that they are related in terms of strength. Second, in order to compute the implicature when
presented with a some-statement (i.e. on an experimental task), the child must be able to retrieve the stronger
alternative all from the lexicon in order to compute the implicature. Failure to compute the implicature
could result from a deficit in either ingredient; that is, either the child has yet to learn the co-scalar status of
some and all, or the child is unable to retrieve all from the lexicon during the experiment.
In contrast, consider the inferences where children have been shown to succeed: SI conditions where the
alternatives are made explicit in the discourse context, FC disjunctions where the alternatives are explicitly
provided as substrings of the assertion, and FC indefinites where the domain alternatives are made salient
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and explicitly mentioned in the discourse context. What these inferences have in common is that the child
does not have to: (i) learn the co-scalar status of the alternatives, as they are either pragmatically or
explicitly provided; or (ii) retrieve the relevant alternatives from the lexicon, as, again, they are
pragmatically or explicitly provided.
Returning our discussion to any, what we have learned in this section is that children are quite adept at
computing FCIs off of any’s domain alternatives. This is consistent with the results from the NPI study
reported in Chapter 3, where many of the children we tested were also shown to be sensitive to any’s
subdomain alternatives. In general, children’s performance on SIs and FCIs suggests children can be quite
adept at making use of contextually provided alternatives. This allows them to succeed in the
comprehension of NPI and FC any: in the case of the former, the adult-like children successfully select the
largest domain and exhaustify the subdomain alternatives, and in the case of the latter, they succeed at
identifying the relevant subdomain alternatives and computing FCIs from those alternatives.

5.

Summary

In this chapter, we have seen more evidence of 4- and 5-year-olds’ target-like knowledge of the semantics of
any. In particular, we began by examining the distribution of FC any, and determined that if productive,
children’s spontaneous production of FC any is target-like. From the onset of productive use of FC any,
children use any in well-licensed modal statements and very rarely make commission errors. We then turned
our attention to the semantics of FC any, in particular examining the FCIs that arise when any is used in a
deontic modal statement such as, Lucy is allowed to hold any rabbit. The results of the TVJT reported in this
chapter revealed that 4- and 5-year-olds have no difficulty computing FCIs from FC any. The results were
shown to converge with previous work on FC disjunction in Mandarin. We discussed how these findings
bear on children’s knowledge of alternatives, and proposed that children are quite adept at computing
inferences based on alternatives that are provided in the discourse context or in the assertion itself. In
particular, as concerns any, children appear sensitive to any’s contextually determined domain alternatives.
This particular finding converges with a large part of the NPI data reported in Chapter 3.
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In sum, 4- and 5-year-old children are quite sensitive to the semantics of any. In the remaining chapter
of this dissertation, we will turn to the how question: how exactly do children arrive at the target semantics
for any?
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Chapter 5
The Learning Problem

1.

Where We Are Now

Up to this point in the dissertation, we have largely focused on what children know about any. After characterizing the negative polarity item (NPI) any in the adult grammar (Chapter 2), we examined in detail
whether 3-5-year-old children were target-like with respect to their production and comprehension of any.
We began Chapter 3 by highlighting the fact that previous studies exclusively targeted children’s knowledge
of the restricted distribution of any. These studies demonstrated that children by the age of 3-4 years are sensitive to the licensing condition on any. In addition to these studies, we examined samples of children’s
spontaneous production, which also clearly demonstrated young children’s sensitivity to the licensing condition. But the objection raised in Chapter 3 was that merely targeting children’s knowledge of the NPI licensing condition is not sufficient to tap into children’s knowledge of the semantics of any. The experiment presented in Chapter 3 demonstrated that as a group, 4-year-olds were sensitive to any’s subdomain alternatives,
and moreover interpreted any as quantifying over the widest possible domain in the context (although not all
the children were fully adult-like in this respect, a point we will come back to in the discussion in this chapter). In Chapter 4, we saw the results of an experiment with children in the same age range who were shown
to be adult-like in their ability to compute free choice inferences (FCIs) from any. That study provided fur-
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ther evidence of children’s adult-like competence with respect to any’s semantic contribution to the sentences in which it appears.
In this chapter, we will finally turn our attention to the how question, discussing how children arrive at
the target knowledge of any (on both its NPI and FC uses). According to the results of our experiments, the
acquisition of the semantics of any is for the most part complete by roughly 4 or 5 years of age. 1 How do
children get to this stage? Critical to this discussion is the nature of the evidence that children receive in their
linguistic input. I assume without question that the input must somehow lead the child to the target grammar;
the question is what precise aspects of the input are informative to the child in this respect, and how they are
informative in leading the child to the target. For example, does the superficial distribution of any lead the
child to its semantics? Does the relative frequency of any in different environments lead the child to its licensing properties? Do the larger discourse contexts in which any appears lead the child to its semantics? Is
there explicit evidence of domain widening, or of the process by which FCIs arise? These are the questions
we will address in Section 3, where we examine some samples of child-directed speech.
Ultimately, the proposal I will make roughly follows the following narrative (to be made more precise in
this chapter): we have seen experimental evidence that by the age of 4, children have knowledge of the exhaustification of any’s subdomain alternatives, of domain widening, and of FCIs from any under deontic
modals. We will see that the parental input provides distributional information as to the dual nature of any,
i.e. that it appears in DE environments and certain modal and sub-trigged statements.2 In contrast, it is not at
all clear whether the input provides evidence for how to exhaustify alternatives, how to widen the domain,
or how to compute FCIs -- all properties which we have demonstrated are adult-like in most 4-year-olds. I

1

In Chapter 3, I provided an explanation for the “non-wideners” (children who appeared to allow restriction of the domain of any), which appealed to performance factors. In this chapter I’ll aim to first provide
an account of the target-like children’s performance, and then within the same proposal, provide an alternative explanation for the non-wideners.
2

This could in itself pose a challenge to the learner, who has to sort out the two different uses of any. If a
learner is sensitive to the relevant properties of the two environments (i.e. to DEness in one, and to the
presence of a modal in the other), the child might be able to keep track of the two licensing contexts, and
make generalizations on the basis of the dual distribution. If the child was not (or could not be) attuned to
these properties of the context however, it’s not clear that the child could make accurate generalizations
about any’s restricted distribution.
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propose that the child must make use of the relatively clear evidence concerning the distribution of any in
order to arrive at the target grammar, where the target is the analysis of any as a polarity-sensitive element
that is interpreted as both an NPI and a FC item. I argue that the key lies in restricting the hypothesis space
of available options from which the learner must choose. When we look cross-linguistically, we see a restricted space of possible polarity-sensitive indefinite (PSI) types, which vary in systematic and predictable
ways. Ultimately I will propose that the child does not need explicit, positive evidence for how to exhaustify
subdomain alternatives, how to widen the domain, or how to compute FCIs. Put more strongly, the child
cannot rely on such explicit evidence, because it simply does not exist in the input. Given a restricted set of
options however, the distribution of any in the input is sufficient to allow the child to map any to exactly that
type of indefinite that triggers obligatory exhaustification of subdomain alternatives, that has the potential to
widen the domain of quantification, and finally, that gives rise to FCIs in certain modal contexts.

2.

Revisiting the Target of Acquisition

Before we turn to the child-directed speech, let us reiterate what must be acquired, i.e. what exactly we consider to form part of the target grammar at which the child must ultimately arrive.3 Once we have the target
in hand, we will be in a position to determine whether there is ample evidence in the input to derive these
target properties.
In Chapter 3, we attempted to identify the target along a couple of dimensions: on the one hand, we
identified a more structural dimension, which included a number of distributional facts about any as well as
its syntactic licensing condition; on the other hand, we discussed its semantics. With respect to any’s distribution, we identified the following relevant properties: (i) any surfaces as an indefinite determiner which can
3

The reader might object to the use of the term “target grammar”, as I am focusing on the development of
a particular lexical item, any. But ultimately I view the development of this lexical item as an integral (or
rather, representative) part of the development of the polarity sensitive system, which does, on the account
we’ll adopt, root polarity sensitivity within the domain of “grammar”. I do not view the development of
any as uniquely a phenomenon of word learning; of course the child must learn the word any and what
meanings it maps to, but on the view I adopt here (by and large, that presented in Chierchia (2013)),
grammatical operations (such as the generation of focal alternatives, exhaustification of these alternatives,
the checking of focal features that trigger exhaustification, etc.) will be part and parcel of the development
of the meaning of any. Thus to know the meaning of any is to know all of these aspects of grammar.
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take an NP complement (which itself can be elided); (ii) it can occur within an NP as part of a complex indefinite such as anything or anyone; (iii) it can be used as a modifier of the comparative adverb more. With
respect to the syntax of its licensing, we stated that the child has to learn that any must be c-commanded by
its licenser. Finally, with respect to the semantic dimension of any, we discussed the exhaustification of its
alternatives, as well as its domain widening property.
At this point, I’d like to be a bit more precise about what exactly needs to be learned about the licensing
condition on any. I take it for granted that the child’s grammar incorporates a notion of c-command that does
not need to be learned from the input, or at the very least, that such a notion is in place well before the emergence of any in the child’s production. Thus I will not focus too much on the structural licensing condition. I
would however like to be more precise about the semantic nature of the licensing condition. First, recall
Kadmon and Landman’s (1993) condition on any:

(1) Strengthening: any is licensed only if the widening that it induces creates a stronger statement, i.e.,
only if the statement on the wide interpretation => the statement on the narrow interpretation.
(Kadmon & Landman, 1993:369)

This account, while descriptively valid, is not particularly informative when transferred over to our discussion of the acquisition of any. On this account, and in fact on any account that merely states a licensing condition, what the child must learn about any is a lexically specified constraint on its distribution.4 On the one
hand, if we assume (1) to be the target semantic property, it is not clear how to go about probing for children’s knowledge of the property. Presumably, once the child has learned that (1) is part of any’s lexical semantics, its restricted distribution (i.e. its restriction to DE environments) will fall out naturally, since the

4 Alternative

proposals like Giannakidou’s (1998, 2011) non-veridicality account will similarly require that
the child learn some condition that is built into the lexical semantics of any; in the case of non-veridicality
for example, the child must learn, as part of any’s lexical semantics, a constraint against its appearance in
the scope of a veridical operator. Thus whatever the relevant licensing property is, accounts that merely
state the licensing condition in terms of a restricted distribution, will require that the child learn, as part of
the meaning of any, a stipulated licensing condition.
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condition is only satisfied in such environments. Thus one could take the child’s ability to restrict any’s distribution as indirect evidence that they had knowledge of (1).5
But considering more compositional accounts along the lines of Krifka (1995) and Chierchia (2013) that
build on the intuitions underlying (1) will allow us to better unpackage the precise elements that constitute
the target of acquisition. According to Krifka (1995), anything introduces a set of alternatives, of which anything is the most ‘general’ property; the alternatives of anything are all properties that are stronger (or more
specific) than the most general property of thing. A statement such as John saw anything asserts that John
saw something of the most general kind, but also generates a scalar implicature, leading to the negation of
the stronger alternative propositions. Doing so yields a contradiction, for it is impossible for John to see
something of the most general kind, while not seeing anything more specific. Essentially the sentence asserts
that John saw something, but generates an implicature that he did not see anything in particular. This semantic contradiction is what rules out any in non-DE environments. Chierchia (2006, 2013) builds on this proposal but implements it in slightly different terms. For him, any triggers a set of subdomain alternatives,
which obligatorily must be exhaustified. The obligatoriness of this exhaustification is implemented through
a system of feature-checking, whereby any is lexically specified with a focal feature that requires checking
by a covert exhaustification operator. As we saw in Chapter 2 (and as in the case of Krifka’s proposal), exhaustification of the subdomain alternatives succeeds in DE environments but yields a logical contradiction
in non-DE environments; this is how the restricted distribution of any is derived on this account. But note
that within this analysis, there is no formal correlate of “domain widening” or strengthening per se. To explain true widening of the kind seen in Kadmon and Landman’s examples, Chierchia invokes contrastive
focus. Given that any’s alternatives are subdomain alternatives, this nicely explains why, when contrasted
with a preceding plain indefinite statement, any is felt to create a stronger statement: the domain of any is
being contrasted with the more restricted domain of the preceding plain indefinite. But if there is no contrastive focus (i.e. no antecedent indefinite quantifying over a more restricted domain), any’s domain can be as
restricted as that of a plain indefinite. Finally, Chierchia also attempts to derive the NPI/FC dichotomy in a

Of course there will be other prerequisites to the production and comprehension of any; for example the
child will also have to have DE operators and modals in place in order to produce and comprehend any.
5
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principled way, that is to say, not as a coincidental ambiguity. For him, indefinites like any (that oscillate
between NPI and FC uses) always trigger exhaustification of their subdomain alternatives; the key is that
they also allow for pre-exhaustified alternatives (i.e. recursive exhaustification). This is what allows us to
generate FCIs in the modal contexts we examined in Chapter 4.
On the Krifka/Chierchia-style analysis then, there are a few ingredients that the child needs to have in
place in order to produce and comprehend any in an adult-like way. First, the child has to learn that any’s
alternatives are subdomain alternatives. I take it for granted that the child’s grammar allows for the generation of alternatives; the possibility of activating alternatives is not specific to NPIs, and is thus independently
required elsewhere in the grammar. Scalar quantifiers and elements forming Horn scales for example all
have the potential to activate alternatives. What the child must learn is the nature of the alternatives for any
given scalar term. In the case of any in particular, the child must learn that it activates subdomain alternatives. I also assume that the child’s grammar will allow for exhaustification of alternatives, again, a process
required independently of any account of NPIs. Specifically with respect to any, the child must learn that
any carries a focal feature that triggers obligatory exhaustification of its (subdomain) alternatives. 6 And to be
able to carry out this exhaustification, the child must have covert exhaustification operators in place. Additionally, in order to achieve ‘domain widening’ effects of the Kadmon-and-Landman type, the child must
have knowledge of contrastive focus (cf. Rooth, 1992). That is, the child must know how to generate or
identify a set of focal alternatives (in this case, more restricted subdomain alternatives), and exhaustify with
respect to these focal alternatives.
Finally, consider briefly the acquisition of FC any. While both the Kadmon and Landman and Chierchia
analyses can be considered examples of unified analyses of any, they lead us to define the target of acquisition slightly differently. The Kadmon and Landman analysis, as we said above, requires that the child learn
the lexical meaning of any, which will include a condition that it must strengthen the assertion. There is no
6 Again,

strictly speaking, there are other prerequisites that I will assume are already in place by the relevant point in development when the child acquires any. For example, in order to check any’s focal feature,
the child must have a grammar that allows for feature-checking. Since syntactic feature-checking is required on independent grounds (or at least, is in place before she produces her first NPI, as evidenced by
the ability to produce appropriate subject-verb agreement, past tense agreement, etc.), we will not focus on
how the child acquires feature-checking.
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distinction between NPI and FC any in this respect. Chierchia’s analysis requires that the child learn that any
triggers obligatory exhaustification of its subdomain alternatives, and moreover that (unlike NPI-only indefinites) any allows for pre-exhaustified alternatives. Moving to the other end of the spectrum, a nonunified account such as Dayal (1998, 2011) leads us to expect that the child must learn the two any’s independently. The child must learn the licensing condition on NPI licensing (whichever conception of it one
chooses), and the child must also learn the universal quantifier any, which (glossing over details) differs
from universal every in that it quantifies over possible individuals. In this case, we might expect the input to
provide evidence for NPI licensing as well as for any’s universal quantificational force. But it’s not clear
whether this alone will get the child to domain widening/strengthening, or FCIs of the kind children were
shown to be able to compute in Chapter 4. To acquire these properties, we might expect the input to also
provide evidence for strengthening/widening, and for the computation of FCIs.7 Thus on an account like
Dayal’s, we can conceive of the required evidence as coming in two parts: whatever the input would need to
provide on any account of NPI any (let’s say, what we proposed would be needed on Kadmon and Landman’s account), plus evidence of the modal nature of FC any, including evidence of the FCIs that are possible in these modal contexts.
Let us now turn to an examination of child-directed speech to see if the input provides any evidence of
the kind that might lead the child to infer the target properties of any.

3.

Corpus Study 3: What the Input Provides

3.1

Evidence for any

Let us now consider the question of what evidence exists in the child-directed speech for the various target
properties of any that we discussed in Section 2. I’ll consider here data from three longitudinal corpora
available on CHILDES (the Kuczaj corpus (US) and the Lara and Thomas corpora (UK)). 8 The basic fre7

It is not obvious what kind of evidence would be informative for the procedure of computing a FCI. I’ll
discuss this further in Section 3.
8

Of the 40 corpora I reported on in Chapters 3 and 4, these three corpora contained the greatest number of
transcripts; the Lara and Thomas corpora also contained the largest number of total child utterances.
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quencies of any in the input are provided in Table 1.9 After reporting on these basic frequencies, I’ll discuss
(in a more qualitative manner) the kind of evidence that the input provides for the syntactic dimension of
any, and then move on to any’s semantics.

Table 1. Frequencies of any in Kuczaj, Lara, and Thomas parental speech samples
Corpus
Kuczaj
(Abe’s father)
(ABE’S AGE RANGE:
2;04,24-5;00,11)
Lara
(Lara’s mother)
(LARA’S AGE RANGE:
1;09,13-3;03,25)
Thomas
(Thomas’ mother)
(THOMAS’ AGE RANGE:
2;00,12-4;11,20)

Total parental
utterances

Total any

NPI any

FC any

12,753

130
(1.02% of all
utterances)

125
(96.15% of all
any)

5
(3.85% of all any)

78,701

428
(0.54% of all
utterances)

423
(98.83% of all
any)

5
(1.17% of all any)

324,778

2528
(0.78% of all
utterances)

2429
(96% of all any)

99
(3.92% of all any)

Of the 130 instances of any in Abe’s father’s speech (Kuczaj corpus), 125 (96.15%) were instances of NPI
any; here licensing primarily involved sentential negation (81=64.8%) and interrogatives (38=30.4%).10 The
9

In analyzing the parental speech samples, I also discounted any repetitions, imitations, routine or idiomatic expressions containing any, and any unclear utterances where a potential licenser was occluded by
xxx in the transcripts. The adult examples of any were generally grammatical; only Thomas’s mother’s
speech revealed any exceptions; I classified five of her 2434 total NPI any as ungrammatical (for example,
you’ve had enough now, please do take anymore out, Thomas). It’s not clear whether these were merely
transcription errors, but they were nevertheless classified as ungrammatical.
10

According to Guerzoni and Sharvit (2007), any is subject to a disjunctive licensing condition: it is licensed by downward entailment in declaratives but strong exhaustivity in interrogatives. Giannakidou
(1998) subsumes interrogatives with other non-veridical operators. Importantly, Nicolae (2013) builds on
Guerzoni and Sharvit’s observation regarding strong exhaustivity, and analyzes interrogative licensing
within an exhaustification-based framework, such that NPI any in declaratives and interrogatives is licensed in the same way, i.e. by successful exhaustification of its subdomain alternatives. I will return to the
issue of licensing in questions in Section 5.3.2. See also Tieu (2010) for relevant discussion.
124

remaining 4.8% of NPI any involved licensing by other DE operators. Finally, 5 (3.85%) of all occurrences
of any were instances of FC any. In the Lara corpus, 423 (98.83%) were instances of NPI any; here too licensing was primarily by sentential negation (342=80.85%) and interrogatives (69=16.31%); 2.84% of NPI
any involved licensing by other DE operators. Finally, 5 (1.17%) of the occurrences of any were instances of
FC any. 11 Finally, 2429 (96%) instances of any in Thomas’ mother’s speech were instances of NPI any, with
1718 (=70.73%) of these involving licensing by sentential negation, and 436(=17.95%) involving licensing
in interrogatives; the remaining 11.32% of NPI any involved licensing by other DE operators. 99 (3.92%) of
the total occurrences of any were instances of FC any.
On the whole, the input seems to provide fairly robust (positive) evidence of any’s restricted
distribution.12 Next, let’s take a qualitative look at the kinds of examples of any children hear in the input,
and determine in particular whether there is evidence for the structural dimension of any, under which we
included: (i) the determiner/modifier status of any; (ii) the c-command requirement on licensing; and (iii) the
non-clausebounded nature of the licensing/c-command relation. As seen in the examples in (2), any consistently showed up either as a determiner or as a modifier of the comparative adverb more. The parental input
also provides positive evidence of the c-command requirement on licensing: all instances of any in declarative statements involved any c-commanded by a DE operator, as seen in all of the examples in (2).13 We also
find evidence that the structural dependency between licenser and NPI is not clause-bounded; as can be seen

11

Note that even though Lara heard the lowest frequency of any in the input, she was not the slowest to
acquire any nor did she struggle with productive use of any in her own spontaneous speech. Abe’s first
productive use of any was at 2;06,14, Lara’s at 2;06,28, and Thomas’ at 2;07,22. Moreover, comparing the
ages at the end of the transcripts for the three children, Lara was much younger than either Abe or Thomas.
Finally, of the 40 children examined overall, Lara produced the third largest absolute number of any across
all transcripts.
12

There is however no direct negative evidence telling the child that any cannot appear outside of these
licensed contexts.
13

There is however no direct negative evidence indicating that NPI any is ungrammatical outside the scope
of a DE operator.
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in the examples in (3), the parental input provides positive evidence that any in an embedded clause can be
licensed by a negation in the higher clause. 14

(2) a. *FAT: we don’t have any hot chocolate . (Kuczaj, Transcript 118, Line 19)
b. *FAT: we didn’t get you any new socks . (Kuczaj, Transcript 166, Line 448)
c. *FAT: I don’t think we have any more . (Kuczaj, Transcript 110, Line 619)
d. *MOT: he hasn’t got any feet . (Lara, Transcript 98, Line 559)
e. *MOT: Lara hasn’t got any shoes on . (Lara, Transcript 100, Line 252)
f.

*MOT: you don’t need any more . (Lara, Transcript 119, Line 3621)

(3) a. *FAT: I don’t think that there’s anything cooking in that pan (.) Abe . (Kuczaj, Transcript 23, Line 53)
b. *FAT: I don’t think we have any honey (.) Abe . (Kuczaj, Transcript 182, Line 308)
c. *MOT: I don’t think anybody can really . (Lara, Transcript 101, Line 8953)

Next, consider evidence for FC any. Children hear any in episodic, sub-trigged statements, as well as modal
environments (with overt and covert modals). The total 10 utterances containing FC any produced by Abe’s
father and Lara’s mother are provided below (with sufficient context to derive the intended meanings):

(4)

Abe’s father (Kuczaj corpus)
a. *FAT: okay (.) Abe look you put this on the paper then you keep the pencil against the edge of
this and draw see (.) then you end up with a animal .

14

It is worth noting that almost all such instances of a matrix negation and an embedded NPI any in Abe’s
father’s speech involve neg-raising predicates such as think. Such neg-raising sentences are often interpreted as though the negation appeared in the embedded clause, and the grammatical status of the construction is controversial. Assuming traditional syntactic “raising” accounts (Fillmore, 1963; Ross, 1973; Prince,
1976, a.o.), according to which the negation is base-generated within the embedded clause, the instances in
(3) may not actually constitute evidence for the child that NPI licensing is not clause-bounded in English.
Assuming a semantic/pragmatic analysis (cf. Bartsch, 1973; Gajewski, 2007) however, according to which
the internal negation reading is generated via a presupposition, these instances would, like non-neg-raising
examples, provide evidence for the lack of clauseboundedness.
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*CHI: what animal ?
*FAT: any animal that you want . (Transcript 12, Line 169)
b. *FAT: being around you two drowsy people would make anyone feel tired . (Transcript 53, Line 734)
c. *FAT: why don’t you tell me a story?
*CHI: what kind of story?
*FAT: any kind . (Transcript 130, Line 587) 15
d. *CHI: Dad (.) are you going to throw these away ?
*FAT: pick up anything you don’t want me to throw away . (Transcript 151, Line 251)
e. *CHI: Dad (.) do you believe a dog could be that big ?
*FAT: anything’s possible but was it really that small ? (Transcript 201, Line 442)
(5)

Lara’s mother (Lara corpus)
a. *MOT: you pop some bricks on there .
*CHI: where does this go ?
*MOT: it can go anywhere you want it to . (Transcript 47, Line 503)
b. *MOT: you’re supposed to just guess .
*MOT: just pick one .
*MOT: any one . (Transcript 53, Line 762)
*DAD: <pick a> [/] pick a card .
*DAD: any card . (Transcript 53, Line 764)
c. *MOT: what does Amy eat ?
*CHI: hay .
*MOT: no she doesn’t .

15

In analyzing children’s spontaneous production of any, I excluded two-word utterances containing any,
as the issue was whether children could produce grammatical, licensed instances of any; I thus did not
count such examples, since in many cases, (i) it was impossible to determine what the intended meaning
was (and therefore what, if anything, was licensing any); (ii) we wanted to make sure children were capable of producing full sentences containing any. The examples in (4c) and (5b) however involve apparently
elided material whose meaning is easy to reconstruct given the linguistic antecedents in the immediately
preceding utterances; thus I have included these in our discussion.
127

*MOT: she eats anything and everything, doesn’t she ? (Transcript 66, Line 794)
d. *MOT: they’ll eat the horse .
*MOT: they’ll eat anything they can . (Transcript 109, Line 1450)
*CHI: why’ve we got to shut that bit ?
*MOT: so that the lions don’t get out and eat everyone .
e. *CHI: I don’t like the water on me .
*MOT: there .
*MOT: now any water will go on the cushion . (Transcript 116, Line 985)
*MOT: not on you .

Beyond evidence for licensing of any, we might expect to find evidence for the quantificational force of any:
existential on NPI uses and universal on FC uses. The examples in (2)-(5) are again relevant. In order to understand what NPI any contributes to the truth conditions of a sentence in which it appears, for example,
what the child needs to learn is to interpret it as an existential within the scope of negation. Crucially, the
successful acquisition of this meaning is reliant on sentence-meaning pairs, i.e. hearing the sentence uttered
in a situation that makes the sentence true. For example, Abe’s father presumably uttered (2a) in a context
where there truly was no hot chocolate. Abe would have had to be able to perceive the truth of the assertion
in the absence of the hot chocolate. Likewise, we assume that Lara’s mother uttered (2e) in a situation where
Lara in fact did not have shoes on. Assuming (that children assume that) parents utter their sentences truthfully, the child must be able to glean the meaning of any in the scope of negation by interpreting these sentences in the relevant contexts, thus deriving the appropriate truth conditions.16 The cases of FC any are considerably more subtle, given the modal meanings that accompany them. Certainly to map FC any to an existential quantifier scoping under the modal in the cases in (4) and (5) would yield rather strange results; these

16 Another

prerequisite is that children have some notion of DEness in place. The input provides positive
evidence of any in the scope of DE operators, but it does not provide explicit evidence of what a DE inference is, or how to distinguish DE from non-DE operators. See Gualmini and Crain (2002) for claims that
children do not in fact need to learn downward entailment (i.e. they have innate knowledge of the logical
property of downward entailment).
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are contexts where the parents seem to be making generalized, universal claims.17 Presumably with the help
of the larger situational context in which these sentences are uttered, the child arrives at the universal meaning of any in these modal contexts. In (5d) for example, when the mother says that they have to try to prevent the lions from eating anything they can, the context (along with knowledge of what the modals in the
sentence mean) should direct the child to the intensionality of any: no individuals have yet been eaten, and
they are trying to prevent all of the animals in the context from potentially being eaten. Thus relying on these
sentence-meaning pairs in context might well lead the child to infer that any quantifies over a (wide) set of
possible individuals.18

3.2 The Gap Between the Input and the Target (Poverty of the Stimulus)
So far, we have seen that the input provides unambiguous evidence for the fact that any has a restricted distribution (i.e. to its DE and modal licensing contexts). It is perhaps not surprising then that 3- and 4-year-old
children can restrict any to the scope of operators like negation in both their production and comprehension.
But let us now turn our attention to the semantic dimension of any, namely to the properties that we tested in
Chapters 3 and 4.
Most 4-year-olds on Experiment 2 were sensitive to any’s subdomain alternatives, and interpreted any as
quantifying over the largest domain alternative in the context; that is, in the same experimental contexts,
children interpreted any as quantifying more widely than plain indefinites. In order to succeed on this task,
children first need to know that any’s alternatives include subdomain alternatives; on top of this, they need
to know how to exhaustify these alternatives; finally, to quantify as “widely” as possible, they also need to
know how to contrast any’s domain with alternative domains in the context. What evidence in the input

17

Note also that the evidence should indicate the difference between any and every; under Dayal’s analysis,
any is crucially different from every in that it quantifies over possible individuals; this seems to be apparent
in the characterizing modal statement in (5c), which contains both anything and everything, hinting at the
subtle difference between the two.
18

I would nevertheless expect the intensionality of FC any to make the learning task more difficult (than
the task of inferring the existential meaning of any under negation).
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could lead the child to these three ingredients? Consider again the parental samples of NPI any, repeated
below:

(6) a. *FAT: we don’t have any hot chocolate . (Kuczaj, Transcript 118, Line 19)
b. *FAT: we didn’t get you any new socks . (Kuczaj, Transcript 166, Line 448)
c. *FAT: I don’t think we have any more . (Kuczaj, Transcript 110, Line 619)
d. *MOT: he hasn’t got any feet . (Lara, Transcript 98, Line 559)
e. *MOT: Lara hasn’t got any shoes on . (Lara, Transcript 100, Line 252)
f.

*MOT: you don’t need any more . (Lara, Transcript 119, Line 3621)

(7) a. *FAT: I don’t think that there’s anything cooking in that pan (.) Abe . (Kuczaj, Transcript 23, Line 53)
b. *FAT: I don’t think we have any honey (.) Abe . (Kuczaj, Transcript 182, Line 308)
c. *MOT: I don’t think anybody can really . (Lara, Transcript 101, Line 8953)

It is not immediately clear to me how such examples indicate that any’s alternatives are subdomain alternatives. Of course, we can imagine the subdomain alternatives that might be active in the utterances; in (6a) for
example, Abe’s father could be saying that they don’t have any kinds of hot chocolate -- not the one Abe
usually drinks at home, or the one that Abe usually drinks at his grandparents’, or the kind he once drank at
school. But there is nothing in the utterance itself that forces this interpretation, and in fact, it’s not immediately clear what prevents the child from simply interpreting any as a (or the entire noun phrase as a bare
noun hot chocolate). So while it’s possible (and in fact, necessary, on Chierchia’s account) that any always
activates subdomain alternatives, the sentences themselves do not force these subdomain alternatives to be
salient, and they certainly don’t force the child (in any obvious way) to adopt the hypothesis that any’s alternatives are in fact, subdomain alternatives. In other words, it isn’t at all clear how these examples in the input are informative regarding the nature of any’s alternatives.
The kind of evidence that would be informative regarding the nature of any’s (subdomain) alternatives
would, I believe, be the same kind of evidence that would be informative about any’s potential for domain
widening. It is precisely those contexts containing salient subdomain alternatives that would allow for con-
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trastive focus on any; parental productions that involve contrasting the larger domain of any with more restricted domains in the context would cue the child into: (i) the fact that any can activate a set of subdomain
alternatives, and (ii) the fact that when there are more restricted domains available in the context, any yields
the familiar domain widening effect. What would this evidence look like? Consider the following (hypothetical) examples:

(8) a. I don’t have a crayon.
b. I don’t have any crayon.
c. I don’t have ANY crayon!

The difference between (8a) and (8b,c) is the widening that is possible in (8b) and certainly present in (8c).
The use of any triggers a set of subdomain alternatives which need to be exhaustified; 19 if there are salient
subdomains in the context, we will get the widened interpretation, according to which the claim that the
speaker doesn’t have a crayon is meant to apply to even exceptional instances of what might count as a
crayon. How obvious is this kind of widening in the examples of any in the input? Consider these examples
from Lara’s mother:

(9)

*MOT: we haven’t got any seeds . (Lara, Transcript 111, Line 1354)

(10)

*MOT: I don’t know any Harrys . (Lara, Transcript 115, Line 497)

It’s not immediately clear how the child could learn, just by hearing (9), the contrast between it and the
statements We haven’t got a seed or We haven’t got seeds, and likewise for the difference between (10) and
the statement I don’t know a Harry. It’s generally not clear from the transcripts whether the children hear

19

If there are no salient subdomains, exhaustification will be vacuous, and the statement will amount to a
run-of-the-mill negative existential statement.
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utterances like (8c), where stress on any might offer a more salient indicator of widening.20 One might imagine that another possible kind of evidence that might helpfully indicate the widening properties of any could
be the explicit use of even focus on some element that might be considered exceptional to the domain, as
seen in the following hypothetical examples:

(11)

I don’t have any crayons, not even a fake plastic one.

(12)

I don’t have any money, not even a penny.

(13)

I don’t like ANY clowns, not even cartoon ones.

Note however that even regular indefinites can co-occur with such indicators of widening or exhaustivity:

(14)

I don’t have crayons, not even a fake plastic one.

(15)

I don’t have money, not even a penny.

(16)

I don’t like clowns, not even cartoon ones.

Given that the overt marker of exhaustive widening is not unique to any, it’s not entirely clear that instances
like (11)-(13) would actually be helpful in highlighting the domain widening induced by any. Even if these
were hypothetically useful, we observe that of the 130 utterances of any produced by Abe’s father, and the
428 utterances of any produced by Lara’s mother, there is not a single instance akin to the examples in (11)(13). We do find however, one example that may hint at domain exhaustivity, from Abe’s father:21

(17)

*FAT: you mean you didn’t do anything at all all day long ? (Abe, Transcript 75, Line 218)

20

Of course we’ll recall that neither Kadmon and Landman nor Chierchia claim that stress is required for
widening. On Chierchia’s account, contrastive focus is required. But for the child, presumably prosodic
salience would provide a much stronger cue to widening than an unstressed any, even if there were domain
alternatives floating around in the context.
21 And

in fact this one example is complicated by the fact that at all is itself considered an NPI.
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Examples such as (17) might in principle be helpful for pointing out the exhaustive nature of the widened
domain, though it’s unclear how useful they are in practice given that we found only one instance across all
of Abe’s father’s uses of any (and none across Lara’s mother’s). If the domain widening properties of any are
to be gleaned from the linguistic context in which any appears, namely those contexts which also include
some overt marker of exhaustivity such as at all, we might expect such markers to occur more frequently
than they apparently do.
To ensure that the lack of explicit evidence tying any to (even a potential for) domain widening is not
restricted to the three parents’ whose speech we’ve examined, let me briefly provide further evidence for the
paucity of evidence we are dealing with, from a greater set of parental speech samples. In addition to the
three longitudinal corpora we have already discussed, I also examined caregiver productions of any in the
Warren corpus (also available on the CHILDES database), which contains 20 files, each a transcript of a
play session involving a child interacting first with one parent and then with the other. 22 Although this corpus contains less data per parent, it provides data from 20 different mothers and 20 different fathers. Using
the CLAN program, I was able to isolate 29 different instances of NPI any. Of these, only one could arguably provide evidence for domain widening:

(18)

*MOT: no , the rabbit is silent .
*CHI: only they can make rabbit noise .
*MOT: well , what kind of rabbit noise ?
*CHI: oo !
*MOT: no , I don’t think the rabbit makes any noise .
(Warren corpus, George transcript, Line 456)

22 According

to the CHILDES database manual entry for the Warren corpus, all children were from white,
middle-class, nonprofessional families. Ten of the transcripts are from the younger group of children (1;063;01) and ten are from the older group (4;06-6;02). Each session with mother or father lasted from 15-30
minutes. Given each child conversed for at least half an hour, the data cover a minimal (total) timeframe of
10 hours of transcribed speech.
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This example is quite like the theoretical ones that we are familiar with, and we can easily apply Chierchia’s
analysis to explain the widening effect. Salient in the discourse context is the restriction of the domain of
quantification to noises made by rabbits; the any-statement can be seen as invoking a contrast between this
previously restricted domain of rabbit noises, and a larger domain containing non-rabbit noises. It is this
contrast that gives us the strengthening effect of the mother’s assertion.
While this example may be reason for some optimism, consider the following. Of the 577 instances of
NPI any across the Lara, Kuczaj, and Warren corpora combined, we found only two instances of apparent
widening like that in (18): this amounts to roughly 0.35% of NPI any that explicitly demonstrates domain
widening. Contrast this with the 431 instances of NPI any occurring in the scope of sentential negation. In
other words, while 75% of instances of NPI any provide evidence that any is licensed in the scope of negation, a mere 0.35% provide evidence of domain widening. What I want to emphasize here is the overwhelming imbalance in the nature of the evidence for the different dimensions of any. It is not at all clear that there
is evidence in the input explicitly tying any to domain widening.
The reader might object that some of the cases of FC any reviewed in this section could also provide
evidence for widening; in fact, it seems that there are more clear cases of contrastively focused FC any than
contrastively focused NPI any. The following examples from the Kuczaj and Lara corpora seem particularly
relevant:

(19)a. *FAT: okay (.) Abe look you put this on the paper then you keep the pencil against the edge
of this and draw see (.) then you end up with a animal .
*CHI: what animal ?
*FAT: any animal that you want . (Kuczaj corpus, Transcript 12, Line 169)
b. *FAT: why don’t you tell me a story?
*CHI: what kind of story?
*FAT: any kind . (Kuczaj corpus, Transcript 130, Line 587)
c. *MOT: you’re supposed to just guess .
*MOT: just pick one .
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*MOT: any one . (Lara corpus, Transcript 53, Line 762)
*DAD: <pick a> [/] pick a card .
*DAD: any card . (Lara corpus, Transcript 53, Line 764)

In (19a), Abe questions what kind of story he should tell, and we can imagine that the wh-indefinite comes
with a contextual domain restriction, e.g., to the typical kinds of stories that Abe and his father are used to
telling, or to the kinds of stories that his father usually likes to hear, let’s say; Abe’s father’s use of any seems
to invite a widening of this domain, such that Abe is free to choose any kind of story he desires, even if outside of the typical domain. (19b) is similar in this respect. The contrast in the wider domain of any with a
previously restricted domain is even clearer in (19c), where Lara’s father’s use of any immediately follows
up on an imperative containing the plain indefinite a.
We should therefore add such FC examples as well to our collection of evidence that potentially ties any
to domain widening. But even with the addition of such examples, recall that Abe’s father’s set of transcripts
and Lara’s mother’s set of transcripts each contained only 5 instances of FC any overall. This makes it very
difficult to hinge (the child’s making) the connection to domain widening on evidence from FC any.
Finally, it is not entirely clear what evidence would be required to lead the child to the ability to compute
FCIs from any in modal statements (as they were shown to be able to do on Experiment 3). The FCI is what
underlies the ‘freedom of choice’ meaning of any, and the examples in (19) of course express freedom of
choice; the question is how the child figures this out. An example like (19a), which makes explicit reference
to the addressee’s desires might perhaps be the most salient indicator of the addressee’s ‘freedom of choice’,
since it directly involves the child’s making a choice. But it’s very difficult to say how the child pieces together the mechanics of FCIs from the evidence available in the input. What in the input could tell the child
that she must consider pre-exhaustified alternatives in the case of FC any? What tells the child how to exhaustify with respect to these pre-exhaustified alternatives? The answer to such questions is not at all clear
from our examination of the parental speech samples. Moreover, even if we could identify the relevant cues
in the examples we have seen, recall that FC any is not very frequent in the parental speech. While it might
be sufficient to indicate to the child that FC any is possible in modal contexts, it’s not clear to me whether
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the examples are abundant enough to allow the child to derive the kind of sophisticated semantic knowledge
that was required for success on Experiment 3. If the 4-year-olds we tested did not have this knowledge, i.e.
if they had failed to compute the relevant FCIs, they would have provided non-target truth value responses.
Yet recall that the children performed at 95% accuracy.
In summary, while the input provides unambiguous evidence for the restricted distribution of any, as
well as for its licensers, it is not quite so clear what evidence allows children to pick up on its particular semantics, which ultimately gives rise to domain widening and FCIs of the kind we saw in Chapters 3 and 4.
Table 2 summarizes the list of target properties and whether we can find evidence for them in the input.

Table 2. Input vs. target
Target property

Evidenced in the
input

Syntactic category/distribution

yes

Quantificational force

yes

Licensing condition (DE restriction)

yes

Domain widening: Activation of subdomain alternatives with contrastive focus

?

NPI any: Exhaustification of alternatives

?

FC any: Pre-exhaustification of domain alternatives

?

4.

Solving the Learning Problem

We have now identified the learning problem that is posed by any to the child learner. By the age of 4, children show extremely sophisticated knowledge of the semantic properties and semantic operations associated
with any, which allows them to produce and comprehend any (on its NPI and FC uses) in an adult-like way.
Yet there is little to no explicit evidence in the input that ties any to these particular semantic operations.
How then, can we explain how the child arrives at the target grammar? In this section, I propose that children do not have to learn these semantic properties and operations per se, from evidence in the input. Rather,
they must use the distributional information that is available in the input to guide their choice from among a
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constrained hypothesis space of indefinite types. The child’s task as a learner is therefore not to “search” for
evidence of domain widening or recursive exhaustification per se; rather the child must pay attention to the
distribution of the indefinite in the input, and on the basis of this information, map any to the right category
of indefinite (among a set of restricted options). I will argue that the evidence from the parental input we
have examined thus far is sufficient (or rather, must be sufficient) to allow children to make this choice.

4.1 An Innately Constrained Hypothesis Space: Chierchia’s Typology
To solve the learning problem that we’ve raised, I’ll suggest that what we need to do is take a step back and
look at how any fits into the cross-linguistic typology of PSIs. Up to this point, I have been pinpointing very
specific aspects of Chierchia’s proposal that successfully capture the behaviour of NPI and FC any; but in
fact, one of the greatest merits of the proposal is that the analysis extends beyond any to PSIs across languages. So let us take a step back and look at the range of indefinite types across languages.
First, it is insightful to consider the historical evolution of any, which suggests the formation of related
classes of indefinites. Chierchia discusses how the Proto-Indo-European oinos ‘one-like’ (literally one plus
an adjectival ending), evolved into different kinds of indefinites in different languages. In German, oinos
evolved into einig-, a plain indefinite. In English, it evolved into NPI any (around the 16th century), only
later becoming ambiguous between NPI and FC any in Modern English. In Italian on the other hand, oinos
evolved into alcuno/alcuni, a pure NPI in the singular form, but plain indefinite in the plural form. This is
summarized in Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1: Evolution of any (Chierchia, 2013)

Chierchia suggests that these different indefinite types correspond to contiguous grammatical classes that
can shift from one to another. Chierchia’s theory derives the distribution/behaviour of PSIs by allowing free
variation along two particular dimensions: (i) the kinds of alternatives that the polarity-sensitive terms activate, and (ii) the possible modes of exhaustification, i.e. the ways in which these alternatives get factored
into the meanings of the sentences that contain them. His full typology is provided in Table 3; note however
that I will only focus on the part of the typology that is relevant for our present discussion of any.
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Table 3. Chierchia’s theory-driven typology
Modes of exhaustification
Types of alternatives

Weak

Strong

Degree-alternatives
(emphatic NPIs)

E
koii bhii, ek bhii, give a damn

ES
sleep a wink

Simple D-alternatives + σalternatives (pure NPIs)

O
ever, mai, alcun

OS
in weeks, N-words

Exhaustified D-alternatives
+ rich scale (Total variation
∃-FC)

O
irgendein, un qualsiasi NP
(total ∃-FCI/NPI)

OS
?

OPS
un NP qualsiasi,
un oarecare, un
quelconque
(total pure ∃-FCI)

Exhaustified singleton Dalternatives + rich scale
(partial variation ∃-FC)

O
irgendein
(partial ∃-FCI/
NPI without
anti total
variation)

OPS
un qualche
(partial pure ∃FCI without
anti total variation)

OPSATV
?
(partial pure ∃-FCI
with anti total
variation)

Exhaustified D-alternatives
+ reduced scale (∀-FCI)

O
any
∀-FCI/NPI

OS
?

OPS
qualsiasi
(pure ∀-FCI)

OATV
vreun
(partial ∃-FCI/
NPI with anti
total variation)

(Chierchia, 2013:367, Ex.112)

Along the first dimension, we find two kinds of alternatives: domain alternatives and degree alternatives.
PSIs that activate domain alternatives include any, and are exhaustified via a covert only-like operator (O)
(as we saw in Chapter 2). PSIs that are associated with degree alternatives, e.g., alternatives that can be
aligned along a scale of degrees are called emphatic NPIs, and include English give a damn; these are exhaustified via a covert even-like operator (E). The E-operator requires that the assertion be the least likely
among the alternatives (with likelihood defined in terms of entailment). The least likely alternative is the
strongest, as it entails all other alternatives. This is represented as follows:

(20)

p⊳c q if p→q and q p (p is less likely than q iff p entails q and q does not entail p)
(Nicolae, 2012:235)
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Next, within the group of PSIs that activate domain alternatives, we see variation in whether or not the PSI
tolerates pre-exhaustified alternatives. Those that do not tolerate pre-exhaustified alternatives, like ever, are
so-called “pure NPIs”, and only appear in the typical NPI licensing/DE contexts. PSIs that do tolerate preexhaustified alternatives however, like any, additionally exhibit the FC effect in certain modal contexts.
Along the second dimension, there are essentially two modes of exhaustification: weak and strong.
Weak exhaustification only takes into account truth-conditional meanings, while strong exhaustification involves enriched meanings (i.e. truth conditions along with implicatures and presuppositions). The further
distinctions made within the various subclasses of PSIs are not immediately relevant for our current purposes. It suffices here to note that fully exploiting the possible variation along the two dimensions yields a
typology of 14 different kinds of PSIs.23 And herein lies our solution to the learning problem: the learner’s
task can now be thought of as navigating this typological space, making a finite set of decisions to arrive at
the target PSI, as symbolized in Fig. 2.

Fig. 2: Simplified representation of the target within Chierchia’s typology

Put very simply, the idea is the following. We can mitigate the learning problem by invoking a restricted hypothesis space: the child only has to entertain a limited set of options. The child does not have to learn that
23

In fact, Chierchia refers to it as a generative matrix, rather than merely a descriptive typology. We expect
to be able to fill out all of the cells of the table with cross-linguistic data. There remains some work to be
done in this respect.
140

subdomain alternatives (and pre-exhaustified alternatives) exist. The child does not have to learn how to activate subdomain alternatives, or that there exist different modes of exhaustification that “use up” these alternatives, nor does the child need to learn how to exhaustify these alternatives. All of these semantic
mechanisms of interpretation come for free. Restricted variation with respect to these mechanisms means
that only a finite set of possible PSIs can be generated; this in turn means that the child need only entertain a
restricted hypothesis space. The child’s learning task is reduced to mapping any to the right category among
a restricted set of options.
In our discussion of the ingredients that would in principle be required to generate the target-like performance that we observed in Experiments 2 and 3, we posited that the child would need to learn that any
activates subdomain alternatives, that these alternatives must be exhaustified via an only-like operator, and
that these alternatives can be pre-exhaustified, giving rise to FC effects. But we’ve now seen that the input
does not provide direct/explicit positive evidence for these semantic mechanisms. What the input does provide evidence of is the dual nature of any, namely that it is the type of PSI that oscillates between NPI and
FC uses. In other words, the child receives evidence for any’s restricted distribution. I propose that this is
precisely what the child needs to map any to the right category within the typology. The strongest cue that
children receive with respect to any is its unique distributional pattern; given the paucity of the input regarding the specific semantic mechanisms underlying any, this distributional pattern must be sufficient to allow
the child to map any to the target PSI.24
I should be very clear here that I am not claiming that there is no learning involved in the acquisition of
any. It is not the case that the child’s grammar comes pre-equipped with knowledge of any. Rather, the
grammar provides the child with a set of semantic mechanisms required to construct appropriate meanings,

24

It may seem as though there are two independent ingredients required to solve the learning problem: (i) a
restricted hypothesis space and (ii) innate semantic mechanisms like exhaustification. In fact, they are inseparable. On Chierchia’s account, these semantic mechanisms (and the variation that they can give rise to)
are what derive the typology, i.e. the child’s restricted hypothesis space on our proposal. Thus it is impossible to have one without the other. Children start off with innate semantic mechanisms which can only generate a restricted set of PSI possibilities. They then have to map any to the target PSI among these possibilities. In other words, the innate mechanisms derive the typology, rather than the other way around; children
do not start with an arbitrary set of possibilities and then derive the mechanisms on the basis of this arbitrary set.
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e.g., the ability to activate and exhaustify alternatives. As a consequence of these semantic mechanisms (and
the variation they can give rise to), the grammar thus constrains the options that are available to the child,
since only a finite set of PSI types can possibly be generated. What the child then has to do is map a particular surface string in the input to a semantically rich, innately constrained PSI category. In the next section, I
will speculate about how the child might use the distributional pattern to lead to a particular cell within the
typology.

4.2 The Mapping Task
The basic idea of the proposal in this section is very simple. Assuming PSIs can vary with respect to the
types of alternatives that they activate, and the modes of exhaustification that are available, acquiring a particular PSI amounts to choosing the right setting along each dimension. The learning task reduces to mapping a particular word or string, to the right PSI within the typology of restricted options, on the basis of its
unique distributional pattern.
Note however that reducing the hypothesis space is not particularly revealing about how the mapping
task actually takes place. Navigating within the set of possible options in order to narrow down the possibilities to just the target category is not a trivial task. But we do know one thing about the evidence that the
child uses, which is almost tautological in its simplicity: the child must make use of the evidence that is
available to her; after all, this is all the help she will get from the input. Given the ingredients of Chierchia’s
typology and the way that the two parameters interact, there are minimally two questions that the learner
must answer for any given PSI. First, does the PSI in question activate degree alternatives or domain alternatives? Second, does the PSI in question tolerate pre-exhaustified alternatives? Let us consider how the mapping task might work for just one slice of the typology, so that we can highlight both the kinds of decisions
the learner has to make and the kinds of evidence that would in principle be informative for making these
decisions.
Consider the following, very restricted partial typology that will suffice for the purposes of illustrating
the mapping task:
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Table 4. Partial typology of polarity-sensitive items (partial representation of Chierchia’s typology)
Types of alternatives

Mode of exhaustification: Weak

Degree-alternatives (emphatic NPIs)

E (e.g., English give a damn, Hindi koii bhii, ek bhii)

Simple domain alternatives and scalar
alternatives (pure NPIs)

O (e.g., English ever, Italian alcun)

Exhaustified domain alternatives (∀-FCI)

O (∀-FCI/NPI, e.g., English any)

Recall that PSIs like any activate domain alternatives; moreover, these alternatives are exhaustified by
means of a covert O-operator. Emphatic NPIs and minimizers like English give a damn, sleep a wink, etc.,
on the other hand, activate degree alternatives. These alternatives are exhaustified by the E-operator, requiring the assertion be the least likely (and the strongest). Now imagine a toy learning situation where a child
acquiring English must figure out whether a particular PSI she is hearing in the input corresponds to the give
a damn, ever, or any category of PSI. The child must make the following decisions:

Fig. 3: The learner’s decision tree

143

Recall the evidence that is available to the child, summarized in the following figure:

Fig. 4: Evidence available to the learner

The idea is that any informative cues from the input must be among the list in Fig. 4; that is, the child must
use either all or a subset of the information in Fig. 4 in order to make the required decisions. Consider the
first decision concerning the nature of the alternatives that the target PSI activates:

Fig. 5: Decision 1: The nature of the alternatives

The question is whether the target PSI is of the give a damn-type, which activates degree alternatives, or of
the any/ever type, which activates domain alternatives. In this case, I suggest that contexts of use might provide one useful cue to the learner (there may of course be others). The contexts in which domain alternatives
are relevant (as in the case of the any/ever-type) are presumably different from the contexts in which degree
alternatives are relevant (as in the case of emphatic NPIs like give a damn). Domains are relevant for quanti-
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fying, while degrees are concerned with expectations about likelihood of values on a scale. Contexts in
which we quantify can be completely neutral without any bias or expectation (e.g., recall our example in
which a person walks into a department store and asks if they sell any cameras), while contexts in which
emphatic NPIs like drink a drop or give a damn, which involve knowledge of scales and likelihood of different values on a scale, are usually used in contexts where such scales are salient. A person who is asked at
a bar whether she would like a drink typically does not respond with, “I won’t drink a drop.” Thus a learner
who has sufficient semantic knowledge to construe intended meanings in any given discourse context might
be able to pay attention to what is at issue in the context, and consequently construe the appropriate meanings that are relevant for domain-PSIs vs. degree-PSIs.25
Now let us assume that the child has decided that the target PSI is not the emphatic minimizer type but
rather the any/ever type, which activates domain alternatives. The learning task is still not complete, because
the child has yet to determine whether the target PSI is a pure NPI without FC uses (i.e. ever in English) or
one which oscillates between the two (i.e. any in English):

Fig. 6: Decision 2: Tolerance for pre-exhaustified alternatives

25

I leave open the question of whether the child would have to have an innate sensitivity to the difference
between neutral and negatively biased contexts, or could learn such a distinction simply by paying attention to different conversational contexts.
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Recall that the input provides evidence for any’s particular (restricted) distribution, i.e. to DE and FC/modal
contexts. Here is where I suggest the distributional information that children receive about any may be absolutely critical in leading the child to map any to the right category within the typology. The distributional
information may help in (at least) two ways.
First, the learner could make use of information about the syntactic distribution of the PSI in question.
Assuming that the learner could map distributional information to a syntactic category, the syntactic category of a given PSI could guide her to the target PSI within the typology. Syntactic category for example,
distinguishes adverbial PSIs from quantificational ones. As far as I know, there are no known adverbial PSIs
that tolerate pre-exhaustified alternatives, i.e. there are no “free choice” adverbial PSIs. If the learner could
pay attention to the syntactic environments in which the relevant PSI appeared, i.e. to the PSI’s syntactic
distribution, she might be able to infer its syntactic category, and this syntactic category could help to narrow
down the possible options.
Second, the learner could pay attention to the semantic/logical properties of the environments in which
the PSI appeared. A PSI like ever, which does not tolerate pre-exhaustified alternatives, has a distribution
distinct from that of a PSI like any, which does tolerate pre-exhaustified alternatives. We know that any is
restricted to two kinds of environments: the scope of DE operators, and modal (FC) environments. PSIs like
ever on the other hand are restricted to DE environments. This kind of distributional difference between the
two could be informative, provided the learner was sensitive to it.
Yet another way in which the distribution might be informative lies in the relative frequencies of the attested environments. Any appears in DE and FC environments at particular frequencies in the input, which,
incidentally, were fairly similar across the three parental speech samples we examined. If two PSIs in the
typology differ categorically in the environments in which they appear, this in principle should make it easier to tease the two apart on the basis of distributional information. But even if they overlap in their licensing
environments, they might differ in the relative frequencies at which they appear in the overlapping environments. Any for example shows up in its ‘NPI’ environments 96-99% of the time, while ever should show up
in such environments 100% of the time. The evidence we’ve examined cannot tell us whether this is suffi-
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cient to allow the learner to distinguish the two categories, but my suggestion is that it is one logically possible cue for the learner, given that it is available in the input.
To summarize, if any aspect of the acquisition of the semantics of polarity sensitivity is to be derived
from the input, the relevant information must be observable in the input, whether it takes the form of qualitative or quantitative information.
Note that the present proposal requires that the learner go into the learning task ‘looking for’ certain
kinds of information. To distinguish contexts in which degree alternatives are relevant from contexts in
which domain alternatives are relevant for example, the learner has to be sensitive to the difference between
biased and neutral contexts in which the two kinds of alternatives would be relevant. To use the varying distribution of any and ever in order to distinguish the two kinds of PSIs, the learner has to be aware of and
sensitive to the difference between DE and non-DE environments. That is, the learner must be attuned to
certain properties in the input, in order to use these properties as informative cues.26
Finally, whatever information is relevant, we expect to find that it is also useful for acquiring PSIs in
other languages. In other words, the solution proposed here should not be restricted to English. Each PSI
category in the typology should have its own unique, observable ‘signature’ in the input, whatever the nature
of the signature, be it statistical or qualitative.

5.

Discussion

5.1

Predictions for the Journey to the Target PSI

One of the predictions of the proposal in Section 4 is that children may make wayward choices on their way
to the target PSI. Given the restricted hypothesis space, one might expect to find children in various developmental stages where they have analyzed a given string as belonging to a non-target PSI category in the
typology. In Chapter 3, I presented the results of Experiment 2, one of which was that some children did not
26

The goal here has been to identify, in principle, the potential cues that could be informative to the learner.
The data we have reviewed so far cannot tell us which cues would in practice lead the learner to the target,
or how strong each cue would have to be in order to be informative. It is my hope that identifying the potential cues here will lead to further research that can more definitively characterize the exact learning path
that the child learner takes.
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correctly reject any-statements that quantified too narrowly. While I speculated as to the status of the children who did not perform in an adult-like manner, let me now raise another possible way of looking at that
data. In addressing this point, I’ll attempt to simultaneously present a prediction of the story presented in
Section 4.
If, as proposed in Section 4, the child’s task as a learner is to map the PSI they hear to the right PSI category within the typology, we might expect that children can go through developmental stages during which
they temporarily map the PSI to the wrong category. In such a stage, we would nevertheless expect that the
(non-target) representation should correspond to one of the other possible options within the restricted typology. Given the assumption that the semantic mechanisms and operations underlying these PSIs are innate,
there is only a finite set of options available to the child. Might our little “non-wideners” have been stuck on
an intermediate choice, on the way to the target any?
I suggest that the answer might be yes, but only if we invoke one further detail of the typology. Recall
from Fig. 1 that the PSI any evolved from the Proto-Indo-European word for one, which evolved into the
non-polarity-sensitive plain indefinite einig- in German, but into an NPI in English. On Chierchia’s account,
this split can be represented in terms of a lexical stipulation on the relevant indefinite’s features: any acquired a focal feature that requires obligatory exhaustification of alternatives, while plain indefinites only
optionally activate these alternatives.27 If we consider non-polarity-sensitive plain indefinites to be yet another possible indefinite “type” or category to map to (perhaps envisioned as a cell adjacent to the PSI ty-

27

This dissertation is decidedly not a study of the historical development of any. It would nevertheless be
interesting to compare children’s development of any with the historical development of any. Chierchia’s
story of the switch from NPI to FC item treats the change as a switch in a feature/parameter specification,
namely in whether the PSI allowed recursive exhaustification of its alternatives. This switch from NPI-only
uses to NPI/FC uses is particularly striking in light of the fact that the emergence of FC any appears to be
significantly later than the emergence of NPI any in children’s spontaneous production. Within the same
perspective, we might say that children initially treat any as disallowing recursive exhaustification of alternatives. This would crucially correspond to an allowed option within the typology of possible PSI types.
Perhaps, given the relatively low frequency of FC any in the parental input, it simply takes longer for children to ascertain that any is indeed a PSI that allows for recursive exhaustification of its alternatives. A future study could investigate the parallel between the historical development and the child’s development of
the polarity sensitivity system more generally (beyond the specific example of any). In this respect, it
would also be worth comparing the historical evolution of PSIs in other languages with the acquisition of
these items in those languages.
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pology), we might also expect children to consider this category as an option.28 Of course, plain indefinites
are not subject to the licensing conditions that PSIs are; this means that if a child has incorrectly mapped any
to a non-PSI (thus giving rise to the inappropriate domain restriction observed in the non-wideners), the
same child could be expected not to restrict any to the scope of appropriate licensers. For all intents and purposes, the child would be expected to treat any as a. Unfortunately, without production and comprehension
data from the same child, we cannot definitively answer this.
Whatever the status of the non-wideners, i.e. whether the performance factor explanation in Chapter 3 is
right, or the possibility raised here is right, the typological account proposed in Section 4 does predict that
children may go through stages where they map an indefinite to a non-target category. A challenge of testing
this prediction is that the semantic knowledge that we would want to test for is rather sophisticated, and
given our children performed well by 4 or 5 years of age, it’s not clear whether we could gather parallel data
from younger children.

5.2

Implications of the Universal Account of FC any

Chierchia’s view of the NPI/FC any dichotomy can viewed as a unified account. It’s worth considering how
a non-unified account would fit with the acquisition data. Under a universal account of FC any for example,
such as Dayal (1998, 2011), FC any is a(n intensional) universal quantifier distinct from NPI any. Recall that
FC any showed up very infrequently in the parental speech (1.17-3.92% of all occurrences of any, in the
three samples that we examined). On such an account, child must learn FC any independently of NPI any.
The infrequency of FC any makes the learning problem that we have outlined for any all the more difficult.
In Abe’s father’s sample for example, there were only a total of five instances of FC any. The learning prob-

28

If we consider the plain indefinite as a contiguous class, we might be able to explain examples of true
production errors (unlicensed any): such errors might be indicative of the child struggling to determine that
any is not just a plain indefinite but rather a PSI within the typology. The child data might well mirror the
historical evolution of the item itself (plain indefinite>>NPI>>FC). The robustness of evidence of licensing of any might be what leads the child away from unlicensed any relatively early on (recall that there was
in fact very little evidence of an error-prone developmental stage). In contrast, there is much less evidence
for FC any, so it takes more time for the child to decide that any also has FC uses; thus FC any emerges
significantly later than NPI any.
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lem that we outlined for any would be considerably exacerbated if the child had to learn all of the semantics
from the very few instances of FC any in the input.
The reader may notice that there is a very subtle, underlying tension in our proposal here: the children
have to hear enough FC any to recognize that it has FC uses, and consequently, on the proposed account, to
then map any to the kind of PSI that oscillates between the two uses (in other words, to distinguish it from
something like ever, which only has NPI uses). Yet these very few instances of FC any in the input seem
insufficient for the learner to acquire the specific semantic mechanisms underlying any. The input might be
enough for the child to derive a restricted distribution and perhaps to ascertain the target quantificational
force; but given the overwhelming amount of evidence for the narrow scope, existential interpretation of
NPI any, we might expect children to interpret any exclusively as an existential quantifier. Yet Experiment 3
shows that they’re able to do something much more than this. It is extremely difficult to see how they could
get to this target state on the basis of so few examples in the input.

5.3

Extensions of the Exhaustification-Based System

One of the merits of the exhaustification-based system is that it allows us to capture deep connections across
different kinds of PSIs, and moreover across different languages. Variation along the two dimensions we’ve
mentioned can generate a particular finite set of possible PSIs (fourteen in Chierchia’s typology); but others
have since used the exhaustification-based semantics to make connections with yet other PSIs, including
positive polarity items (PPIs). PPIs are particularly relevant to acquisition, as children have been reported to
have difficulties with such items. The next subsection will therefore discuss an extension of the
exhaustification-based system to PPIs, and its relationship with the child data. The second subsection will
discuss how licensing of NPIs occurs in questions, again within the exhaustification-based framework; here
too I will discuss a connection with child data.
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5.3.1 An Extension to Positive Polarity Items
Positive polarity items (PPIs) like someone or something can only take wide scope with respect to strongly
negative elements such as clausal negation and negative quantifiers:

(20)

I didn’t eat something

a. There is a thing such that I didn’t eat it

∃>¬

b. *There is nothing that I ate

*¬>∃

PPIs have been of interest in child language because children appear to have difficulties with the scope restrictions of some. Musolino (1998) investigated the comprehension of sentences such as (21) in a context
where the detective found two of four guys participating in the story. Musolino found that children as old as
5;09 were non-adult-like in rejecting the sentence, i.e. they allowed a narrow scope reading of the existential
quantifier.29

(21)

The detective didn’t find some guys

a. There are some guys that the detective didn’t find
b. It is not the case that the detective found any guys

Since Musolino’s original study, Gualmini (2004) has reported that manipulating the experimental materials
to increase compliance with felicity conditions on the test sentences leads to improved performance. Children’s reported difficulties with PPIs however are not restricted to comprehension. Recall O’Leary and
Crain’s (1994) elicited production study which found that children sometimes produced the sentence, ‘No,
this dog did not get some food,’ where an adult would produce any. Looking to children’s spontaneous production, it is also possible to find examples of some in the scope of negation (where it is interpreted on a par

29

The reader will recall Xiang et al.’s (2006) study which we reviewed in Chapter 3; these authors also
found some proportion of narrow scope interpretation of some under negation.
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with any under negation). The following examples are from Abe’s transcripts (Kuczaj corpus); (24) in particular may suggest that he has not entirely distinguished the two:

(22)

Abe (Kuczaj corpus), Transcript 15 (age 2;06,14), Line 298
*CHI: uhhuh momma (.) I don’t want any more milk don’t want any more milk .
*MOT: you don’t want any more milk today ?
*CHI: uhuh (.) today don’t want some .
*MOT: okay (.) it’s up to you .

(23)

Abe (Kuczaj corpus), Transcript 33 (age 2;08,25), Line 450
*CHI: uhhuh I need some pennies I can’t get some I can’t get some .

(24)

Abe (Kuczaj corpus), Transcript 33 (age 2;08,25), Line 684
*FAT: Abe (.) I think you have enough pennies .
*CHI: I saw some in there I didn’t get any some .
*FAT: yes you did you have four pennies .

Yet samples from the same corpus indicate that Abe is (eventually) able to use both lexical items (some and
any) in an adult-like manner, and can even use both in the same utterance:

(25)

Abe (Kuczaj corpus), Transcript 110 (age 3;06,16), Line 354
*CHI: oh my throat is so thirsty I can’t eat any more cereal until I drink some milk (.)
so get me some milk now get me some milk now .

Although the nature of children’s difficulty with PPIs is not entirely clear, I’d like to suggest that there may
lie an explanation of the any/some asymmetry within the exhaustification-based framework we’ve been
adopting.
Nicolae (2012) proposes that PPIs, like NPIs, also activate alternatives that require exhaustification. Instead of activating subdomain alternatives as any does however, PPIs like some activate so-called super-
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domain alternatives, i.e. larger domains of quantification available in the context. Another difference between any and some is that whereas any’s alternatives are exhaustified by the O (only-like) operator, some’s
super-domain alternatives are exhaustified via the E (even-like) operator. I briefly sketch the main idea of the
analysis here (see Nicolae, 2012 for details).
Recall that the operator of choice for emphatic NPIs and minimizers like give a damn, sleep a wink, etc.
is E, which requires that the assertion be the least likely among the alternatives (with likelihood defined in
terms of entailment). The least likely alternative is the strongest, as it entails all other alternatives. In the case
of minimizer NPIs, Nicolae demonstrates that the requirements of the E operator are met in DE but not in
upward-entailing (UE) environments. Similarly to how O-exhaustification of any’s alternatives succeeds in
DE environments but fails in UE environments, E-exhaustification of the degree alternatives likewise fails in
UE environments but succeeds in DE environments. Without going into details, exhaustifying Mary slept a
wink requires that the assertion that Mary slept the minimal amount be the least likely of the alternatives,
entailing all alternative propositions according to which Mary slept more than the minimal amount. This is
clearly contradictory. On the other hand, exhaustifying Mary didn’t sleep a wink requires that the assertion
that Mary did not sleep the minimal amount be the least likely of the alternatives, i.e. the strongest. Since the
scales are reversed, exhaustification succeeds; if Mary did not sleep the minimal amount, then she did not
sleep for any amount greater than the minimal amount.
Crucially, because some-PPIs activate super-domain alternatives, we end up with the reverse situation:
E-exhaustification succeeds in UE environments but fails in DE environments. In an UE context, if something holds true of a domain, it will also hold true of any super-domain. If John saw Bill or Mary, it is also
true that John saw Bill or Mary or Bob. Thus when we exhaustify with the E-operator in an UE context, the
assertion will indeed entail all other alternatives. Nicolae formalizes the result of exhaustifying in UE and
DE contexts as follows:
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(26)

John saw someone[+DE]

a. Assertion: ∃x∈D[saw(John,x)]
b. Alternatives: {∃x∈D’[saw(John,x)]: D⊂D’}
c. E[DE] John saw someone[+DE]
= ∃x∈D[saw(John,x)] ∧ ∀D’⊃D [(∃x∈D [saw(John,x)]) ◁c (∃x∈D’ [saw(John,x)])]
(27)

*John didn’t see someone[+DE].

a. Assertion: ¬∃x∈D[saw(John,x)]
b. Alternatives: {¬∃x∈D’[saw(John,x)]: D⊂D’}
c. E[DE] John didn’t see someone[+DE]
= ¬∃x∈D[saw(John,x)] ∧ ∀D’⊃D [(¬∃x∈D [saw(John,x)]) ◁c (¬∃x∈D’ [saw(John,x)])]
(Nicolae, 2012:235)

Now let us return to the acquisition question. It is reported that children have difficulties with the scope
properties of PPIs but not of NPIs. In the exhaustification-based system, NPIs must appear in the scope of
DE operators because these are the environments in which exhaustification is consistent; PPIs on the other
hand must appear in UE environments because these are the environments in which exhaustification is consistent. Within the typological proposal of Section 4, difficulties arise when children have not yet mapped a
string to the target PSI within the typology. The question becomes the following: why should mapping some
to the right PSI category be more challenging than mapping any to the target category? Here I suggest three
possible explanations for children’s difficulty with PPIs (compared to NPIs). These potential explanations lie
in the key differences between the two kinds of items, within the exhaustification-based framework.
First, any activates subdomain alternatives, while some activates super-domain alternatives. While there
may not be an a priori reason why one ought to be more difficult than the other, no study to my knowledge
has examined children’s sensitivity to super-domains. Experiments 2 and 3 of this dissertation are among the
first attempts to experimentally probe children’s sensitivity to subdomain alternatives. It remains an empiri154

cal question whether children can likewise be shown to be sensitive to super-domain alternatives, and
whether these might pose more difficulty to children. Recall the kinds of experimental contexts we created
in Experiments 2 and 3: domains of discourse containing six rabbits (in Experiment 3), or domains containing nine diamonds (in Experiment 2). In these cases, in order to identify subdomain alternatives, what the
child has to do is identify “subkinds” of a type, i.e. more specific kinds of rabbits, or more specific kinds of
diamonds. Now imagine if the child, rather than having to identify subkinds had to identify superordinate
categories. In other words, given blue diamonds, the child to generalize to a larger class of diamonds of different colours, or if given a set of small rabbits, the child had to identify a larger set containing rabbits of
different sizes. It’s not clear whether one ought to be more difficult than the other, but one could imagine that
children’s conversations tend to revolve more around specific tokens rather than general kinds (i.e. Spot the
dog rather than canines). I leave it open as an empirical question whether one can be shown to be more challenging than the other. In theory, a difference between sub- and super-domains could be behind the some/any
asymmetry in child language.
Another potential difference that could be behind the asymmetry is the nature of the exhaustification
process. Recall that exhaustification of any’s subdomain alternatives is carried out via the O-operator, while
some’s super-domain alternatives are exhaustified via the E-operator. If we could experimentally determine
that children perform better with O-exhaustification than E-exhaustification, this might be suggestive that
the asymmetry lies in the exhaustification process. It’s not entirely clear how one could compare children’s
performance with these covert operators, but one could easily look to children’s performance with the overt
counterparts (which may not be identical, but could serve as good approximations for our purposes). Kim
(2011) in fact investigates children’s performance with the English focus particles only and even and finds
that children perform better on comprehension of only than even. This kind of data is exactly what would be
required to more carefully investigate the hypothesis that the some/any asymmetry derives from an asymmetry in children’s ability to perform O- vs. E-exhaustification.
Finally, a reason that the PPI some might be delayed relative to NPI any lies in an ambiguity of some. In
English, some can also have an epistemic indefinite use:
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(28)

Lisa married some student from the psychology department

Items such as some student give rise to ignorance inferences, signaling the speaker’s ignorance as to the
identity of the relevant object (cf. Kratzer and Shimoyama, 2002; Alonso-Ovalle & Menéndez-Benito, 2010;
Fălăuş, 2010; Chierchia, 2011 for relevant discussion). Although the two uses are semantically distinct, the
overlap in surface form could result in some difficulty for children, who must sort out the different uses in
the input. 30
In sum, within the exhaustification-based framework pursued here, some and any differ in key ways, and
any of these key differences may underlie the developmental asymmetry between some and any.

5.3.2 An Extension to NPIs in Questions
The exhaustification-based framework makes a straightforward extension to licensing in questions, and thus
we can also discuss children’s acquisition of NPIs in questions within the same framework. Interrogatives
have long been a thorn in the side of the DE account, because although they license weak NPIs like any and
ever, they are not strictly speaking DE. Polar questions (root or embedded) (29)-(30) and the nucleus of matrix wh-questions (31) license weak NPIs such as any and ever:31

(29)

Has Nicholas ever been to Paris?

(30)

Sophie wonders whether Nicholas has any interest in visiting Paris.

(31)

Who has ever been to Paris?

30

One might think that such an overlap in surface form, if problematic for some, should also be problematic for any, which has both NPI and FC uses. It is possible that the differential distribution of the two
kinds of any is somehow easier to observe; if DEness and modals are the two major licensing contexts for
any, then NPI and FC any are generally in complementary distribution. PPI some and epistemic indefinite
some on the other hand overlap more in their distribution (e.g., the following are both fine: Lisa married
someone / Lisa married some guy).
31

Following Guerzoni and Sharvit (2007) and others, the “nucleus” refers to the material following the whphrase.
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Guerzoni and Sharvit (2007) observe that weak NPIs like any and ever are licensed only in certain interrogative environments. For example, any is acceptable in wh-questions embedded under wonder (32a), and for
some speakers under know (32b), but not under realize or surprise (32c,d).

(32)

Embedded wh-questions
a. Sally wonders who brought any cake
b. %Sally knows who brought any cake32
c. *Sally realized which students brought any cake
d. *It surprised Sally which students brought any cake

Guerzoni and Sharvit propose that what licenses weak NPIs in questions is the property of strong exhaustivity. The strong/weak exhaustivity distinction is exemplified as follows:

(33)

Sally knows who brought cake.
a. Weakly exhaustive reading: For every x, if x brought cake, Sally knows that x brought cake.
b. Strongly exhaustive reading: For every x, if x brought cake, Sally knows that x brought
cake, and if x didn’t bring cake, Sally knows that x didn’t bring cake.

The strongly exhaustive reading in (33) is available because it is possible for Sally to know both of the x’s
who brought cake that they brought cake and of the x’s who didn’t bring cake that they didn’t bring cake.
While wonder provides a strongly exhaustive environment, know exhibits inter-speaker variation (the
authors report that those who can access the strongly exhaustive reading accept the NPI licensing in (32b)),
and surprise does not support a strongly exhaustive reading.33 Polar questions are inherently strongly exhaustive, so the NPIs in the polar questions in (29) and (30) are also correctly predicted to be acceptable.
32

Following Guerzoni and Sharvit (2007), % indicates inter-speaker variation in judgments.

33

Surprise can license NPIs in declaratives, and has been argued to be Strawson-DE (von Fintel, 1999).
Wh-questions embedded under surprise however are neither strongly exhaustive nor Strawson-DE, and
thus do not license NPIs.
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Nicolae (2013) provides an explanation of these facts (and of NPI licensing in questions more generally), extending Chierchia’s exhaustification-based approach. For her, question-embedding predicates semantically subcategorize for either weakly or strongly exhaustive questions. Unlike weakly exhaustive questions, strongly exhaustive questions have a null only operator adjoined at the level of the question nucleus,
which associates with the trace of the wh-phrase. The result is that NPIs are acceptable only in strongly exhaustive questions because in these cases the question nucleus creates a Strawson-DE environment.34 In
other words, Nicolae’s is a unified approach to NPI licensing in declaratives and questions: in either case,
licensing is satisfied via O-exhaustification.
Given that there is a single NPI any that is licensed the same way in declaratives and questions (i.e. via
exhaustification of subdomain alternatives), this analysis gives rise to the prediction that once children acquire the semantics of any, they should be able to use any in both declaratives and questions.35 Let us see if
this prediction is borne out.
There are, to my knowledge, only two previously reported acquisition studies of NPIs in questions, one
of which we reviewed in Chapter 3. Thornton (1995) examined children’s comprehension of any in questions and found adult-like comprehension by the age of 3;06. In Tieu (2010), I examined children’s spontaneous production of any and provided evidence for the concurrent emergence of any in declaratives and
questions. Of the 40 children I examined, four produced at least 15 instances of NPI any in questions and at
least 15 instances of NPI any in declaratives. For these four children, there was no statistically significant
chronological gap between the onset of any in one environment and the onset of any in the other (by Binomial Test). The chronological gap between the onset of any in the two constructions is consistent with concurrent emergence, suggesting that once the children know how to use any in one environment (e.g., in declaratives), they also know how to use it in the other (e.g., in interrogatives).
One final thing to note is that it may not be surprising that children catch onto licensing in questions; a
look at samples of parental input reveals that children get fairly robust evidence that any can be licensed in
34

The licensing is therefore parallel to the case of NPIs licensed by the overt only in declaratives, as in
Only John ate anything.
35 A prerequisite

of course is that the children must also have interrogative structures and semantics in

place.
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questions. Besides sentential negation in declaratives, the next largest proportion of NPI any involves licensing in questions:

Table 5. NPI any in the input
Corpus

Total
utterances

Total NPI any

Licensing by
sentential negation

Licensing in questions

Kuczaj (Abe’s father)

12,753

125
(=.98% of all
utterances)

81
(=64.8% of all NPI
any)

38
(=30.4% of all NPI
any)

Lara (Lara’s mother)

78,701

423
(=.54% of all
utterances)

342
(=80.85% of all NPI
any)

69
(=16.31% of all NPI
any)

In sum, children’s acquisition of any is consistent with a unified treatment of licensing in both declaratives
and questions.

6.

Conclusion

This dissertation has examined the acquisition of a particular PSI, namely any. Chapter 2 began the dissertation by identifying the target set of knowledge underlying any, including both structural and semantic kinds
of information. Chapter 3 argued that previous studies targeted only one half of the story. The experiments
presented in Chapters 3 and 4 presented the other half of the story: children in fact can be shown to demonstrate incredibly sophisticated semantic knowledge of polarity sensitivity. The sophistication of their knowledge is made all the more remarkable when we consider the (paucity of the) evidence that is available to
them in the input. While children receive positive evidence for any’s restricted distribution, they do not receive evidence for a number of semantic properties and mechanisms that are part and parcel of the polarity
sensitivity system: activation of subdomain alternatives, exhaustification of alternatives, and contrastive focus. Chapter 5 identified the starkness of the learning problem through an examination of parental speech
samples, and then proposed one way that children could, despite absence of direct evidence for these semantic mechanisms in the input, nevertheless arrive at the target grammar. By expanding our view beyond any
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single PSI, to more generally consider polarity sensitivity as a complex system derivable from a finite set of
lexical parameters, we can capture not only variation within the polarity sensitivity system (as well as crosslinguistic variation), I argue we can also explain the learnability of PSIs.
More generally speaking, when considering the acquisition of semantics, one may have the perhaps naïve impression that in this domain (i.e. the domain of meaning, as opposed to syntax), children might be able
to depend more heavily, or more exclusively on evidence in the input. After all, how can the child come to
know the meaning of any word without hearing it in use, in appropriate contexts? But ultimately the data
reviewed and presented in this dissertation lead us to the conclusion that in fact the context may not be sufficient at all, for many aspects of semantics. It is my hope that I have provided some compelling evidence that
the input is simply not rich enough to derive all the semantic knowledge of polarity sensitivity that children
can be shown to have. Even in the acquisition of semantics, we need to assume some innate machinery,
which can generate an accordingly constrained space of possible hypotheses for the learner to entertain. At
the same time, as I have tried to elaborate on in Sections 3 and 4, there is learning involved, and much work
needs to be done in order to better understand the process by which this learning takes place. In the case of
polarity sensitivity, I have suggested that the learner must be keyed to certain properties and distributional
patterns in the input. It is by identifying signature patterns of distribution in the input that the learner can
map a superficial string to an underlying category, given a sufficiently constrained hypothesis space.
To conclude, this dissertation has taken as its target of study the acquisition of the semantics of a particular PSI, i.e. any, in a particular language, i.e. English. But the proposal we have put forth should be able to
be extended to the development and acquisition of other PSIs, in other languages, given the theoretical tools
provided within an analysis such as Chierchia (2013). Although I have tried to be very precise in my object
of study, what we have ultimately examined is how children acquire some very complex, sophisticated semantic knowledge concerning a rather complex system. The polarity sensitivity system is one that blurs the
line between grammar and logic, and in choosing to focus on the development of a particular PSI, it is my
hope that this study has more generally furthered our understanding of how children acquire logic within the
grammar.
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